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Abstract 
The primary aim of this thesis was to understand some of the factors that make an 
individual more likely to ascribe to conspiracy theories. Ascription to conspiracy theories 
was conceptualised dimensionally along a continuum labelled Conspiracy Theory Affinity 
(CTA). Strong CTA reflects both a high level of belief in conspiracy theories and a 
tendency to create conspiracy theories (conspiracy theorising). To gauge this, I measured 
level of conspiracy belief, conspiracy pattern perception (conspiracy theory creation), as 
well as various forms of psychopathology. The findings of the psychopathology study 
(study 4) suggested that high conspiracy theory affinity individuals are more likely to 
present with high levels of paranoia, delusion, general mental pathology, as well as a high 
level and range of schizotypal traits. 
The conspiracy theory literature has also suggested that a lack of control is 
germane to development and maintenance of the tendency to believe in conspiracy 
theories (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Groh, 1987; Hofstadter, 
1965; Leman, 2007; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Swami et al., 2013; Sullivan et 
al., 2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). The literature also suggests that one 
compensatory strategy commonly used to re-establish a semblance of control is illusory 
pattern perception. Illusory pattern perception or Apophenia, is when unrelated stimuli 
(either visual or situational) are perceived to be connected in some meaningful way. 
Therefore, I also sought to establish if a direct link between illusory pattern perception 
and CTA actually exists. In studies 1 and 2 I experimentally induced a sense of low 
control using methods that have proven effective in previous research. The findings of 
these studies suggested that a lack of control does not necessarily reflect that a person is 
more likely to engage in conspiracy pattern perception. However, the findings also 
suggested that when a low level of control is felt by an individual who also has a magical 
thinking style, they are more likely to demonstrate illusory visual pattern perception. 
Limitations of these studies and therefore their potential influence on interpretations of 
the findings were also considered.  
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Another major research aim of this thesis was to elucidate how society perceives 
conspiracy theorists and how those with strong CTA perceive the label of conspiracy 
theorist. The findings of two studies (studies 3b and 5) revealed that the majority of 
respondents considered conspiracy theorists to be characteristically similar to those with 
current mental health concerns and also convicted criminals, and dissimilar to targets 
with resolved mental health issues and no current mental health issues (e.g. the average 
man). In contrast however, those with strong CTA rated the target Conspiracy Theorist 
significantly more favourably than those with low CTA.  
Theoretical and clinical implications of these findings across these 5 studies are 
discussed, and methodological limitations are also acknowledged.  
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Preface 
 As a clinical psychologist in training, a particular interest of mine has been 
understanding the reasoning style of subsets of the wider population, and how this 
interacts with potential psychopathology. One such interest group is commonly referred 
to as “conspiracy theorists”. In chapter one I reviewed the existing literature on the 
subject of conspiracy theorists and conspiracy theories. I started this review by discussing 
why the research of conspiracy theorists is important. According to the literature 
conspiracy theories can be highly influential and therefore can alter the way people 
behave and also how they feel towards authority. An important aspect of chapter one is 
also the specification of conspiracy theory affinity, or the dimensional variation in 
conspiracy theory belief and conspiracy theory creation. I also considered the various 
facets of conspiracy theories including their content, structure, and the function they 
serve for those who believe them. The research has also discussed the responsibilities 
conspiracy theorists believe they have once they have identified a conspiracy, and this 
literature is also outlined in chapter one. I also included a brief review of how conspiracy 
theory affinity has been measured in the past to give some context to the problematic 
issues around considering conspiracy theory belief and conspiracy theory creation 
synonymously. Finally, in the first chapter I outlined to the extant literature on the 
personality variables associated with conspiracy theory belief in past research.   
The main basis of most of the conspiracy theory literature has been that those 
who believe them tend to be those who perceive low personal control. Thus I reviewed 
the relevant literature on how low control can affect individuals, and what strategies are 
employed to restore a sense of control. Two key compensatory strategies are outlined: 
causal explanations, and illusory pattern perception. Illusory pattern perception is a 
phenomenon whereby the perceiver makes meaningful connections between unrelated 
stimuli. According to researchers illusory pattern perception can occur in both the visual 
and situational realms. Therefore, I investigated the attributional style and potential 
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illusory pattern perception in low and high control conditions, and then examined this in 
relation to conspiracy theory belief and conspiracy theory creation.   
When reviewing the conspiracy theory literature, I stumbled upon some fairly 
strong and negative sentiments about conspiracy theorists both in academic circles, but 
also by the public on the world wide web. Thus a key concern for my research became to 
explore the stereotype people tend to have about conspiracy theorists. I measured 
stereotypes for conspiracy theorists and twelve other targets using the semantic 
differential technique, and descriptors used in the conspiracy theory literature, as well as 
in previous semantic differential research. I expected to find empirical support for what I 
had anecdotally found on the internet but also found in academic literature, that is, that 
the label of conspiracy theorist carries significant stigma. In fact, I predicted that people 
would tend to perceive conspiracy theorists as more similar to those with current mental 
health issues than those without current mental health issues. The findings of this study 
provided the foundation for which I could build my next study.  
In the fourth chapter I reviewed the literature on delusional thinking and 
schizotypal traits, as both have been associated with conspiracy theory belief in previous 
research. Next in the chapter I draw conceptual parallels between these forms of 
psychopathology and conspiracy belief and make predictions about how psychopathology 
may be related to various strengths of conspiracy theory affinity. In study four I divided 
my sample by according to how plausible participants thought the conspiracy theories 
they were presented with were; and also by their tendency to create conspiracy theories. 
The findings are then discussed in relation to previous research in this field. I was also 
really interested in examining how those who think conspiracy theories are plausible, and 
who also create conspiracy theories stereotype the label of conspiracy theorist. 
In the final chapter I present a general discussion of the key findings of my 
research, but also how theories about conspiracy theory belief and creation can account 
for my findings. I also considered the theoretical and clinical implications of my findings, 
as well as acknowledging methodological limitations of this research.  
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Chapter One 
The Facets of Conspiracy Theories 
 
“Our cause is a secret within a secret, a secret that only another 
secret can explain, it is a secret about a secret that is veiled by a 
secret.” 
 -Ja’far as Sadiq (6th Imam) 
 
Introduction 
Why Study Conspiracy Theorists? 
One of the most polarising issues in our recent history has been who was 
responsible for the 9/11 collapse of the World Trade Centre twin towers. Twelve 
years on and we appear to be no closer to consensus about what took place on that 
fateful day (Keniston & Follansbee Quinn, 2013; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2010). Official reports ascribe responsibility to Al Qaeda, an Islamic 
terrorist group, however, approximately a third of the American population reject 
this account as accurate (Hargrove, 2006). In fact, a number of theories suggest that 
the American Government were actively involved in the attack or did nothing to 
stop it (Mole, 2006; Swami et al., 2010). Both the rejection of official accounts and 
also the propagation of alternative explanations suggest a significant level of distrust 
in Governmental transmission of accurate information to the public (Swami et al., 
2013). These unofficial accounts have been largely been deigned conspiracy 
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theories (CTs) generated by “otherwise intelligent people” (Mole, 2006). Certainly 
9/11 is not the only significant event to have sparked CTs: the assassination of John 
F Kennedy, the death of Princess (of Wales) Diana, Watergate, widespread AIDS in 
African nations and so on have also elicited CTs. CTs also exist for beliefs where a 
specific event or situation can not necessarily be identified, for instance, that a New 
World Order is planning to take over the planet’s most precious assets, the 
existence of the Illuminati/Elders of Zion, the Rothschild family’s financing major 
conflicts across history and so on (Newton, 2006).  
 History has shown us is that when a firmly held CT remains unverified and 
is transmitted across a community it can result in rejection of public policy and 
instilment of fear of health-giving medical discoveries. A prominent example of this 
was seen in 2001when South African President Thabo Mbeki (with the support of 
the then South African Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang) banned the 
dispensation of anti-retroviral medications to South African public hospitals. 
President Mbeki claimed that a conspiracy was at play where scientists were in 
league with the pharmaceutical industry, who he believed were exaggerating the 
link between Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in a bid to profit from an increase in anti-
retroviral sales. He further suggested that the conspirators were covering up 
information about the supposed toxic side effects of the anti-retrovirals, which he 
believed in and of itself could cause the symptoms associated with (AIDS).  The 
result of this Governmental action led to the deaths of thousands of South Africans 
(Grebe & Nattrass, 2012; Nattrass, 2005; Nattrass, 2012).  
African-American resistance to public health policy efforts also illustrates 
how CT belief can affect public well-being. Many African-Americans believe that 
contraceptives are a form of genocide against their ethnicity (Bird & Bogart, 2005). 
Research indicates that African-Americans who believe this and related CTs are 
3 
 
less likely to use birth control, placing themselves at significant risk of sexually 
transmitted diseases (such as AIDS) and unwanted pregnancies (Bates, 1990; Bird & 
Bogart, 2003; Bird & Bogart, 2005; Ross, Essien, & Torres, 2006; Thorburn & Bogart, 
2005). Related research has also found that in a sample of men who have sex with 
other men, 86% (comprised of more respondents from ethnic minorities than white 
respondents) were likely to endorse at least one HIV/AIDS CT, including ones 
relating to distrust of information about HIV/AIDS provided by public health 
providers (Hutchison, Begley, Sullivan, Clark, Boyett, & Kellerman, 2007). 
Therefore, HIV/AIDS prevention programmes run by the Government are less 
likely to be effective if Government are untrusted as a source of information and 
are held in ill-faith.  
Goertzel (2010) provides other examples of how CTs have affected human 
wellbeing in the past. For example, in 2002 in the midst of severe famine, southern 
African Governments (of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Malawi) refused 
food relief supplies from the United States which they believed to be genetically 
modified (Zerbe, 2004). Another CT was that the United States Government was 
complicit in concealing evidence from the public that mercury in childhood 
vaccinations (e.g measles-mumps-rubella vaccine) can cause autism (Wallace, 
2009). This led to a downtrend in parents vaccinating their children, and a 
consequent increase in childhood disease (Goertzel, 2010).  
What the above examples illustrate is that the consequences of CTs being 
held with much conviction, but with little evidence to their veracity, can have dire 
consequences for human wellbeing. This is particularly so when the CTs have gone 
unverified yet engender distrust of publically elected Government officials, 
rejection of public health policy, and ultimately places the lives of thousands of 
people at stake. Deparle (1990) discusses CTs as destructive beliefs that lead people 
to alienate themselves from society.  
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Research has investigated belief in a variety of CTs (Bates, 1990; Clarke, 
2002; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; Harrison & Thomas, 1997; McCauley 
& Jacques, 1979, McHoskey, Miller, 2002; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & 
Furnham, 2009; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010). Early research of 
this area considered the personality factors and thinking style most commonly 
associated with CT belief (Abalakina-Paap, Stephen, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; 
Grzesiak-Feldman & Kaminska-Feldman, 2005). However, there is much debate 
surrounding the nature of conspiracy theorists, and whether believing in CTs 
should be considered a form of psychopathology (Groh, 1987; Hofstadter, 1965; 
Mirowsky & Ross, 1983; Jameson, 1991; Pipes, 1997; Melley, 2000; Bale, 2007; 
Aupers, 2012; Moritz et al., 2012; Wulff, 1987). Some researchers have proposed 
that belief in conspiracies can to some extent be considered a collective delusion 
(Groh, 1987), and therefore is a phenomenon seen in groups, whereas other have 
argued that conspiracy thinking can also be held at the individual level (Freeman, 
Garety, Bebbington, Smith, Rollinson, Fowler et al., 2005). For instance, Zukier 
(1987) considers that in essence CTs are intergroup phenomena, whereby they are 
held by a solidarity, they operate in solidarity, and are against solidarity. That is, 
according to Zukier (1987), CTs are typically held by a group of people, who 
believe that conspiracies are perpetrated by another group of people against them. 
Other researchers have suggested that CTs can be considered a severe threat belief 
whereby an individual perceives that they are at high risk of being grievously 
harmed (Freeman et al., 2005). Clarke (2002) presented an integrated view which 
considers both individual and collective levels, proposing that CTs tend to start 
with an individual, and are then culturally transmitted until they become a belief 
held by a collective.  
Despite suggestion that psychopathology may be implicated in CT belief 
(e.g. Hofstadter, 1966) little research has empirically investigated this notion 
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(Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Swami et al., 2013). The present thesis 
investigates to what extent CT belief can be accounted for by psychopathology; and 
also the perceptual style implicated in endorsement and generation of CTs. 
Research attention has also focused on another interpretation which is that CT 
belief serves a rational function, and is therefore is not necessarily pathological 
(Pratt, 2003; Raab, Ortlieb, Auer, Guthmann, & Carbon, 2013; Sunstein & 
Vermeule, 2009; Swami et al., 2013; Waters, 1997; Zonis & Joseph, 1994). For 
instance, Swami et al. (2013) states that “…CTs offer a coherent explanation for 
phenomena that is not otherwise forthcoming” (p. 71).  
Some authors also contend that CT research is an important way to explore 
how humans generate and maintain theoretical explanations (Keeley, 1999). Indeed 
researchers have suggested that CTs operate similarly to other forms of theoretical 
explanation whereby an event is perceived, and in order to explain the event, 
hypotheses are generated (Graumann & Moscovici, 1987). Therefore, the present 
thesis is also intended to shed some light on the factors that make a person more 
likely to engage in this particular form of theoretical explanation, and under what 
circumstances.  
Another considerable gap in the extant CT literature is any purposeful 
distinction between CT believers compared to those who generate CTs. In this 
thesis I work towards somewhat distinguishing between these variations, in the 
hope that readers of this body of work may come to slowly tease apart some of the 
differentiating factors between various degrees if CT ascription.  
Belief in CTs has been researched worldwide (Byford & Billig, 2001; de 
Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Grebe & Nattrass, 2012; 
Goertzel, 1994; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2007; Grzesiak-Feldman & Suzek, 2008, 
Nattrass, 2005; Nattrass, 2012; Swami et al., 2011; Zonis & Joseph, 1994), with the 
popularity of CTs varying depending on the location of the sample studied. Whilst 
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the majority of CT research relates to American CTs, research has also been 
conducted across other cultures including in the Middle East (Zonis & Joseph, 
1994), Africa (Grebe & Nattrass, 2012; Nattrass, 2005; Nattrass, 2012), Asia (Swami, 
2012), and Europe (Byford & Billig, 2001; de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Douglas & 
Sutton, 2008; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2007; Grzesiak-Feldman & Suzek, 2008; Stieger, 
Gumhalter, Tran, Voracek, & Swami, 2013; Swami et al., 2011). As an example, 
Goertzel (1994) found that 21.1% of his American New Jersey sample believed that 
at least two of the CTs presented to them (mostly about topics relevant to the 
United States of America in the early 1990’s, with two of them having scope outside 
America also) were true, 19.1% believed at least three CTs, where 6.2% did not 
believe that any of the CTs were true. This pattern of findings suggests that in 
Goertzel’s (1994) sample, belief in presented CTs was more common than non-
belief. Therefore, CT belief is a phenomenon that occurs often enough to warrant 
attention and research. No research on the presence or popularity of CTs in 
Aotearoa New Zealand has been published. Therefore the present thesis will be a 
considerable contribution to the CTs research pool, and how conspiracy theorizing 
presents in New Zealand. 
 Having thus far discussed the rationale for CT research, I now seek to clarify 
the distinction between CT believers and those who create CTs. I then turn my 
attention to discussion of what distinguishes a CT from other forms of theoretical 
explanation, what happens after one adopts a CT, how CT belief is measured, and 
also the personality variables found to correlate with CT belief.   
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The Dimensionality of Conspiracy Theory Affinity 
The literature largely uses the ideas of conspiracy belief and conspiracy 
theorists interchangeably; when in fact there may some differentiating aspects to 
consider. I am proposing that CT belief and CT generation could reasonably be 
conceived as continuous in nature (as opposed to categorical). For instance, it does 
not appear to make sense to consider someone who believes one CT as synonymous 
with an individual who believes many CTs and also creates CTs. In this body of 
work I have conceptualised these two aspects along a continuum (Figure 1) I refer 
to as Conspiracy Theory Affinity (CTA). CTA refers to the degree of affinity one 
feels with CTs, whether in relation to belief alone, or belief and CT generation. 
More specifically, those who believe CTs but do not create them sit lower on the 
continuum; whereas those who believe in and generate CTs sit higher on the 
continuum. There are also likely to be shades of variation between these two 
positions on the continuum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conspiracy Theory Affinity (CTA) conceptualised along a continuum.  
 
As previous research has never identified the continuous nature of CTA (e.g. 
Bale, 2007; Banas & Miller, 2013; Clarke, 2002; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 
2010; Goldberg, 2004; Keeley, 1999; Swami et al., 2010), it is hard to discern which 
pieces of research were intended to account for CT belief versus CT creation. For 
the purposes of this thesis, I will not seek to change the terminology used when 
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No belief in CTs 
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referring to previous research. However, when regarding the current research I will 
clearly identify when I am discussing CT belief versus CT creation.  
My next key discussion note is identifying what is actually meant when 
someone refers to a “conspiracy theorist”. As argued above, CT belief and CT 
creation are not one and the same. I have come to consider conspiracy theorists as 
those who create CTs, and those who only believe in CTs to be CT believers. My 
conceptualisation of CTA as continuous in nature, implies that conspiracy theorists 
are those who have strong CTA, meaning they must first believe CTs before 
themselves generating CTs. However, those who only believe in CTs are not 
conspiracy theorists.  
In this section I have talked about the variations in CTA. But what actually 
constitutes a CT? In a colloquial sense, this may seem obvious; however, empirical 
research has been conducted on the typical content of CTs, how they are 
structured, and the purpose or function they serve for the believers. Thus, before 
investigating how psychopathology may be related to conspiracy theorising, it is 
important to consider three key aspects of CTs. Such consideration will allow more 
integrated discussion of how psychopathology may develop as the result of or in the 
context of conspiracy theorising.  
 
Conspiracy Theories as a Construct 
Content 
Researchers have offered a number of definitions of conspiracies, conspiracy 
beliefs, and CTs, and have often used these terms interchangeably.  A conspiracy 
has most commonly been described as being composed of multiple elements 
including a number of agents (be they human or supernatural; actors) with covert 
goals (intention; Zonis & Joseph, 1994) which are malevolent in nature and which 
they seek to realise (behaviour; Zonis & Joseph, 1994). Other definitions also mirror 
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the notion of multiple agents, for instance Moscovici (1987) describes the idea of 
conspiracy as implying that “…members of a confession, party, or ethnicity (Jews, 
Freemasons, communists, pacifists, etc.) are united by an indissoluble secret bond” 
(p.154); and according to Pruitt (1987) “CT is the belief that a group of people is 
plotting to harm one’s interests” (p. 191). Further, Keeley (1999) has suggested that 
when a theory supposes that there is only one ‘conspirator’ involved, it does not 
hold up as a CT, but is merely a belief about the actions of one individual. Similarly, 
Moscovici (1987) has stated that conspiracy theorists will acknowledge a 
conspirator as an individual, but only to the extent that they have membership to 
an esoteric conspiratorial group, and their identity may either be overt or covert.  
Keeley’s (1999) full definition asserts that a CT attempts to explain the cause 
of historical event(s) set into motion by a small group of agents working in secret. 
Kruglanski (1987) also details that a CT is an “elaborate schema” (p. 219) where 
there are a number of actors with a common goal to plot against another group, also 
referred to as Masada syndrome (Kruglanski, 1987). CTs have also been thought of 
as explanations about explanations (meta-explanations), used when one seeks to 
make sense of a situation (Swami et al., 2013). Synthesis of these definitions has led 
me to consider CTs as a form of explanation, where multiple agents share a 
surreptitious intention, bond, or goal to cause harm to another group.   
However, according to Douglas and Sutton (2008), CTs can influence an 
individual’s attitudes without conscious awareness. Douglas and Sutton (2008) 
presented undergraduate students with five statements relating to the death of 
Princess (of Wales) Diana. Participants were required to rate their current 
agreement and retrospective (before reading the statements) agreement with each 
of the statements, as well as what they perceived the current and retrospective 
agreement with the statements to be for their classmates. Participants were 
accurate in their approximation of how much their classmates attitudes had 
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changed, but underestimated how much their own attitudes had changed (between 
pre-test and post-test agreement). Douglas and Sutton (2008) interpreted this 
phenomenon to be a consequence of people underestimating how easily they can 
be persuaded, compared to how easily others can be persuaded. This finding 
suggests belief in or creation of CTs is not necessarily a conscious strategy.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
According to Groh (1987), the content of CTs are generally irrational beliefs 
about real or paranormal malevolent forces causing harm to others. Thus, believers 
of CTs will often villanize the conspirators, attributing evil characteristics to their 
disposition and motives. Although Tobacyk and Milford’s (1983) definition of 
paranormal beliefs was not specific to CTs, theirs is the most commonly referred to 
definition in research on paranormal CTs. Their definition encompasses beliefs in 
“…religion, psi…, the occult, witchcraft, superstitions, the supernatural, and 
extraordinary and extraterrestrial life forms” (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983, p.1029). 
Jacques-Chaquin (1987) examined one of the earliest examples of conspiracy 
regarding the paranormal, that is, the witches’ conspiracy - an inquisition between 
the 15th and 17th centuries into allegations of the presence of a sect of witches. The 
conspirators, or witches, were considered to be those who had the ability to brew 
poisonous beverages, or cause actual harm to others by uttering a threat 
accompanied by some bodily gesture judged to be suspicious, which coincided with 
some undesirable event occurring. For example, stating that one day a particular 
woman will be sorry for her vanity, touching her cosmetics or hairbrush, and then 
that woman begins to lose her hair. The aim of the witches was to “ruin the human 
race, to sow destruction of material good, to murder, and commit all crimes against 
nature (sodomy, incest, cannibalism) destined to insult the laws of God and 
man…to the detriment of public interest and to the disadvantage of the honour of 
God” (Bodin, 1580;1979, p.7, as cited in Jacques-Chaquin, 1987). The motives of the 
witches were equated with those of demons, who work separately, but always with 
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the shared goal for the loss of souls (Institoris & Sprenger, 1486; 1973, as cited in 
Jacques-Chaquin, 1987). Jacques-Chaquin (1987) contends that such a group of 
witches never existed, and was a “conspiracy myth” (p.84) that he likened to an 
elaborate collective imagination or delusion that was transmitted over time (across 
two centuries) through literature. For many years now, CTs relating to unidentified 
flying objects and aliens have also been popular (Harrison & Thomas, 1997; Keeley, 
1999). 
Other (non-paranormal) CTs tend to revolve around societal factors such as 
politics, religion, celebrities, disease and so on. Such CTs number in the hundreds 
and so an exhaustive list will not be provided here. However, examples of common 
CTs include that Elvis Presley (Clarke, 2002) and Michael Jackson (Lee & Goh, 
2013) are still alive; that Princess Diana’s death was a planned attack (Douglas & 
Sutton, 2008); that the Trans World Airline flight 800 crash was the result of 
accidental US Navy misfire (Miller, 2002); that John F. Kennedy’s death was not the 
work of a lone assassin (Harrison & Thomas, 1997; McCauley & Jacques, 1979; 
McHoskey, 1995);  that AIDS is a man-made disease created with the intention of 
Genocide of Africans and Homosexuals (Bates, 1990; Goertzel, 1994); that the US 
Government is covering up intelligence they have on extra-terrestrial life 
(Goertzel, 1994; Harrison & Thomas, 1997); as well as numerous CTs relating to the 
9/11 downing of the twin towers (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2009; 
Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010). For a more comprehensive list of 
CTs see Newton (2006). 
 
Structure 
Conspiracy theorising has been considered to be similar to other forms of 
theorising, where an event is observed, and hypotheses are formulated to try and 
explain the causality and mechanisms operating within it (Graumann & Moscovici, 
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1987). Melley (2000) notes that CTs have broad explanatory power, with the ability 
to explain much within one theory. Melley (2000) suggests the explanatory power 
of CTs makes them highly attractive to those who are faced with some form of 
anxiety or crisis they need to explain. Researchers also contend that a theory that 
claims to explain everything, actually explains nothing (Graumann & Moscovici, 
1987; Kelley, 1999). Such explanatory breadth is virtually impossible, because the 
data that such theories are based on are unlikely to be all true (Keeley, 1999). 
According to researchers, because conspiracy thinking tends to be Manichean in 
nature (a battle between good and evil; Groh, 1987), so will be the theories 
espoused from such a thinking style.  
 Research has discussed how belief in conspiracies may be characterised as a 
generalised ideological trait, where an individual believing one particular CT is 
more likely to believe in other CTs (Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; 
Swami, et al., 2010). Additionally, personal relevance of the CTs may play a 
strengthening role in this framework. Goertzel (1994) found that African-American 
participants who believed in one CT to do with their ethnicity were more likely to 
believe in other CTs relevant to their particular ethnicity (“The American 
government deliberately put drugs into the inner city communities” - 62%; “The 
government deliberately spread the AIDS virus in the black community” - 31%; 
“The FBI was involved in the assassination of Martin Luther King” – 68%). These 
findings of Goertzel (1994) and similar studies have been interpreted in terms of 
monological belief systems (Swami et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013). Such belief 
systems are structured in a ‘closed’ manner, in that they do not interact with their 
context in a reciprocal manner (except in a very cursory way). As a consequence, 
this system does not adjust beliefs according to feedback loops or evidence counter 
to beliefs. This is as opposed to dialogical belief systems, which do actively engage 
in open and reciprocal style with their environment. Therefore, according to 
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Goertzel (1993) those who possess monological belief systems will apply the 
evidence for one CT as affirmation for other related CTs.  
Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, and Blaine (1999) offer an alternative 
explanation for belief in multiple CTs. These researchers suggest that in general the 
African-American community is more likely to endorse African-American 
discrimination CTs, whilst white Americans have a tendency to reject such CTs, 
because each respective racial group has more or less familiarity with such CTs. For 
instance, it is possible that African-Americans have more access to information 
about such CTs through storytelling and so on, whereas, non-African-Americans 
may need to actively exert more effort in order to access the same information (e.g. 
by looking it up on the internet or getting a book out of the library on the topic). 
Due to increased familiarity with such CTs, African-Americans may be slower to 
reject their validity compared to non-African- Americans who are less familiar 
with the idea of such discrimination (Crocker et al., 1999).   
 A theme that has received limited empirical attention has been how 
conspiracy theorists respond to evidence contradictory to their beliefs. For instance, 
according to Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) CTs “…[are] unusually hard to 
undermine or dislodge, they have a self-sealing quality, rendering them particularly 
immune to challenge” (p. 204). Similarly, Groh (1987) contends that the founding 
principles of CT beliefs are beyond the rationality and logic that can be applied to 
normal scientific thinking. Therefore, attempting to present scientific 
disconfirming evidence against paranormal CTs would not be seen as relevant by 
those who held those beliefs (Groh, 1987). Other research has suggested that 
conspiracy theorists do contemplate contradictory evidence, but rather than 
disregarding completely they accommodate for the contradiction by modifying 
their initial hypotheses, or creating ancillary ones that prevent their theories from 
being disproved (Clarke, 2002; Leman, 2007). Keeley (1999) furthers this notion, 
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suggesting that evidence against a CT can also actually serve in favour of the CT; 
with growing evidence against CTs as being considered evidence of how much 
authorities want the “official story” to be believed.  
 
Function 
Possibly the most important aspect of CTs is the function they serve for the 
conspiracy theorist. CTs are an attractive option for those faced with uncertainty, 
complexity, and powerlessness (Swami et al., 2013; Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 
2010). These functions can also be conceptualised as perpetuating factors for 
continued belief in CTs even in the face of disconfirming evidence. According to 
researchers (Groh, 1987; Melley, 2002; Swami et al., 2013; Uscinski, Parent, & 
Torres 2011) CTs can serve the purpose of making situations perceived as complex 
more manageable for the person holding the belief. This is done by reducing the 
complexity of the situation by using a simplified causal explanation to understand 
why an event has occurred, thus reducing the associated stress a person 
experiences, therefore giving one a sense of closure (Leman, 2007; Leman & 
Cinnirella, 2013). Furthermore, when a person has conflicting perceptions about an 
event, information they have received, or a behaviour they are considering, CTs 
can mitigate this internal dissonance and subsequent stress the person experiences 
(Desantis & Morgan, 2004). Earlier in this chapter I cited research where birth 
control CTs in African-American samples were found to be a barrier to participants 
engaging in safe sex practices (Bird & Bogart, 2003; Bird & Bogart, 2005; Ross, 
Essien, & Torres, 2006; Thorburn & Bogart, 2005). It is possible to apply cognitive 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Festinger, 1972) to this example. Individuals in 
the samples who prefer to have unprotected sex may also at the same time 
experience cognitive discomfort having received information about sexually 
transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy. Ascribing to birth control CTs may 
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alleviate this cognitive discomfort, and these individuals will hence be more likely 
to engage in risky sexual behaviour (unprotected sex) (Desantis & Morgan, 2004).  
Early attributional frameworks (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Rotter, 1966; 
Rotter, 1990; Weiner et al., 1971; Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976) are still 
prominent theories in psychological and sociological research today (Weiner, 
2008). Of particular relevance to our discussion here, attribution theory has been 
applied to CT research to offer an explanation as to how conspiracy theorists 
perceive causality for the events which cause them concern (Clarke, 2002; Harvey 
& Weary, 1984; Kelley & Michela, 1980; Kruglanski, 1987). A key notion 
underlying why people make attributions is that humans have an innate need to 
explain (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Heider, 1958; Katz, 1960; Kay, Gaucher, 
McGregor, & Nash, 2010; McCauley & Jacques, 1979; Salt, 2008). This need is even 
more pronounced when an individual experiences a sense of powerlessness and 
develops a motivation to re-establish a sense of control (Clarke, 2002; Melley, 
2002). Explanations of causality curtail the aversive nature of low subjective 
control, because it offers some form of understanding of why or how a situation has 
come about (Clarke, 2002). Being able to provide some form of explanation, even if 
at first it seems ridiculous, is a preferred state to feeling powerless (Swami & Coles, 
2010). In accordance with this contention, Pittman and Pittman (1980) reported 
that following an experience of low-control an individual is more likely to try and 
infer causality. It was concluded that causal inference is a strategy for enhancing 
sense of personal control.  
The extant literature describes two key ways in which one could attribute 
causality for an event. First, one could explain the cause of an event to lie with the 
disposition (internal factors) of a person (e.g. personality factors), or situational 
(external) factors (e.g. economic factors; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Rotter, 1966; 
Rotter, 1990). Clarke (2002) suggests that people will usually employ only one of 
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these attribution types at a time, although there are times when they may 
incorporate both to explain a situation. A phenomenon known as the fundamental 
attribution bias is considered a natural and cognitively-wired response to the 
environment (Harvey & Weary, 1984; Clarke 2002). This bias reflects the tendency 
that most people will overestimate the influence that dispositional factors have on 
an event occurring; and at the same time underestimate the influence that 
situational factors have on that event occurring (social judgement bias). This error 
has been reliably replicated a number of times (see Harvey & Weary, 1984 for a 
review). According to Clarke (2002) CTs are inherently theories about the 
disposition of the conspirators. That is, the conspirators, whoever they may be, 
have the intention and personality to carry out the conspiratorial action(s). Because 
the fundamental attribution error is such a reflexive and embedded response, giving 
up a dispositional explanation (e.g. CTs) for a more situational-based one is very 
cognitively effortful (Andrews, 2001). Additionally, as previously described, those 
who believe in conspiracies are not always explicitly aware of their beliefs; 
therefore, renouncing a CT is not always possible (Clarke, 2002; Douglas & Sutton, 
2008).  
Other researchers (Abalakina-Paap, 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Nefes, 2012; 
Volkan, 1985) have come to understand that anomia (feeling alienated from 
society) can account for the blame attribution seen in conspiracy theorists. In fact, 
in these studies, the biggest predictors of belief in the CTs presented was found to 
be (in order) anomie, minority group status, and lack of interpersonal trust. 
According to Melley (2000) one of the functions of CTs is to protect one’s own 
integrity from the social order/society – to understand one’s own position in 
relation to society. And thus Melley (2000) suggests that the process of conspiracy 
theorising is synonymous with regarding oneself as in opposition with society.  
Therefore, anomie can be understood as a general sense of alienation, or distance 
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between oneself to others, i.e. feeling a low level of integration with society (Srole, 
1956). Therefore those who experience anomie will feel discontent towards the 
system in which they exist, and some will seek a way to restore balance to their 
world by way of a CT. CTs allow the anomic individual to ascribe blame to a 
specific entity outside themselves, thereby making them feel less vulnerable to the 
unknown; thus enhancing or maintaining their perception of one’s own integrity. 
Srole (1956) hypothesised that anomie is a trait that can develop as a result of 
sociological processes, such as belonging to a disadvantaged societal group (e.g. a 
minority group of some kind).  
Previous research has also aimed to understand the underpinnings and 
mechanisms of conspiracy theorising by focusing on the heuristics and inferences 
that conspiracy theorists utilize in order to claim a conspiracy. For instance, studies 
(Le Boeuf & Norton, 2012; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; McCauley & Jacques, 1979) 
have found evidence for the ‘major event-major cause’ paradigm, where people 
tend to endorse a major cause for major events, and similarly, minor causes for 
minor events (e.g. the assassination of a president is more likely to be seen as a 
result of a CT compared to a scenario where the president is attacked but survives). 
These researchers suggest that explanations for major events where only minor 
causes are offered are harder for some people to accept because they require 
consistency between cause and effect (McCauley & Jacques, 1979). For example, 
John F. Kennedy’s death was officially reported to be the work of a lone assassin, 
however, conspiracy theorists tend to reject the lone assassin explanation in favour 
of theories that one or more groups were responsible for his death (e.g. the CIA, 
FBI, Mafia etc; McHoskey, 1995). That is, a minor explanation that one person 
murdered John F. Kennedy tends to be rejected (by conspiracy theorists) in favour 
of a major explanation that the murder was the work of a group. 
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It is also important to note that whilst there are a number of unverified CTs 
in circulation, there is also evidence that some conspiracies really have taken place. 
One example is the Watergate scandal of the 1970’s where US President Nixon and 
his administration were found guilty of organising a series of break-ins of the 
Democratic Party’s headquarters in order to install listening devices. The revelation 
of President Nixon’s involvement led to his later resignation (de Haven-Smith, 
2010). Another substantiated CT is known as the Iran-Contra Affair (Keeley, 1999). 
In the 1980’s, claims of conspiracy emerged in Beirut that the Reagan 
administration sold missiles to Iran in exchange for U.S hostages held in Lebanon. 
A portion of the proceeds from the sale of these arms were channelled towards 
financial support of a Nicaraguan rebel group (Banks, 1987; Cavender, Jurik, & 
Cohen, 1993). The Reagan administration initially denied these events had taken 
place, vowing that they stood by Governmental pledge to never negotiate with 
terrorists, and also prohibition of U.S financial aid to the civil war in Nicaragua. 
Congress investigated the allegations and was able to provide evidence that both 
counts of wrong-doing by the administration had taken place (Banks, 1987; 
Cavender et al., 1993).   
There is also reason to suggest that some CT belief is founded on historical 
evidence of maltreatment towards some groups. For instance, a well-established 
finding is that African-Americans are more likely believe CTs relating to the 
targeting of their race compared to white Americans (Goertzel, 1994). Belief in CTs 
by African-Americans may have been predisposed by their awareness of the 
Tuskegee syphilis study (Thomas & Quinn, 1991). In this study by the Tuskegee 
Institute (which was conducted with the active support of the U.S Public Health 
Service) across approximately 40 years, the progression of naturally occurring 
syphilis in a group of African-American men was tracked (Thomas & Quinn, 1991). 
The men in the study agreed to participate but were misled about the purpose of 
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the study, and thus were not given sufficient information to provide informed 
consent. Participants who were afflicted with syphilis were often not notified of 
their illness, and treatment of the condition was intentionally withheld from 600 
men so as to track the natural progression of the disease (Bates, 1990). Furthermore, 
incentives for participation were advertised such as free medical exams, free meals, 
and burial insurance (Thomas & Quinn, 1991). Knowledge of the inequality 
African-Americans were afflicted by as result of the actions of the Public Health 
Service in the case of the Tuskegee syphilis study, may serve to undermine trust in 
the US Government; thus making CTs about the intended genocide of African-
American’s through AIDS seem more plausible (Thomas & Quinn, 1991). 
An important lesson to be taken from the aftermath of the Tuskegee syphilis 
study and the Watergate scandal is that CTs can make people question the motives 
of their chosen representatives in Government. Petitioning Governments to be 
transparent in their processes could lead to a reduction in unethical behaviour, 
greater accountability to the public (Sasson, 1995), and hence possibly a reduction 
in mistrust of authority.  
In sum, CTs are multifaceted forms of explanation whereby they typically 
relate to perceived clandestine mal-intentions by one group towards another. They 
have been conceptualised as generalised ideological traits, where belief in one CT 
increases the likelihood of belief in other CTs. CT believers can also consider 
evidence for one CT as evidence for other CTs. CTs are also malleable, where they 
will accommodate disconfirming evidence in a way that supports the CT.  But once 
a CT has been adopted, what happens then? According to Moscovici (1987), 
conspiracy theorists will tend to believe that they are privy to certain information, 
and that with this knowledge come certain responsibilities they must act out.  
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The Duties of Conspiracy Theorists 
 Even though the CTs people believe in may not be factually realistic or 
evidentially substantiated, the conspiracy theorist may still affectively respond to 
the CT as if it were real, for instance with anxiety (Zukier, 1987). Once a CT belief 
has been adopted, another response can be a burgeoning sense of responsibility, 
because of the self-perception that they have unique insight and knowledge about 
the CTs (Moscovici, 1987).  
Moscovici (1987) outlined two key responsibilities of being a conspiracy 
theorist, the first of which is to make the existence of this conspiracy known to 
others. The only instance in which this would not be expected would be if 
outwardly endorsing the CT would interfere with the process of discovering the 
identity of the conspirators. According to Moscovici (1987), if the masses (who are 
innocent) unite in their pursuit of the conspirators, the conspirators are more likely 
to be discovered. Only once the identity of the conspirators has been discovered 
can they be conquered or attacked. This is an idea that Keeley (1999) also supports. 
As a consequence, these malevolent beings (the conspirators) end up becoming the 
minority and thus their power diminishes. The most common form of attack on 
conspirators is to directly accuse them of the suspected conspiracy, for which they 
must be persecuted and atone for in some way (Moscovici, 1987). Once the 
conspirators have been reduced to an identified minority they will be demonised. 
This process becomes allowable in the minds of conspiracy theorists as a result of 
heavy focus on the differences between themselves and the conspirators. Thus 
widening the perceived distance between the two groups, appears to make it 
acceptable for conspiracy theorists to depart from the typical societal norms and no 
longer treat conspirators as humans. Thus “to insult them, to rob them, even to 
exterminate them is not a crime but a merit” (Moscovici, 1987, p. 167).  
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 Following on from this the second responsibility of the conspiracy theorist 
is to focus on the disposition of the conspirators, and emphasise how much they 
differ from the masses (Moscovici, 1987). Consideration of social identity theory 
(SIT; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979; Mugny & Papastamou, 1982) and intergroup 
behaviour can explain how self- and other- categorizations may operate to weaken 
the influence the conspirators have on the masses. That is, people tend to be less 
effectively influenced by those they do not identify with. People have a tendency 
to categorize themselves and others, forming ingroups and outgroups (Turner, et 
al., 1979; Mugny & Papastamou, 1982). In the case of CTs, the ingroup is the 
category where people will assign themselves and those they feel related to in some 
way, whereas an outgroup is the dissenting category. When members of an ingroup 
become aware of how they differ from the outgroup, they can develop a sense of 
competitiveness with the outgroup.  When an outgroup is identified and the 
psychosocial differences between the two groups are emphasised (Mugny & 
Papastamou, 1982), resentment for the outgroup can build (although according to 
Turner et al. this is not always the case), and this in itself can attenuate the power 
the outgroup has in influencing the ingroup’s behaviour and actions. The third 
obligation of the conspiracy theorist is to impel the ingroup to take action against 
the conspirators, although Moscovici (1987) does not appropriately elaborate on 
what this might entail; one could infer he was referring to the process of chastising 
the outgroup as described in the quote mentioned earlier.  
 
Measurement of Conspiracy Theory Affinity 
 CT belief has most commonly been measured using questionnaires 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Bogart & Thorburn, 2003; Crocker et al., 1999; 
Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010). Typically researchers in this field have devised 
their own measures of CT belief, rarely utilising CT belief tools developed by 
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others1. As a result little attention has been expended on the psychometric 
properties of these tools (other than internal consistency of items), and this 
introduces some challenges in drawing comparisons across studies. For instance, 
different CTs have been selected between the measures, or the similar CTs have 
been selected but with different wording (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). 
However, recently two research articles have published two measures of CT belief: 
the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, 
Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013); and the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS; 
Brotherton et al., 2013).  
 Both measures were designed with the purpose to measure general tendency 
to endorse CTs. The items of the measures are non-event based, meaning they may 
be appropriate for administration across a variety of cultures (Brotherton et al., 
2013). Both measures employ a Likert-type response scale where participants are 
required to indicate how likely they think each CT is. The key difference between 
the two measures is that the GCBS scale is comprised by 15 items, and the CMQ has 
only 5 items. The CMQ has also previously been used by Darwin et al. (2011), 
meaning that future use of this measure can allow for comparisons across time and 
cultures. Ideally, future research will seek to employ one of these measurement 
tools, where the psychometric properties have been investigated across culture and 
time.  
 To my knowledge only one study has considered measurement of CT 
creation (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Their study presented participants with three 
scenarios outlining events relating to a protagonist, and then in a later study events 
relating to the responder. Participants were then required to rate how likely they 
believed the events in each scenario were related to the outcome of the event (for 
                                               
1 Swami and colleagues have tended to use the same questionnaire devised by Swami et al. (2010) across 
later studies led by Swami; thus providing some basis for comparison across their research. 
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either the protagonist or responder). Whitson and Galinsky (2008) did not report 
any psychometric properties for their measure.  
 
Characteristics of Conspiracy Theorists 
 Using purpose-designed tools to measure CT belief, as described above, 
previous research has suggested that there are a set of personality variables that are 
correlated with CT belief. These individual differences include traits such as 
anomie/alienation (Abalakina-Paap, Stephen, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Goertzel, 1994; 
Hofstadter, 1954; Nefes, 2012), low interpersonal trust (Goertzel; Abalakina-Paap et 
al., 1999), authoritarianism (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), minority group status 
(Goertzel, 1994), paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005), low self-esteem (Abalakina-Paap et 
al., 1999), low sense of personal control (helplessness; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; 
Hofstadter, 1958;), hostility (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Moscovici, 1987), and an 
external locus of control (Clarke, 2002). In fact, the biggest predictors of belief in the 
CTs presented was found to be (in order) anomie, minority group status, and lack of 
interpersonal trust (Abalakina-Paap, 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Nefes, 2012; Volkan, 1985). 
Anomie was discussed earlier in this chapter, but now we turn to description of the 
other personality variables common among conspiracy theorists. 
 According to researchers (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; 
Moscovici, 1987) hostility and aggression can be useful for conspiracy theorists as it 
can provide a means for releasing pent-up negative tension. These researchers 
suggest that conspiracy theorists will channel their hostility toward targets they 
believe to be responsible for their personal disadvantage, or disadvantage for the 
group they belong to (e.g. ethnic minorities). Indeed Moscovici (1987) stated that 
“Resentment fuels the conspiracy mentality” (p. 640), reflecting that hostility could 
be considered both a contributing and maintaining factor for CT belief. Earlier in 
this chapter I discussed attributional research whereby CTs can be conceived as 
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explanations of causality (Clarke, 2002; Harvey & Weary, 1984; Kelley & Michela, 
1980; Kruglanski, 1987). According to Weiner (2010), a significant influence in the 
causal explanation process is emotions, further suggesting that anger can be a 
powerful motivating factor in the process of attributing causality about the actions 
of others. Therefore, the perception of others behaviour as conspiratorial may be 
influenced by underlying hostility in some conspiracy theorists. 
 The findings of at least one study (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999) suggest that 
strong CT belief is correlated with high scores on measures of Authoritarianism. 
Altemeyer (1999; 2004) states that authoritarians are individuals who tend to 
submit to established authorities (they trust authority), but that they also tend to be 
highly self-righteous individuals who make incorrect inferences from evidence, are 
fearful of a dangerous world, and are dogmatic (close-minded). Altemeyer (2004) 
also suggested that authoritarians can tend to be prejudicial as a result of a 
combination of both fear and self-righteousness. Abalakina-Paap and collegues 
(1999) argue that to such individuals, CTs may have particular appeal as CTs can be 
used as vehicles for ascribing blame to outgroups.  In a similar vein, Srole (1956) 
suggested that those who are highly anomic can have a propensity to develop 
authoritarian traits over time.  
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 Recent research by Douglas and Sutton (2011) suggested that one individual 
difference predictive of endorsement of CTs was morality (how much a person 
conforms to right conduct2), and that this relationship could be explained by an 
individual’s personal willingness to themselves be part of the conspiracy. Douglas 
and Sutton (2011) used projection theory to examine the predictive capacity of 
morals and willingness to conspire for CT endorsement (agreeing that a conspiracy 
really took place). Projection is a process whereby an individual applies their own 
feelings, thoughts, motivations, and actions to others (Douglas & Sutton, 2011). 
Therefore, an individual may try to understand why another person has behaved as 
they did, by contemplating how they might have behaved themselves in a similar 
situation (Douglas & Sutton, 2011).  
In the context of conspiracy thinking, Douglas and Sutton (2011) reasoned 
that a conspiracy theorist would likely project their own subjective moral qualities 
and apply them to the conspirator. The argument follows that if a conspiracy 
theorist who does not conform to typical societal norms of “right conduct”, they 
would be more willing to conspire, and consequently also more likely to believe 
certain CTs to be true. Similarly, if a person’s character is one of beneficence, they 
would be less willing to conspire, and consequently less likely to believe that 
certain conspiracies actually took place.  To test this contention, participants were 
asked to complete either a Machiavellianism scale or a positive moral prime task, 
                                               
2 A succinct definition of ‘morality’ is hard to come by, and possibly this is because there is no universal 
governing body who ultimately decides what is or is not moral. Most literature on morality, even as it 
pertains to CTs (e.g. Douglas & Sutton, 2011; van Prooijen & Jostman, 2013) does not actually define 
morality. However, contributors from the fields of law and philosophy have attempted to offer some 
structure to the concept. Typically, morality refers to right conduct towards self and others (Perry, 
2000; Prinz, 2008). A moral deed is one where the majority of others would look upon it with approval, 
and conversely, an immoral deed is one where the majority of others would judge with disapproval 
(Prinz, 2008).  
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and then read 17 statements about a range of CTs. Participants were required to 
then indicate how willing they would have been to participate in the conspiracies if 
they had been in the same position as the conspirators, and also to indicate their 
level of agreement with the statement (about whether the conspiracy took place or 
not; Douglas & Sutton, 2010).  
The Machiavellianism scale was used as a measure of poor morality (low 
conformity to societal norms of right conduct). According to Christie and Geis 
(1970), Machiavellianism is a personality trait characterised by behaviour that is 
self-serving, deceitful, that typically disregards the ethics or needs of others. 
Therefore, Machiavellianism seems an appropriate measure of low conformity to 
right conduct. By contrast, in the positive moral prime task, participants were asked 
to recall (think and write about) a situation where they “behaved in a moral and 
decent manner, by helping another person” (Douglas & Sutton, 2011, p. 547). In 
both conditions, personal willingness to conspire fully mediated the relationship 
between morality and endorsement of CTs. Personal willingness to conspire 
accounted for 67% of the relationship in the poor morality condition, and 74% in 
the positive moral prime condition.  Therefore, it could be reasoned that a subgroup 
of conspiracy theorists with an impoverished moral code, may be able to conceive 
that certain conspiracies took place, because the actions of the conspirators are not 
so different from how they would act themselves. In contrast, those individuals 
who are more innocent-minded may be less able to conceive that such conspiracies 
actually took place, because the actions of the conspirators are far removed from 
the way they believe they themselves would act. This study could have been 
substantially strengthened if the experimental design had considered the order-
effects of always presenting the Machiavellianism scale before the other two 
measures, as the poor morality scale may have negatively primed participants. That 
is, it is possible that the item content of the measure may have artificially inflated 
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participants’ responses regarding their willingness to conspire and endorsement of 
CTs.  
 
Summary 
The current chapter outlines a number of contributions that the present 
thesis will make to the pool of literature on conspiracy theorists. Belief in CTs have 
been found to be more common than non-belief in such theories (Goertzel, 1994), 
suggesting that it is an avenue of research worthy of empirical attention. There 
have been no CT studies published in Aotearoa New Zealand to date, which is one 
important gap the current research aims to reduce.  
The rationale for understanding what makes a person more likely to believe 
in a CT is two-fold. First, CTs are generally suggestive of mistrust of authority 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). Accordingly history has demonstrated that unverified 
CTs can in fact interfere with public health policy programmes, to the detriment of 
human well-being (Bird & Bogart, 2003; Bird & Bogart, 2005; Goertzel, 2010; Grebe 
& Nattrass, 2012; Hutchison, Begley, Sullivan, Clark, Boyett, & Kellerman, 2007; 
Nattrass, 2005; Nattrass, 2012; Ross, Essien, & Torres, 2006; Thorburn & Bogart, 
2005). Furthermore, there is a dearth of literature on the role psychopathology 
plays in the development and perpetuation of CTA (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et 
al., 2013). Therefore, understanding what influence, if any, psychopathology has on 
whether a person is more likely to believe CTs has wide implications in terms of 
acceptance of public policy.  
Another key contribution of the current thesis is that it will be the first to 
conceptualise CTA dimensionally; whereby conspiracy believers and CT creators sit 
at different positions along the same continuum. This differentiation is referred to 
throughout this thesis.  
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A review of the literature on the composition of CTs was also provided in 
the present chapter. Content, structure, and function are important facets of CTs 
that require consideration in order to understand the motivations for people to 
endorse CTs. Once an individual has adopted a CT, they tend to perceive that they 
are unique in their understanding of the CT, and as such are then burdened with 
duties and responsibilities. These duties relate to revealing the CT and its 
conspirators to the rest of the world, and to weaken the power the conspirators 
hold over the masses. 
The personality correlates (anomie, hostility, adherence to right conduct, 
powerlessness, and self-esteem) commonly found in conspiracy belief research 
were also touched upon in the current chapter. In chapter three I move on to 
empirically examine these personality variables. In the current chapter I briefly 
introduced the function that CTs serve for those who believe them. In the next two 
chapters I build upon this by more extensively reviewing the literature pertaining 
to loss of subjective control and the cognitive mechanisms underpinning CTA.  
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Chapter Two  
Causality and Control 
“…when [an] elephant is young and relatively weak it is tied to 
a small immovable stick. So later no matter how large and 
strong he becomes he continues to believe that he cannot free 
himself...Many intelligent people are like the circus elephant; 
they never question their self-imposed limitations” 
- Cold Souls Motion Picture (Carey, 2009) 
 
Introduction 
In chapter one, the various facets of CTs were outlined, including their nature, 
content, and structure; as well as the function that CTs can serve for those who believe 
them. A number of researchers have postulated that perceived low subjective control 
can lead people to believe in CTs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; 
Groh, 1987; Hofstadter, 1965; Leman, 2007; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Swami 
et al., 2013; Sullivan et al., 2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). CTs have been claimed 
to be a compensatory strategy (however, not necessarily consciously driven) used to 
re-establish some semblance of control (Melley, 2002). 
In this chapter I review the literature on ways in which people try to explain 
complex and confusing situations, and their motivations for doing so. Reflecting on 
previous findings may further our understanding of how conspiracy theorising 
operates. According to a number of researchers, humans have an innate need to 
understand and explain their surroundings (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; Heider, 1958; 
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Katz, 1960; Kay et al., 2010; McCauley & Jacques, 1979; Salt, 2008). Heider (1958) 
furthered this notion by suggesting that those who feel powerless are averse to highly 
complex situations, and can develop a perceptual style that enables them to re-
establish some sense of control: 
“…a region whose properties are not known to the person, can be 
considered a barrier which makes action and therefore control 
difficult if not impossible. Perceptions helps to structure the region 
and to remove this barrier.” (Heider, 1958, p. 71). 
 
One theory of cognition that could be argued to assist in the process of re-
establishing perceived personal control is attribution theory. Attribution theory 
describes differential styles of explanation people use to infer the causes for events in 
their environment (Kelley & Michela, 1980). There are in fact a number of attribution 
theories however the main premise underlying them all is that the way in which one 
interprets causation (antecedents of attribution style) will influence their response 
style to situations (consequences of attribution style) or how they interact with their 
environment (Kelley & Michela, 1980). Attribution research has been applied to a 
wide variety of contexts such as, sports psychology (Si, Rethorst & Willimczik, 1995), 
organisational psychology (DeJoy, 1995; Judge & Bono, 2001), education psychology 
(Wolleat, Pedro, De Vaney Becker, & Fennema, 1980) religion (Spilka, Shaver & 
Kirkpatrick, 1985), medicine (Borkowski & Allen, 2003), as well as psychological 
research on aspects such as emotion and motivation (Schachter, 1964; Weiner, 1985). 
In chapter one, attribution theory was posited to provide conspiracy theorists with a 
tool with which they could ascribe the causality of situations, and thus transform a 
complex and stressful situation into something more simplified and readily 
explainable, hence re-establishing a sense of control over one’s environment (Harvey 
& Weary, 1984). Another key notion underlying theories of attribution is whether 
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inferences about causality are attributed to internal or external factors. Rotter (1966; 
1990) expands on this idea with what has been termed internal versus external 
control of reinforcement, locus of control (LOC), or expectancies for outcomes of 
future events (Kelley & Michela, 1980).  
 
Locus of Control 
LOC refers to individual differences in attributional style, and the degree to 
which individuals perceive whether the likelihood of a particular outcome of a 
situation can be reinforced by (is under the influence of) their own behaviour and 
personal characteristics, or outside their personal control and reinforced (influenced) 
by forces external to person (Rotter, 1990). More simply put, LOC is the 
reinforcement influence an individual believes they personally have, relative to forces 
external to them, to elicit a particular outcome of a situation. According to 
researchers (Mirowsky & Ross, 1983; Pittman & Pittman, 1979), when an individual 
feels powerless they have a generalised tendency to view their life as not being under 
their own control, but as largely ascendant to some force outside of themselves (e.g. 
luck, fate, or others they perceive to be powerful). That is, they believe their life 
happens to them, rather than by them. This assertion is particularly consistent with 
CTs where a group of agents (paranormal or otherwise) act out malevolent intentions 
towards another group (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Melley, 2002; Zonis & Joseph, 
1994). Furthermore, in accordance with Mirowsky and Ross (1983) and Pittman and 
Pittman (1979), CT belief can be conceptualised as a generalised ideological trait, or 
tendency to believe in CTs. 
Glass and Singer (1972) conducted a study to investigate how perceived low 
personal control operates. In their study participants were allocated into two groups: 
one which had control over the termination of an aversive noise, and another group 
which did not. As a manipulation, those in the control group were shown a switch 
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with which to terminate the noise if they wished, and were made aware of the 
possibility that they could stop the noise themselves. A manipulation check 
confirmed that perceived-control was heightened in this group compared to the no-
perceived-control group who were not provided with a noise termination switch. 
When participants rated how much controllability they felt in the task over an 
aversive stimulus (noise), those who had no control also provided self-ratings of high 
helplessness compared to those who had control (Glass & Singer, 1972). In contrast, 
earlier research by Petzel and Gynther (1970) suggested that those who have high 
internal LOC experience more discomfort when they unexpectedly face a situation 
where they have no control. Clarity of self-concept (certainty of one’s own attributes 
and traits) has also been shown to be stronger amongst those who have a tendency to 
make internal attributions over external attributions (Organ, 1973). As earlier 
described, the fundamental attribution error is when there is a tendency to 
overestimate dispositional (internal) factors and underestimate situational (external) 
factors (Clarke, 2002). Clarke (2002) asserted that conspiracy theorists tend to focus 
on the disposition of conspirators to infer causality for situations or events rather than 
on situational factors.   
Similarly, Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) suggested that an external attribution 
style serves an important function for conspiracy theorists. Specifically, if a person 
possesses an external attribution style, they can then ascribe the responsibility of the 
powerlessness they feel in their own lives to powerful others, and therefore provide 
an explanation for their lack control. An external attribution style, may also allow 
conspiracy theorists to feel some psychological comfort that this low control over 
their own lives is not their own fault. Organ (1976) presents a different perspective by 
reflecting on the actor-observer hypothesis. The actor-observer hypothesis is a 
phenomenon where people tend to infer internal factors being causal for their own 
behaviours, whereas those observing the actors will infer an external LOC for the 
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actor’s behaviour (Sharf & Newman, 1976). Organ (1976) argued that the reason for 
the actor-observer hypothesis may be that an individual needs to view themselves as 
having the ability to control the situation they are in, and thus will show a bias to 
explain the outcome of the situation as being a result of internal factors rather than 
external factors.  
The basic premise of CT research is that conspiracy theorists are individuals 
who feel a low sense of control (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; 
Groh, 1987; Hofstadter, 1965; Leman, 2007; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; 
Swami et al., 2013; Sullivan et al., 2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Thus the 
fundamental attribution error/actor-observer finding may be even stronger in those 
with strong CTA (compared to those with low CTA) due to their strong control 
motivation (need to re-establish a sense of control). However, when a conspiracy 
theorist (or any other individual) is repeatedly exposed to situation where they 
perceive little personal control of these situations, they have potential to develop a 
propensity to think, behave, and feel in a helpless manner. This tendency is known as 
learned helplessness.  
 
Learned Helplessness 
Learned helplessness (LH) is a process whereby individuals who have a history 
of exposure to uncontrollability over an aversive stimuli (e.g. an event), develop 
beliefs that future events will have negative outcomes such as failure (Kelley & 
Michela, 1980; Lieder, Goodman, & Huys, 2013), and thus when encountering future 
exposure to aversive events will demonstrate passivity in their response style 
(Seligman & Maier, 1967). According to Seligman, Maier, and Solomon (1971), the 
individual would then have difficulty responding to the aversive situations adaptively 
(with an appropriate coping style) by exhibiting poor self-control (will not show self-
monitoring, self-evaluation, or self-reinforcement; Rozensky, Kravitz & Unger, 1981). 
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The cornerstone of LH is the sense of uncontrollability when faced with a traumatic 
event (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), which can lead to the development of 
the perception of response-reinforcement independence (Klein & Seligman, 1976).  
There are three key types of deficits that have been observed in studies of LH 
both in human and animal populations (Klein & Seligman, 1976). The first type of 
deficit is cognitive. One such cognitive deficit is a form of proactive interference 
(Prindaville & Stein, 1978) induced by a sense of uncontrollability (and 
unpredictability), whereby development of the perception of response-reinforcement 
independence occurs such that an individual believes that their behavioural response 
to a stimuli or event will have no bearing on success or failure with regard to the 
stimuli (Klein & Seligman, 1976). That is, they believe that their response is 
independent to the outcome. The quote at the beginning of this chapter from the 
movie “Cold Souls” could be considered to illustrate the concept of learned 
helplessness as seen in circus elephants. In animal studies (Overmier & Seligman, 
1967; Seligman & Groves, 1970; Seligman & Maier, 1967) it was observed that dogs 
failed to learn that their responses could affect the outcome of avoiding an electrical 
shock. Similarly, in human studies (Klein & Seligman, 1976), it was observed that 
participants acquired response-reinforcement independence, where they believed 
that their response would not affect the outcome; therefore their success or failure to 
escape the undesirable stimulus had no effect on their future expectancies for success 
or failure.  An example that applies this theory to humans might be if a learner driver 
believes that whether they practice driving or not, it will not affect whether they pass 
their driving test.  
The second type of deficit associated with LH is motivational, where an 
individual displays a lack of response initiation. That is, the individual will display 
behavioural passivity and may not take action to reduce their trauma induced by a 
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stimulus, or may be slower to respond than those who have not developed LH 
(Seligman, 1972).  
Another by-product of LH and the abovementioned deficits is an emotional 
expression of the stress and the sense of uncontrollability LH engenders (Overmier, 
2002). LH has often been utilised as a model of depression, and a number of 
researchers assert that the symptoms of depression parallel the deficits produced by 
LH (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Forgeard et al., 2011; Teasdale, 1978; 
Vollmayr & Gass, 2013). For instance, a person experiencing a cognitive deficit may 
believe that their actions in a situation will have no effect on the outcome, and thus 
will become passive in their motivation to actually take any action. The result of this 
is a “negative cognitive set” (Abramson et al., 1978, p. 64) which may lead the 
individual to possess depressive beliefs and affect. However, a number of researchers 
assert that the LH model of depression can only account for some aspects of 
depression and the LH model is not comprehensive enough to be considered as an 
overarching theory of depression (Abramson et al., 1978; Maier, Henn, Mayberg, 
Seligman, & Beck, in Forgeard et al. 2011).  These researchers suggest that LH is not a 
comprehensive model of depression as some sources of depression are not 
situationally-based, and are not reliant on a sense of future uncontrollability. Some 
such sources include “…physiological states, postpartum conditions, hormonal states, 
loss of interest in reinforcers, chemical depletions” (Abramson et al., 1978, p. 64). 
Furthermore, the LH model cannot account for instances where a sense of 
uncontrollability does not induce depressed affect, or where an individual has not 
encoded the uncontrollability on a personal level, so as to develop lowered self-
esteem. According to a number of researchers (Crocker & Park, 2004; Mor & 
Winquist, 2002; Tennen & Herzberger, 1987) low self-esteem is considered to be the 
signature characteristic of depression, so some argue that if LH could be considered a 
synonymous model with depression, then it should be able to account for low self-
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esteem (Abramson et al., 1978). Therefore, there are a number of variables that need 
to be considered more thoroughly when reasoning a model of depression. However 
Abramson et al. (1978), also suggest that the LH model can account for a subset of 
depression, they termed as helpless depressions, which encompass the three deficits 
outlined above (motivational, cognitive, and emotional expression). Furthermore, 
Abramson et al. (1978), suggest that those individuals who experience depression and 
attribute their situation to personal shortcomings (internal) are more likely to have 
low self-esteem. Others have also suggested that when an interaction of internal and 
global attribution styles interact within the same person, the person is much more 
likely to experience LH when faced with situations (whether similar or dissimilar to 
early experiences of uncontrollability) of uncontrollability (Mikulincer, 1986). 
Whitson and Galinsky (2008) suggested that pattern perception is one way 
individuals can self-soothe when they present with LH. When an individual makes 
meaningful connections between unrelated stimuli (known as illusory pattern 
perception; be it visual stimuli, or stimuli relating to pieces of information in a 
situation), this can provide some form of explanation for a situation, thus enhancing 
the sense of control experienced and thus releasing some of the discomfort or deficits 
associated with LH. Whitson and Galinsky (2008) were able to demonstrate that 
when perception of low personal control was experimentally induced (via a recall task 
introduced later), participants tended to perceive more conspiracy (in ambiguous 
scenarios) than those in the high-control condition. Furthermore, when participants 
in the low-control task were given an opportunity to take part in a self-affirmation 
task, these individuals perceived the same level of conspiracy as those in the high-
control condition (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). This suggests, than when participants 
were able to re-establish a sense of control prior to the being presented with potential 
conspiracy scenarios, they were no longer susceptible to illusory pattern perception; 
and therefore perceived the unrelated pieces of situation information in the scenarios 
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to indeed be ambiguous. This finding supports earlier findings by Klein and Seligman 
(1976) that experience of being able to re-establish a sense of control (by being able to 
solve a problem or escape an aversive situation) can reverse the cognitive deficits 
associated with LH such as the perception of response-reinforcement independence. 
Therefore, being able to effectively reverse the effects of powerlessness only by 
introducing some semblance of controllability to a situation, these researchers 
provided support for the contention that perceived powerlessness can lead to illusory 
pattern perception. 
Hofstadter (1965) made the earliest suggestion that a low perceived personal 
control could lead to ascription to CTs. Supporting this notion, a number of other 
researchers have been able to demonstrate an association between feeling powerless 
and perception of conspiracy (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) 
 
A Reformulated Model of Learned Helplessness (Abramson et al., 1978) 
Abramson et al. (1978) criticised the early model of LH as being too general, 
lacking specificity or detail and therefore only being relevant to a narrow range of 
situations. In essence Abramson et al. (1978) argue that the first model of LH does not 
specify the factors that can exacerbate or attenuate the degree of uncontrollability 
(perceived powerlessness) that one can experience. Their reformulated model 
remedies four omissions of the early model by integrating the original hypothesis 
with attribution theory in order to specify detail in four areas. The first key 
inadequacy of the original LH model is that it ignores whether a person perceives 
personal or universal helplessness. Personal helplessness is where an individual does 
not believe that they personally possess the ability to produce a desired outcome 
compared to relevant others, therefore exhibiting an internal LOC. Universal 
helplessness is where an individual perceives that they as well as all relevant others 
are equally unable to produce a desired outcome, therefore exhibiting an external 
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LOC.  Therefore, if a person attributes a desired outcome not eventuating to internal 
(personal) reasons, they are more prone to lowered self-esteem.  
Second, the reformulated model of LH implicates the dimension of the 
changeability (stability) of circumstances across time. For instance, if an individual 
failed their drivers’ licence test, and attributed this to a lack of peripheral vision, this 
unchangeable factor could be considered stable and chronic over time. However, if 
the individual attributed their failure to very poor weather conditions, or a 
malfunction of a particular set of traffic lights, these would be considered situational 
factors that could change over time, and therefore are unstable.  
The third aspect of the reformulated model considers whether the cause of an 
undesired outcome is something that could be expected in most other situations (a 
global cause), regardless of whether they are related to the target undesired outcome 
or not. This is compared to an attribution that the cause of an unwanted outcome is 
something that could be expected in only specific (related) situations. The 
reformulated model would then suppose that if the individual came to the conclusion 
that the failure or undesired outcome was a result of global-internal factors, they 
would then formulate expectancies of failure in future similar and dissimilar 
situations. The emotional reaction would likely be one of low self-esteem and 
depressed affect.  
The last consideration of the reformulated model of LH pertains to the 
intensity or severity of cognitive, affective, and motivational deficits generated by LH. 
According to the Abramson et al. (1978), the more certain a person is that a particular 
unwanted outcome is non-contingent on their response and the more personally 
relevant the outcome is the more severe or intense the deficits will be.  
All four areas of resolution in the reformulated model are open to interaction 
with any and all of the others. For instance, if an apprentice fire fighter is unable to 
save a person from a burning house, they may attribute this to be due to them not 
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being competent or brave enough (internal), and that they will always (stable) be a 
failure as a fire fighter (a role which encompasses many types of rescue - global), and 
they are really certain that this is the case, the more severe or intense the cognitive, 
emotional, and motivational deficits they are likely to suffer will be.  
However it is important to consider LH studies (such as Roth & Bootzin, 1974) 
where in the pre-treatment phase, participants’ demonstrated helplessness, but then 
in the treatment phase did not manifest performance deficits. That is, the initially 
helpless individuals showed greater response initiation compared with control 
subjects, which is antithetical to the typical pattern of LH. According to Roth and 
Bootzin (1974), one potential explanation for such a pattern could be that the helpless 
individuals boosted their efforts to obtain control over the situation and restore a 
sense of generalised control. However, with continued repeated exposure to 
uncontrollable situations, it is quite possible that participants would then develop 
sustained LH and display one or all three of the described deficits associated with LH. 
The idea of repeated exposure to feeling low control has undergone substantial 
research in the LH literature (Friedlander & Chartier, 1981; Maier, 2001; Rosellini & 
Seligman, 1976; Seligman, 1970), and the general consensus appears to be that the 
more experience an individual has had with situations of uncontrollability, the more 
embedded LH becomes as a response style to undesirable events and stimuli. 
Therefore, a prerequisite of repeated exposure of uncontrollability in situations may 
be necessary in order for stability of an attributional style to establish.  
One consideration that has only received modest attention in the literature is 
the perception of indirect control over an aversive stimulus. Earlier, a study by Glass 
and Singer (1972) of perceived control was discussed. In their next study, participants 
were again exposed to an aversive stimulus (noise). However, in this experiment 
variation, participants were allocated into four conditions: the perceived-indirect-
control group, whereby participants were told they could communicate (by switching 
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on a light) with another participant to terminate the noise; a no-perceived-indirect 
control group, whereby participants had the button to terminate the noise, but was 
not able to be signalled to do so by other participants; and two no-perceived-control 
groups, where participants had no control over stimulus termination (in one 
condition there was another participant in the room, and in another condition no one 
else was in the room). To measure the effects of perceived indirect control and no 
control, participants were required to complete a post-noise proof-reading task, on 
which their performance was measured. Compared to the no-perceived-control 
groups, the indirect-control group on average made fewer performance errors. The 
researchers interpreted this finding to mean that if a person senses they at least have 
access to someone who can change the course of events, they show fewer effects of 
LH. Therefore, if a person does not perceive they have personal control of a situation, 
as long as they feel they can influence external conditions in some way, they are less 
likely to demonstrate LH. This finding echoes earlier discussion that the deficits (e.g. 
illusory pattern perception) associated with perceiving powerlessness can be reversed 
if an individual has some access to a sense of control being re-established (Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999; Klein & Seligman, 1976; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).  
Another possible explanation for the pattern of results obtained by Roth and 
Bootzin (1974) is that in their study, the treatment phase activities participants were 
required to complete were rather dissimilar to the activities presented in the pre-
treatment phase, therefore, participants may not have been primed for a global 
attributional style, but rather a specific attributional style, that would mean LH-
associated deficits would only become apparent in activities that were similar to that 
presented in the pre-treatment phase where participants experienced LH. This logic 
follows as the concept of globality in attributional style was not suggested in the 
literature until the early to mid-1980’s (e.g. Alloy et al., 1984; Mikulincer, 1986). 
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Evidence to support the majority of the reformulated LH theory can be 
gleaned from one study (Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, Semmel, & Peterson, 1982), 
where in a classroom setting it was found that when university students received a 
low midterm grade (negative life event), and if they had the propensity to attribute 
their low grades to internal and global causes, their subsequent self-rated mood 
signified higher levels of depression. Further the reformulated model of LH, accounts 
for why not everyone develops LH and instead build resilience to LH. They suggest 
that this resilience is likely to develop if a person attributes undesired outcomes to 
unstable, external and specific causes (Abramson et al., 1978). 
 
The Generalisability of Attributional Style  
Global Attribution Style 
A global attribution style is one where a person systematically attributes the 
causes of an undesirable outcome to factors that are present across a range of 
situations (Alloy, Peterson, Abramson, & Seligman, 1984). Hence, when the person is 
faced with situations that are similar or dissimilar to their early experiences of 
uncontrollability (LH training), the three deficits of LH are likely to be demonstrated. 
For instance Alloy et al. (1984) investigated global attributions in a group of 108 
undergraduate university students who were divided into three pre-treatment groups: 
controllable bursts of noise (meaning participants could control the termination a 
loud tone that sounded in their earphones), uncontrollable bursts of noise 
(participants were not able to terminate the loud tone), or no noise. A week previous, 
participants were asked to fill out the Attributional Style Questionnaire (Seligman, 
Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979) and Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
1967). In the two treatment phases of the experiment, participants were put in either 
a similar or dissimilar situation (respectively) as in the pre-treatment session. The 
similar situation involved trying to terminate a loud tone again, whereas the 
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dissimilar situation required participants to unscramble letters in a visual anagram to 
make a word. The results showed that those with a global attributional style for 
negative outcomes showed LH whether the subsequent uncontrollable situations were 
similar or dissimilar. 
 
Specific Attribution Style 
The global attribution style is in contrast to a specific attribution style, where 
an individual attributes the causes of an undesirable outcome to factors specific to the 
situation (Alloy et al., 1984). Therefore when exposed to future instances of 
uncontrollability, this individual is more likely to display the deficits associated with 
LH in situations that are similar in some way to their early experiences of 
uncontrollability, but not in situations that are dissimilar (Alloy et al.,1984; 
Mikulincer, 1986). In the Alloy et al. (1984) study, participants who possessed a 
specific attributional style for negative outcomes, only demonstrated LH in the 
treatment phase which was similar to the pre-treatment phase and where they had 
also demonstrated LH, therefore they did not generalise LH to all subsequent 
situations.  
The specific attributional style theory has been used to explain the sense of 
powerlessness experienced by minority groups such as African-Americans as reflected 
in CTs relevant to them (Crocker, et al., 1999). However, there have been conflicting 
results regarding the externality of the generalised attributional style of African-
Americans. At least one study (Lefcourt & Ladwig, 1965) found African-Americans to 
be more external in their attributional style in explaining some of the challenges 
facing the African-American community over the years (unemployment, poverty, 
racism, rates of criminality, low socioeconomic status).  Other studies have not always 
found a significant difference in the level of externality of attributional style between 
African-Americans and white Americans (Graham, 1994). A particular form of 
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specific attributional style known as system blame has been referred to in 
examinations of the CTs African-American’s tend to believe (Crocker et al., 1999).  To 
be more precise, system blame does not refer to how African-Americans ascribe 
causality to undesirable events within their individual lives, but rather to how they 
explain why African-Americans as a racial group have encountered particular 
difficulties like those listed above. Further, Crocker et al. (1999) suggest that system 
blame serves a particular function for the psyche of African-Americans. That is, 
attributing the causes of aversive events that afflict their community on an individual 
level could be rather detrimental to their “personal and/or collective self-esteem” 
(Crocker et al., 1999, p. 943). However, interpreting these events as a result of wider 
societal issues such as discrimination or prejudice allows them to somewhat deflect 
the effect of the potential diminished self-esteem, although this may not be done at a 
conscious level of awareness. 
 
Personal Need for Structure 
Conspiracy theorists have a tendency to prefer closure and simple causal 
explanations for events and situations (Groh, 1987; Leman, 2007). CTs serve the 
function of providing predictable and clear explanatory conclusions about event 
occurrence and people, therefore conspiracy theorists who display high levels of 
response initiation rather than LH, may also have concomitantly high levels of 
Personal Need for Structure (PNS).  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Roth and Bootzin (1974) suggested that 
when some individuals are predisposed to think in a helpless manner and then are 
later exposed to unsolvable problems, they do not always demonstrate performance 
deficits. Roth and Bootzin (1974) interpreted this finding as evidence that these 
individuals engaged in high levels of response initiation in order to establish their 
own sense of control over the situation. But as has already been discussed, some 
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individuals do not show this heightened level of response initiation and develop LH. 
A possible explanation for this paradigm could be that those who boost their efforts to 
re-establish control over their situation could also possess high PNS. According to 
Whitson and Galinsky (2008), the experience of perceived low subjective control can 
motivate one to look for structure and order in their environment. It is therefore 
possible that CTs provide one means of organising chaos into structured and 
meaningful explanations for causality (van Prooijen, 2012). According to Salt (2008), 
humans also have an innate need for certainty. Researchers have suggested that 
through CTs humans are able to achieve a sense of certainty in uncertain times 
(Miller, 2002; Swami & Coles, 2010).  
According to the extant literature heightened PNS also has multiple 
relationships with a Need for Closure (desire for things to conclude tidily), 
Dogmatism (close-mindedness), and an Intolerance of Ambiguity (preference for 
clarity; Leone, Wallace, & Modglin, 1999). The basis for PNS is that due an intrinsic 
need to satisfy these requirements, those who display amplified response initiation 
also possess the motivation to resolve the problematic situation in the most simplistic 
manner possible for them to alleviate their distress. The chosen method of restoring 
sense of control in such a problematic situation may not be the most adaptive strategy 
because the goal is to reduce distress in the easiest way possible (Leone et al., 1999). 
There are a number of definitions for PNS, but each depicts that those who 
have a high need for PNS have a preference for simplicity, predictability, and clarity 
in contextual situations (Meiser & Machunsky, 2008; Moskowitz, 1993). Therefore, 
those who have a high PNS have a chronic information-processing motive to avoid 
complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity in their environment. This notion is very 
much in line with the ideas put forward in chapter one describing the function of 
CTs.  
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Consequences of Elevated Personal Need for Structure  
Schemas 
A consequence of elevated PNS identified in the literature is that it can cause 
an individual to make biased judgements as a result of not following the reasoning 
process through to completion and not considering all competing explanations 
(Schaller, Boyde, Yohannes, & O’Brien, 1995). Another consequence is that how such 
an individual with high PNS operates in and interprets social situations can be primed 
by the stereotypes they hold (Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 
1994).  Accordingly, Moskowitz (1993) states that in terms of social categorization, 
when a high PNS individual attempts to makes a social judgement, they engage in a 
process of hypothesis generation to justify their judgements. As there are numerous 
intrinsic guidelines that could be used to judge social situations, in order to prevent 
the hypothesising process from continuing endlessly, a high PNS individual’s strong 
need for closure and simplicity as well as cognitive accessibility of a relevant group 
stereotype, will allow them to settle on the most convenient judgement; therefore the 
chosen stereotype as a schematic social category is egocentrically perpetuated and 
strengthened. 
In the literature (as in this thesis), the terms stereotype, schema, and script are 
generally used interchangeably to refer to cognitive knowledge structures, whereby a 
person categorises information and experiences (either social or non-social, previous 
or current) into pre-set groups. This grouping process occurs with the conscious or 
unconscious aim of using the least amount of cognitive energy in order to understand 
ones world (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). According to Neuberg and Newsom (1993) 
efficient schemas are those that are simple with clear parameters, as these allow for 
fast interpretation of one’s context. In contrast, schemata that are less well-defined 
allow confusion and less efficient interpretation. A resonating theme throughout this 
body of work is that for those with a high PNS, simplicity is a key concern.  Indeed 
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Moskowitz (1993) suggested that those high in PNS are more likely to socially 
categorise people based on trait or dispositional inferences, a cognitive process 
referred to as spontaneous trait inferences (STI).  
STIs can operate at either a conscious or unconscious level, whereby “trait 
labels are used to categorise behaviour during the encoding stage of information 
processing” (Moskowitz, 1993, p. 132). Eventually, the tendency to generate STIs can 
become so overdeveloped (D’Agostino, 1991) that it can progress to the point of being 
a fundamental attribution error (Moskowitz, 1993). This is because the target trait 
used to make inferences about a person may not be sufficient to encapsulate the 
essence of the person as a whole, and the reasons for their behaviour. For example, if 
a prejudiced person perceives an act they believe to be negative by an individual of 
another race, they may attribute this to dispositional characteristics they believe are 
innate to a person of that race (stereotype), at the expense of considering potential 
causal situational factors (Pettigrew, 1979).  
 
Avoidance 
 Neuberg and Newsom (1993) suggest that stereotyping is a heuristic social 
information processing strategy that reduces cognitive burden. One way of 
simplifying information-processing is to avoid/limit the amount of information one 
takes in. In extreme cases this may lead to avoidance of the house (agoraphobia), but 
more commonly such individuals are likely to keep social interactions to a minimum, 
and may avoid social media. I suggest that it is altogether possible that those with 
strong CTA may use avoidance strategies to prevent their exposure to evidence that 
may refute their beliefs; therefore, rather than having a tendency towards only one 
cognitive burden reduction strategy, such individuals may switch between strategies 
(stereotyping, incomplete reasoning processing, avoidance) depending on which 
proves to be most effective for the situation they find themselves in. If however, an 
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individual finds themselves in a situation where they cannot avoid exposure to new 
information, stereotyping is likely to come into play again (Neuberg & Newsom, 
1993). In such instances an individual is more likely to have an attentional bias to 
information that is consistent with their existing knowledge structures, and to also 
interpret ambiguous information in a way that favours these knowledge scripts rather 
than considering alternative competing explanations. Such information processing 
biases therefore serve to preserve these knowledge structures, allowing the individual 
to consider their beliefs as reliable and valid, and consequently they are unlikely to 
abandon these beliefs. This may be yet another explanation as to why conspiracy 
theorists can display resistance in accepting explanations and evidence which 
contradict their theories. This propensity to discount contradictory evidence has been 
empirically supported by research where shared statistical variance was established 
between PNS, dogmatism, and intolerance for ambiguity (Leone, et al., 1999); 
meaning that these are related concepts. 
In summary, PNS is a chronic information-processing motive which can vary 
in extremity from person to person (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).  For example, social 
categorisation is theorised to be a form of information-processing largely attendant on 
the motivation to control or make sense of one’s environment (Moskowitz, 1993). 
More specifically, Moskowitz (1993) asserts that the degree of an individual’s PNS 
will govern the extent to which they feel driven to socially categorise. That is, the 
more elevated one’s PNS, the greater the extent to which one is likely to generate 
spontaneous trait inferences.  
 
Correlates of High Personal Need for Structure 
 In one of the earliest accounts of dogmatism, Rokeach (1954) conceptualised it 
as an ideological belief system (as opposed to single beliefs represented by rigidity; 
Rokeach & Fruchter, 1956) that, while highly structured is also closed and intolerant 
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of diversions from the central belief system. A related concept is that of intolerance of 
ambiguity, where those possessing this trait have a tendency to perceive their 
surroundings in very categorical terms. That is, such individuals have a tendency to 
perceive things in a very black-and-white manner with no shades of grey, attending 
to information and processing it in a polarised manner (Leone et al., 1999). In her 
seminal work, Frenkel-Brunswick (1949) based the tolerance of ambiguity model on 
the following parameters:  
“resistance to reversal of apparent fluctuating stimuli, the early 
selection and maintenance of one solution in a perceptually 
ambiguous situation, inability to allow for the possibility of good and 
bad traits in the same person, acceptance of attitude statements 
representing a rigid, black-white view of life, seeking for certainty, a 
rigid dichotomizing into fixed categories, premature closure, and 
remaining closed except to familiar characteristics of stimuli.” 
Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949, as cited in Furnham, 1994, p. 403 – 404).  
  
Need for cognitive closure (NCC) is another personality construct related to 
PNS, characterised by an aversion to confusion and ambiguity, and a strong 
preference to arrive at a conclusion quickly. NCC can be either non-specific, where 
any conclusion is considered better than no conclusion; or alternatively the need can 
be specific, where the conclusion arrived at must be ego-syntonic, or consistent with 
one’s belief system (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). An individual with a high NCC will 
conduct a cursory cost-benefit analysis of what relief closure will bring. For instance, 
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) suggest some of the most common instances where a 
lack of closure could be costly to the individual to include situations where a time-
pressure exists and lack of closure could mean missing important deadlines, the effort 
that would be required for further information-processing when the a fast conclusion 
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would suffice, or if the task at hand does not appeal to the individual and appears 
inherently boring. Fast closure is often contingent upon simple knowledge structures, 
so again simplicity is a desired commodity for individuals with a high NCC.  
In their study, Leone et al. (1999) found PNS to be strongly correlated to 
dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, and NCC. Initial review of these personality 
constructs imply some shared variance even at the theoretical level (as each 
implicates a desire for simplicity), meaning that investigation of these structures as 
factorially distinct from each other could potentially result with strong (inflated) 
correlations. However, an earlier study conducted by Neuberg and Newsom (1993) 
found only weak to moderate correlations between these constructs; a finding which 
was consistent with Webster and Kruglanski (1994). The issue here may be one of 
measurement, where the psychometric tools used to investigate these constructs 
encroach on related concepts.  Therefore, each of these personality constructs 
connotes a desire for simplicity, and identification of these constructs as completely 
separate from each other may not be an authentic representation of their nature.  
 
Summary 
 In sum, a personal sense of control is a psychological need underpinning a range 
of cognitive and behavioural styles. Feeling a lack of subjective control is in itself an 
aversive state and has consequences for how people respond to their environment 
(Friedland et al., 1992). In many cases, attempts to re-establish control can be an adaptive 
task-focused endeavour, however, in other cases, maladaptive responses to a lack of 
control can have a deleterious impact on affective states (Abramson et al., 1978; Forgeard 
et al., 2011; Overmier, 2002; Teasdale, 1978) as well as how we respond to future 
situations anticipated to be characterised by uncertainty. When a person has been faced 
with repeated exposure to a lack of control, a trait of LH can ensue, where the person 
begins to believe that their responses bear no effect on eventual outcomes (Abramson et 
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al., 1978; Klein & Seligman, 1976; Mikulincer, 1986). Consequently cognitive, affective, 
and motivational deficits characterising how one interacts with their environment cand 
develop (Klein & Seligman, 1976; Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Prindaville & Stein, 1978; 
Seligman & Maier, 1967; Seligman & Groves, 1970). A sense of low subjective control can 
also impact on the way contextual information is processed, and in particular can 
influence how ascriptions of causality are made (Harvey & Weary, 1984; Kelley & 
Michela, 1980; Klein & Seligman, 1976). In addition, if an individual has a strong PNS and 
they find themselves facing uncertainty; chronic information-processing motives can 
result in degradation of normal information processing (D’Agostino, 1991; Frenkel-
Brunswick, 1949, as cited in Furnham, 1994; Leone et al., 1999; Moskowitz, 1993; 
Neuberg & Newsome, 1993; Pettigrew, 1979; Schaller et al., 1995; Thompson et al., 1994; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  
 The literature contends that people commonly referred to as conspiracy theorists 
also experience a lack of subjective control as a very aversive state, and in a bid to re-
establish a sense of control (compensatory mechanism) present with a tendency to 
perceive meaningful relationships between ambiguous or unrelated stimuli. Perception of 
conspiracy in ambiguous situations is also considered a form of illusory pattern 
perception, and thus a compensatory mechanism to restore some semblance of subjective 
control (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Groh, 1987; Hofstadter, 
1965; Leman, 2007; Newheiser et al., 2011; Sullivan et al., 2010; Swami et al., 2013; 
Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). The concept of illusory pattern perception is elaborated upon 
in the next chapter. Experimental investigation of illusory pattern perception as it relates 
to conspiracy theorists is also presented.  
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Restoration of Subjective Control: Illusory Pattern 
Perception 
 Previous research has suggested that those who feel low subjective control are 
more likely to perceive patterns between unrelated stimuli, or make meaningful 
connections between ambiguous pieces of information (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). 
This phenomenon is known as illusory pattern perception. Conspiracy theorising has 
been argued to be a form of illusory pattern perception (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; 
Kay et al., 2009). So far this chapter has discussed the idea of perceived low subjective 
control, its associated deficits, and also the motivation to restore a sense of control 
over a situation. One such method for control restoration was argued to be illusory 
pattern perception as suggested by Whitson and Galinsky (2008) and Kay et al. (2009). 
In the remainder of this chapter I review the literature on illusory pattern perception 
and then experimentally investigate illusory conspiracy pattern perception with two 
studies intended to replicate portions of the study by Whitson and Galinsky (2008).  
Most research articles in the field of pattern perception have had a tendency 
(intentionally or unintentionally) to omit defining what patterns are or what pattern 
perception actually is. Exceptions are Elliman (2006), and Dixon (2012). Dixon refers 
to patterns as “…common structural forms that emerge from…natural and non-
natural, evolutionary complexity…they are shapes that repeat themselves” (p. 3). 
And, whilst not specifically aimed at psychology, Elliman’s definition of pattern 
recognition broadly suggests that pattern recognition is about discovering similarities 
and regularities present in raw data” (Elliman, 2006, p. 102). This definition appears 
applicable to pattern perception in psychology. Also relevant to the study of pattern 
perception in psychology is Elliman’s observations that “Pattern recognition 
[perception] is the discovery of a set of relationships that are satisfied by observations 
of a system or a collection of systems” (Elliman, 2006, p. 102), and also that “Pattern 
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recognition [perception] is the identification of emergent properties of a system, 
where a pattern is a property the system as a whole, but is not a property of small 
parts of the system” (Elliman, 2006, p. 102). When pattern recognition is considered 
synonymous (for the purposes of psychology) with pattern perception, then Elliman’s 
(2006) two latter observations suggest that perception of a pattern gives an overall 
impression or conclusion about the nature of the system as a whole rather than its 
comprising parts.  
According to Elliman (2006), part of the challenge facing those engaged in 
pattern perception is to conquer any randomness in the dataset. The randomness or 
“noise” in the dataset can sometimes distract from perception of actual patterns 
residing within the dataset. Such a contention is consistent with ideas of Dixon (2012) 
and Cramer (2006) who note the important role that feedback or reinforcement 
contingencies play in evaluating the accuracy of one’s own pattern perception. If an 
individual does not have a reciprocal relationship with their environment, they do 
not become attuned to the fact they were inaccurate in their perception, and thus this 
uni-directional relationship can become a maintaining factor in illusory pattern 
perception. This idea is consistent with the closed belief systems Goertzel (1994) 
suggested where characteristic of CT beliefs. These monological belief systems do not 
interact with their environment and thus do not feature feedback loops (Goertzel, 
1994). In the previous chapter, it was also discussed that those with a high PNS who 
experience low subjective control as an aversive state are likely to present with deficit 
information-processing tendencies in order to reduce the associated level of distress 
and cognitive burden. One such information processing tendency could be argued to 
be illusory pattern perception, which relates to both visual stimuli, but also how one 
perceives situational information.  
Conspiracy theorists are one subset of the population who have been found to 
experience low subjective control as a very aversive state. Degraded information-
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processing tendencies such as PNS, dogmatism, intolerance or ambiguity, need for 
closure (NCC), and illusory pattern perception have been also demonstrated by 
conspiracy theorists (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). In this 
chapter, on the basis that conspiracy theorising may be considered a form of illusory 
pattern perception (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 
2009), I sought to replicate the study by Whitson and Galinksy (2008), where they 
found illusory pattern perception in a group of conspiracy theorists. 
 
Apophenia 
 Reaching as far back as 1958, a concept known as Apophenia has been used to 
describe a phenomenon whereby a person will perceive a set of random and unrelated 
stimuli as being meaningfully related in some way. The term was first introduced by 
Klaus Conrad (1958) in his work focusing on the delusional patterns of behaviour and 
perception that emerge during the onset of schizophrenia. The term Apophenia 
initially referred to a state of delusional perception where normal stimuli are 
perceived with abnormal significance to the perceiver (Fish, 1960). Matussek (1958, as 
cited in Fish, 1960) further elaborated the concept of Apophania describing it as a 
state where connections between the qualities of a particular stimulus become 
loosened and less coherent, and take on a special significance to an individual afflicted 
with the early stages of psychosis. In more recent times, however, Apophenia as a 
term has been used to describe illusory pattern perception, whereby an individual 
will make meaningful connections between unrelated and random stimuli (e.g. 
Brugger, 2001; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Apophenia is also very commonly referred 
to as a type one error, which differs from a type two error, where patterns that do 
actually exist are missed (Brugger, 2001; Elliman, 2008). 
 Since its original coining by Conrad (1958), the term Apophenia has been 
similarly defined by other researchers (Brugger, 2001; Petchkovsky, 2007; Fyfe, 
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Williams, Mason, & Pickup, 2008) who suggest that Apophenia is an unmotivated 
phenomena (not intentionally conceived), whereby an individual will ascribe specific 
meaning to the perceived connection between random stimuli. When Apophania 
occurs in the realm of visual perception, it is termed pareidolia (Dansey, 2008; 
Elliman, 2006). Vannucci, Mazzoni, and Cartocci (2011) simply define pareidolia as 
inaccurate detection of visual patterns. However, when illusory pattern perception is 
more situationally-based (as opposed to visual), it is most commonly referred to as 
Apophenia. Non-visual Apophenia (where unrelated, random, accidental, or 
coincidental events are perceived to have a meaningful link) has been researched in a 
number of areas including conspiracy theorising (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; Kay et 
al., 2009), paranormal beliefs (Brugger, 2001; Kay et al., 2001; Wang, Whitson, & 
Menon, 2012), and psychopathology (Fyfe, Williams, Mason & Pickup, 2008).  
  
Why Does Apophenia Occur? 
According to the literature, the purpose of Apophenia (whether it be visually- or 
situationally-based) is to re-establish a sense of control (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; 
Kay et al., 2009; Vannucci et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012). Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008) and Kay et al. (2009) hypothesised that when individuals experience a lack of 
subjective control, and feel they cannot objectively improve their situation, they will 
try and re-establish a sense of control perceptually as a compensatory mechanism. 
The premise of the studies conducted by these researchers was that any instance 
where normal pattern perception can take place, abnormal pattern perception can 
also take root depending on the level of subjective control experienced at the time. 
Friedland, Keinan, and Regev (1992) researched the way stress influences 
which compensatory mechanisms (such as illusory pattern perception) are used to 
regain control. They suggested that when a person is stressed they are likely to engage 
in emotion-focused strategies rather than task-focused strategies to regain a sense of 
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control. Thus, the type of illusory pattern perception they may engage in is likely to 
occur in activities or situations that will improve their overall perceived control, but 
may not necessarily improve actual control over the situation. A clinical implication 
of this finding then is that a subjective feeling of low control can undermine self-
esteem, a theory which has conceptual parallels to Abramson et al.’s (1978) 
reformulated model of learned helplessness (LH). According to the reformulated 
model of LH, when a person encodes uncontrollability on a personal level, they can 
develop low self-esteem (Abramson et al., 1978). Thus, as the findings of Friedland et 
al. (1992) suggest, boosting perceived personal control may to some extent be able to 
counteract the low self-esteem associated with low sense of control in specific 
situations. 
 In a series of six experiments, Whitson and Galinsky (2008) used a range of 
methods to manipulate the level of control felt by participants, and investigated visual 
as well as situational illusory pattern perception. In their first experiment, Whitson 
and Galinsky (2008) investigated if low subjective control induced visual illusory 
pattern perception. Participants were randomly assigned to either low-control or 
baseline conditions and were then administered a concept-identification task.  In the 
task participants were presented with two symbols on a computer screen, and were 
required to choose which of the two symbols best related to a target concept. 
Participants in the low-control condition were given feedback (told whether their 
choice was incorrect or correct) about each of their selections, and were instructed to 
use this feedback in the subsequent series of symbols. The feedback given however, 
was non-contingent on participants’ actual performance; 50% of the time participants 
were told they were correct and the remaining 50% of the time they were told they 
were incorrect in their choice, thus creating an atmosphere of uncontrollability. 
Participants in the baseline condition were told their responses would be used to 
generate a baseline, and therefore were not given feedback. After the concept 
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identification task, participants were administered the PNS Scale (Neuberg & 
Newsome, 1993) to assess whether subjective control influenced the level of structure 
desired. Participants in the low-control condition were found to have a significantly 
higher PNS than those in the baseline condition. A limitation of such a methodology 
is that the PNS scale only measures transient or state level of personal need for 
structure, rather than a trait need for structure. Participants were then administered a 
modified version of the Modified Snowy Pictures Task (MSPT; Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008).  
In the MSPT, participants view 24 pictures of objects, however 12 of these 
pictures were granulated to the extent that the object detect was still possible albeit 
more difficult. The remaining 12 pictures had been further granulated until the 
objects were not possible to identify. Participants were required to respond by 
indicating if an object was present in the picture and if so, to write down what the 
object was (dependent variable). When an object was actually present all participants 
were able to identify what the object was. When an object was heavily obscured, 
more participants in the lack of control condition compared to the baseline condition 
responded that they could identify an object (however, this finding did not reach 
statistical significance at the 5% level), meaning that there was a trend towards those 
who felt a low sense of control perceiving objects that did not really exist. Whitson 
and Galinsky (2008) found that regardless of condition, all participants were able to 
accurately identify objects that did really exist.  
In a third experiment, these researchers (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) employed 
a different type of control manipulation. Those in the baseline condition were asked 
to recall a time where they felt they had complete control of a situation, and to then 
describe what happened and how they felt. Similarly, in the lack of control condition, 
participants were asked to recall a situation where they felt they had no control, and 
were asked to describe what happened and how they felt. Whitson and Galinsky 
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(2008) then asked participants to complete a questionnaire on superstitious beliefs, 
and found that those in the lack of control condition perceived greater connection 
between events (e.g. forgetting to stomp one’s feet three times before entering an 
important meeting, and then the personal outcome from this meeting being 
unfavourable), compared to those in the high control condition. The aim of this third 
study was to elucidate whether threat perception interacts of lack of control to cause 
illusory pattern perception (both visual and situational). The findings suggested that 
perceived low personal control induced illusory pattern perception irrespective of 
threat perception.  
In two of their studies, Whitson and Galinsky (2008) investigated situational 
illusory pattern perception as it applies to conspiracy theorising. In both studies, 
perceived low personal control was induced using the same recall task as used in 
experiment three. Participants were also presented with three scenarios (to measure 
conspiracy pattern perception) containing ambiguous information that have either a 
negative or positive outcome. Participants were then asked to decide whether the 
people other than the protagonist in the scenario were innocent, or part of a 
conspiracy that caused the outcome. In one study the scenarios were phrased using 
first-person, and in the other study the scenarios were phrased using third-person. 
Both studies found that perceived low personal control significantly increased 
perception of conspiracy. This suggests that perceived low personal control influenced 
greater perception of conspiracy regardless of whether the conspiracies were self-
referential or other-focused. Whitson and Galinsky (2008) extended one of these 
studies to investigate whether restoration of perceived subjective control can 
influence illusory pattern perception to return to baseline (normal). Therefore, half of 
the participants in the low-control group were given a self-affirmation task (the 
purpose of which was to improve subjective sense of control) to complete after the 
recall task, but before the conspiracy pattern perception task; whereas the second half 
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of the low control group were not given an opportunity for self-affirmation. Those 
who were not given an opportunity for self-affirmation perceived significantly more 
conspiracy in ambiguous scenarios compared to the self-affirmation group. By 
experimentally manipulating the level of control participants felt, Whitson and 
Galinsky (2008) were able to reverse their earlier findings and provided further 
support for the contention that those who feel a low sense of control have a tendency 
to perceive patterns that do not actually exist.  
Vannucci et al. (2011) also found Apophenia in situations of perceived low 
subjective control to be associated with a need for closure (NCC). In their study, 
participants were presented with images of real objects, but the first presented version 
of the object was extremely degraded. Each subsequent presentation of a version of 
the object was characterised by increasing levels of clarity. The same concept 
identification task as used by Whitson and Galinsky (2008) was also used by Vannucci 
et al. to experimentally manipulate the level of control participants felt. Participants 
in the low-control group signalled objective identification significantly earlier (at 
higher levels of visual degradation) than the neutral group.  
 
Apophenia – Not Always a Case of Maladaption 
When considered situationally (as opposed to visually), Apophenia can be 
considered a form of meaning-making, which in settings characterised by uncertainty 
can allow an individual to re-establish some semblance of order and control 
(Petchkovsky, 2008). Petchkovsky suggests that Apophany can sometimes have 
beneficial consequences. In particularly, Petchkovsky argues that Apophenia can 
sometimes be an important tool for discovery, so while in some circumstances it can 
reach a psychopathological extreme, in others it can be useful. For example, 
perception of genetic patterns in the predisposition for cancer, or perception of 
patterns in weather forecasting to provide severe storm warnings to people in high 
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risk zones. The sometimes adaptive nature of Apophenia can also be seen in statistical 
analysis, where eliminating randomness, such as in the law of averaging, allows 
meaningful patterns to emerge in large data-sets once the noise has been cancelled out 
by removing outliers (Elliman, 2006).  
Vannucci et al. (2011) also suggested that although participants in their low 
control group made object identifications earlier than the neutral group, there was no 
significant difference in accuracy between the groups. This finding is important as it 
supports the contention that those who feel a low level of control cease reasoning 
processes earlier than those who feel a high level of control, requiring fewer pieces of 
information before arriving at their decision (Schaller et al., 1995). In addition, the 
low control group made significantly more attempts to identify degraded visual 
objects compared to the neutral group. This finding demonstrates that at least in this 
non-clinical sample, greater response initiation was observed in the low control 
group, and so could reflect more efficient information-processing. One implication of 
this finding, however may be that because the experience of a low sense of control 
was experimentally induced, the low control group may not be representative of 
individuals who have experienced many occasions of low subjective control, and 
therefore were less likely to have acquired learned helplessness (chapter two). 
Therefore, the amplified response initiation seen in this group may also not be 
representative of those who feel a low sense of control in their everyday lives.  
Cross-cultural differences in illusory pattern perception have also implicated 
lack of control. Wang, Whitson, and Menon (2012) experimentally induced a lack of 
control in half their participants using the same recall task as employed by Whitson 
and Galinsky (2008). Wang et al. (2012) found that when a sense of low-control was 
induced, participants from Western cultures regarded information in horoscopes as 
self-referential and perceived patterns between horoscopes and their own lives. That 
is, participants applied the description of themselves in the horoscope to themselves 
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and considered the description be more true than not. In contrast, participants 
belonging to Eastern cultures were more likely to perceive patterns between 
information in horoscopes and the lives of their friends. This self-other cultural 
difference was said to be reflective of the individualistic versus communal 
characteristics of each culture.   
 
Study 1: Pattern Perception in Conspiracy Theorists 
 In this study I sought to replicate the findings of Whitson and Galinsky (2008) 
regarding illusory pattern perceptions underlying not only visual Apophenia, but also 
situationally-based Apophenia. Earlier research has also suggested that magical 
ideation is a form of meaning-making of ambiguous data, and therefore magical 
ideation could be considered a form of illusory pattern perception (Fyfe et al., 2008).  
 
Magical Ideation 
Magical ideation (MI) is a state of belief in one or more magical influences 
(which are culturally-inconsistent) as being responsible for the outcome of events 
(Meehl, 1964, as cited in Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Magical ideation can sometimes 
revolve around paranormal beliefs and include (but are not limited to) sensing a non-
human presence, a frequent sense of déjà vu, extrasensory perception (clairvoyance, 
telepathy, pre-cognition; French, 2001), and out-of-the-body-experiences. MI has also 
been linked to a tendency towards apophenia (making connections between unrelated 
stimuli; Bell, Reddy, Halligan, Kirov, & Ellis, 2007). A particularly important clinical 
consideration is that any magical or odd beliefs an individual may hold must not be 
consistent with the cultural or religious background of that individual, otherwise it 
cannot be considered abnormal or schizotypal in nature (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; 
DSM-IV-TR).  Furthermore, presence of MI has been found to be a strong predictor of 
development of other schizotypal personality (outlined in chapter four) and 
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psychotic-like symptoms (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Hewitt & Claridge, 1989; Meyer 
& Hautzinger, 1999).  
 The key functions of MI have been thought to allow explanations of causality 
(as hinted at by Meehl’s definition; Meehl, 1964, as cited in Eckblad & Chapman, 
1983), and as a motivation to increase the perception of control in uncontrollable 
situations (Pronin Wegner, McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2006). More specifically, humans 
have an innate need to explain and understand the events around them (LeBoeuf & 
Norton, 2012; Heider, 1958; Katz, 1960; Kay et al., 2010; McCauley & Jacques, 1979; 
Salt, 2008), and as such, when no rational causal explanation is available, MI-prone 
individuals are more likely to make odd or “magical” connections between unrelated 
aspects of a situation in order to allow this innate need to be satisfied (Pronin et al., 
2006) For instance, one study found that when presented with unrelated word pairs, 
and asked to produce a word semantically-related to the word pair, paranormal 
believers were more likely to produce a word, whereas non-paranormal believers 
were more likely to not produce a word and instead move on to the next item 
(Giannotti, Mohr, Pizzagalli, Lehman, & Brugger, 2001). This concept seems 
particularly relevant to apophenia, a form of illusory pattern perception (outlined 
earlier in this chapter).  Heuristically, MI may allow cognitive shortcuts to be made 
between two similar looking situations, which non-MI individuals would consider as 
coincidental. That is, if situation A and situation B are similar, it is possible that 
situation A caused situation B. For example, if a person finds a cake they’ve just iced 
on the kitchen floor, and later find their cat with icing on their paw, they may assume 
the cat knocked the cake off the kitchen windowsill whilst eating it (when the cake 
may have been blown off the windowsill by wind coming through the open window, 
and the cat having walked through the icing after the cake landed on the floor). An 
implication is that MI individuals require less information (compared to non-MI 
individuals) before choosing a causal explanation, and furthermore, will show high 
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levels of conviction for these causal explanations (Brugger & Graves, 1997). This is 
consonant with the jumping-to-conclusions information-processing bias seen in 
delusions (outlined later in chapter four; Fine et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2008; Garety 
et al., 1991; Moritz & Woodward, 2005) 
Another function MI may serve is to preserve a sense of control for individuals 
who otherwise feel a lack of control. That is, in situations characterised by 
uncertainty when a person has a need to feel some directive control of the outcome, 
that individual may be more motivated to engage in MI (Pronin et al., 2006). For 
example if a person strongly desires to win the lottery and decides that if they 
sacrificed food consumption for a week, they would be rewarded with a win.  
An aim of this study was to ascertain whether perceived low subjective control 
was associated with increased levels of magical meaning-making and the way in 
which individuals ascribe responsibility for negative events (illusory pattern 
perception). As earlier described, research has found that an external LOC is more 
likely in those who perceive low subjective control (Glass & Singer, 1972). 
Participants in this study were randomly assigned to low and high control 
conditions. Low and high perceived personal control (the two conditions) were 
experimentally manipulated using a method used by Whitson and Galinsky (2008). 
Across two studies Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found significant differences 
between these two conditions using this method, and given that this was the only 
differentiating factor between the two conditions it is conceivable that the statistical 
difference was induced by the experimental manipulation. However, it should also be 
noted that Whitson and Galinsky (2008) did not report whether a manipulation check 
was conducted, and thus care must be taken in interpreting their results. All 
participants were then administered the Magical Ideation (MI) subscale of the 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ), the MSPT (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) 
to assess visual illusory pattern perception, and then the conspiracy pattern 
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perception scenario task developed by Whitson and Galinsky (2008) to assess 
situational illusory pattern perception.  Patterns of responding were then compared 
across the two conditions. Furthermore, in the present study MI was considered a 
proxy for Apophenia, which has been argued to occur in response to perceived low 
personal control (Bell et al., 2007; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; Kay et al., 2009; 
Vannucci et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012). 
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the findings of Whitson and Galinsky (2008) as well as the discussion 
article by Kay et al. (2009), the following hypotheses for the current study were 
generated. The first hypothesis was that consistent with Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008), participants in the low-control group would demonstrate higher scores on the 
conspiracy pattern perception (scenario) measure compared to participants in the 
high-control group. The second hypothesis of the current study was that participants 
in the low-control condition would produce more incorrect responses (low scores) on 
the object absent dimension of the MSPT than participants in the high-control group. 
Third, it was expected that in the current study there would be no statistical 
difference in performance on the object present dimension of the MSPT between the 
low- and high-control groups. Fourth, participants in the low-control condition were 
hypothesized to score higher on a measure of MI compared to those in the high-
control condition. Fifth, it was hypothesised that participants who score highly on 
magical ideation (a proxy of Apophenia), will also score more highly on the 
Internal/External Locus of Control Questionnaire (reflecting a more external LOC of 
control), compared to low scorers on magical ideation. The final hypothesis of the 
current study was that participants in the low-control group would show higher 
scores on scales measuring anomie, authoritarianism, and hostility, and lower scores 
on the self-esteem scale compared to participants in the high-control group.  
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Method 
Participants  
Eighty-three (44 females) introductory-level psychology students participated 
in this study and received credit towards a mandatory course research requirement in 
exchange for their participation. Participants were randomly allocated to either the 
low control condition (n = 38) or the high control condition (n = 45). The uneven cell 
sizes are a result of the particular procedure used, whereby alternating testing sessions 
were administered either the low or high experimental manipulation. In one of the 
high control condition testing sessions more participants had signed up resulting in 
slightly more high control participants relative to low control participants. 
Participation in the study was voluntary, and all participants provided informed 
consent prior to commencement of the experiment. The specific hypotheses of the 
study were not revealed to participants before the experiment (but were during the 
debriefing phase of the session), however information on the types of measures used 
in the study was provided beforehand. All participants had normal or corrected vision 
and hearing, and none had any reading difficulties. Participants were aged 18 to 70 
years (M = 19.55, SD =6.59). The largest ethnic presence within the sample was New 
Zealand European (79%), followed by Maori (6.2%), and Asian (3.7%). The remainder 
of the sample was comprised by Anglo-Chinese, Cook Islanders, Eurasians, European-
Africans, Indian, New Zealand Indian, New Zealand Samoan, and South Africans, 
each contributing a proportion of 1.2% to the sample. One participant chose to not 
report their ethnicity. 
Materials/ Manipulation 
 All of the following measures can be found in Appendix A. See Table 1 for 
Cronbach alpha’s for each measure. 
In order to replicate and extend on the study conducted by Whitson and 
Galinsky (2008), participants were randomly allocated to high and low-control 
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groups, whereby participants were given either a low-control recall task or a high-
control recall task.  In the low-control recall task participants were asked to 
remember a situation in their lives (past or present) where they felt they had no 
control over the situation. They were then asked to describe the situation, i.e. what 
happened and how they felt. The high-control recall task differed in that participants 
had to recall a situation where they felt they had complete control over the situation.  
A range of measures were employed in the current study to measure various 
forms of pattern perception and personality variables. They are as follows: 
The Modified Snowy Pictures Task (MSPT; Whitson and Galinsky, 2008) was 
used to assess visual pattern perception. Twenty-four items (plus two practice items) 
of granulated images (that visually looked similar to a snowy television screen) were 
presented to participants. In 12 of the items, objects were present, however even 
though the images were grainy, the objects were still discernible, e.g. chair. In the 
remaining 12 items there was no object present. Participants were told that some 
items may not contain an object. Participants were required to write one or two 
words to describe each item. They were told to simply write ‘none if they could not 
see an object. A further instruction for this measure was to not spend too long on any 
one item. Consistent with Whitson and Galinsky (2008), scores on this scale are 
calculated in three ways: total number of correct responses; object present correct 
responses (saying an object is present in an image when it really is; OP); and object 
absent correct responses (saying an object is present in an image when it is not; OA).  
The Conspiracy Pattern Perception (CPP; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) scale 
involved the presentation of three scenarios worded in the first person (see Appendix 
A for items). In each scenario, participants were presented with an ambiguous 
situation, and then were asked to rate to what extent they believed the events or 
other actors in the scenario were connected to the outcome for the protagonist. 
Participants responded using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “a great 
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deal”. A high score on this measure reflects stronger conspiracy pattern perception or 
CT creation (creating connections between unrelated situational stimuli).  
The previous measures were used to replicate Whitson and Galinksy (2008), 
however, the following measures were administered to all participants to extend on 
the findings of Whitson and Galinsky to potentially identify underlying mechanisms.  
The Conspiracy Beliefs Scale (CBS; Wilson, unpublished) was also 
administered to participants during a mass testing session (outlined below). 
Participants were presented with a range of CTs and were asked to rate how likely 
they thought it was that the conspiracies had actually taken place. E.g. “NASA faked 
the first moon landings for publicity” and “The All Blacks were deliberately poisoned 
before the 1995 rugby world cup final”. Participants responded to 30 items on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all likely” to “Very likely”. The greater the 
score on this scale, the greater the level of conspiracy thinking.   
The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1994) was 
administered to all participants during a mass testing session (is outlined below); 
however only the odd beliefs and magical thinking subscale of the SPQ was of 
relevance to this particular study, as it was used to measure Magical Ideation (MI). An 
example item from this subscale is “Have you had experiences with astrology, seeing 
the future, UFO’s, ESP, or a sixth sense?” This subscale was comprised of seven items 
to which participants responded “yes” or “no”. The higher the score on this scale, the 
higher the level of magical thinking.  
The Internal/External Locus of Control Questionnaire (Rotter, 1966) is 
comprised of 23 forced-choice questions. Each question is comprised of two 
statements from which participants must select one of the two choices best reflects 
how they feel.  This questionnaire was used to measure attribution style. E.g. a) “As 
far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither 
understand, nor control”, b) “By taking an active part in political and social affairs 
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people can control world events”. A high score on this measure reflects external locus 
of control (external attribution style), and a low score reflect internal locus of control 
(internal attribution style).  
As previously discussed, research (Moscovici, 1987; Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999) has suggested that conspiracy theorists tend to feel more 
aggression/hostility compared to non-conspiracy theorists. Therefore, Participants 
were also administered the Hostility subscale of the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & 
Perry, 1992) to measure the cognitive component of aggression. Participants 
responded to eight items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Extremely 
uncharacteristic of me” to “Extremely characteristic of me”. An example item is “I 
wonder why sometimes I feel so bitter about things”.  The higher the score on this 
scale, the higher the hostility. 
The Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) is comprised of 10 items, to which 
participants respond on a 4-point Likert scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree”. E.g. “I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with 
others”. A high score on this measure reflects high self-esteem. 
Anomia and Authoritarianism were constructs both measured using the 
corresponding subscales of the Attitude-Type Scale (Srole, 1956). Each subscale was 
comprised by five items, to which participants responded using a 4-point Likert scale 
ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”. An example Anomie item is 
“There’s little use in writing to public officials because often they aren’t really 
interested in the problems of the average man”. An example Authoritarianism item is 
“Any good leader should be strict with people under him in order to gain their 
respect”.  Low scores on these subscales reflect strong anomie and authoritarian 
attitudes respectively.  
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS; version 18) and 
ModGraph (Jose, 2013) were used to analyse the data.  
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Procedure 
Introductory-level psychology students at Victoria University of Wellington 
were tested on a range of measures in a mass testing session in exchange for which 
they received credit towards a mandatory course research requirement in exchange 
for their participation. The two measures from the mass testing session that are of 
relevance to this particular study were the CBS, and the SPQ. All participants in this 
study completed each measure online using an online survey tool (Survey Monkey).  
The remainder of the measures in this study were administered in sessions 
comprised by no more than 10 participants at a time. Participants were able to sign up 
to participate in the study using an online system operated by the School of 
Psychology at Victoria University of Wellington. Participants were able to read a 
short description of the study and what would be expected of them should they wish 
to participate. At this stage the inclusion criteria for participation was also outlined. 
The inclusion criteria required English as participants’ first language, that they had 
completed the mass testing session in their first psychology laboratory, that they had 
normal (or corrected) vision and hearing, and that they had a reasonable level of 
reading skill. If the students wished to participate in the study they indicated this by 
ticking a box, at which point a schedule of available sessions appeared on screen. 
Participants were then able to select which testing session to would like to attend. 
Five minutes before the session, the principal investigator collected the participants 
from a previously designated area and led them to a quiet testing room. Once all 
students who had signed up for the study had arrived, the principal investigator 
described the study to them. Each student was given an information sheet (see 
Appendix B) which outlined the purpose of the study and what they would be 
required to do if they wished to continue, and that they could withdraw their 
participation any time up to the conclusion of the testing session. Potential 
participants were given an opportunity to ask questions before the experiment 
69 
 
commenced. Once these questions were answered to their satisfaction, each 
participant was required to provide signed consent (see appendix B) before they could 
continue.  Each batch of participants (up to 10) were assigned to the high-control or 
low control conditions in alternating order (i.e. first batch tested was low-control, 
second batch was high-control, third batch was low-control and so on). Testing 
sessions were 30 minutes in duration and took place in a quiet room. Participants 
were given the opportunity to ask questions before the experiment commenced. 
Participants were then given a package of the all the measures (refer to Appendix A) 
outlined above. Participants were asked to complete the various measures in the order 
they were provided (not skipping back and forth) starting with the recall task. This 
was to ensure that the control level manipulation was effective as a prime.  
 Once all participants in a batch had completed the experiment, the debrief 
phase of the session commenced (see Appendix C), in which the purpose and specific 
hypotheses of the study were explained. Participants were again given the 
opportunity to have any questions answered, and were provided with a debrief sheet 
to keep.  
Results 
An Alpha level of 5% (α = 0.05) was used for all statistical analysis reported in 
this thesis. Three participants were removed from the analysis as they were outliers in 
the data when conducting regression analysis (reported below); therefore all data 
analysis was recalculated excluding the outliers.  
For each measure used in this study, scores were compared across the two 
conditions low control and high control (Table 1). However, one-way between-
groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no significant differences between the 
conditions for any of the measures, with the exception of the MI subscale where the 
high control condition demonstrated a higher level of magical ideation. However, a 
number of the measures used in this study were correlated at either the p < .05 or p 
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< .01 level across both conditions (Table 2). For instance, the higher the scores on the 
CBS, the more magical ideation a participant was likely to experience; the more 
disconnected a participant felt from society (high scores on Anomie), the less likely 
they were to make meaningful connections between unrelated situational stimuli 
(high scores on CPP).  High scores on any of the measures (excluding MSPT) also 
meant a participant was likely to score highly on the measure of hostility. Other 
significant correlations of note include that an external LOC of control was associated 
with higher levels of MI, but also lower self-esteem and anomie. 
 
Table 1 
Mean Scores and Analysis of Variance on Scales by Condition 
  
Measure 
Low Control 
(n = 37)   
High Control 
(n = 44) 
Between-
group 
differences 
Internal reliability 
Mean SD   Mean SD F(1, 79) = α = 
Conspiracy Pattern Perception 11.97 3.31  12.50 3.12 0.03 ns .46 
        
MSPT 15.32 3.16  15.52 3.59 0.07 ns .17 
        
Hostility 20.62 4.41  21.43 4.88 0.61 ns .71 
        
Magical Ideation 7.92 1.14  8.73 1.97 4.71* .91 
        
LOC 12.68 4.10  11.45 3.63 2.02 ns .67 
        
Self-Esteem 19.22 3.12  19.07 4.39 0.03 ns .83 
        
Anomie 5.78 1.73  6.00 2.02 0.26 ns .50 
        
Authoritarianism 4.32 1.49  4.02 1.98 0.58 ns .40 
Note. ns = not significant. * = p < 0.05. MSPT = Modified Snow Pictures Task.
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Table 2 
Significant Correlations Between Study 1 Measures 
 
Conspiracy 
Pattern 
Perception 
Magical 
Ideation 
subscale of 
SPQ 
Conspiracy 
Beliefs Scale 
Anomie Subscale 
of Attitude-Type 
Scale 
Authoritarianism Subscale 
of Attitude-Type Scale 
Self-
Esteem 
Scale 
Internal/External Locus of 
Control Questionnaire 
Aggression 
Questionnaire 
Conspiracy Pattern 
Perception 
 
 0.15 0.18 0.26* 0.11 -0.13 0.01 0.29** 
Magical Ideation subscale 
of SPQ 
 
  0.32** 0.19 0.19 -0.25 0.25* 0.37** 
Conspiracy Beliefs Scale 
 
   0.23 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.23* 
Anomie Subscale of 
Attitude-Type Scale 
 
    0.32** -0.26* 0.28* 0.54** 
Authoritarianism Subscale 
of Attitude-Type Scale 
 
     -0.22 0.09 0.38** 
Self-Esteem Scale 
 
      -0.50** -0.49** 
Internal/External Locus of 
Control Questionnaire 
 
       0.27* 
Aggression Questionnaire 
 
        
Note. * p < 0.05. **p < 0.01.
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Modified Snowy Pictures Task  
The mean total score for the MSPT showed no significant differences across 
condition. However, in order to replicate Whitson and Galinsky (2008), performance 
on the MSPT was broken down by object absent correct responses (OA), and object 
present correct responses (OP), and then compared across condition (level of control).  
 A one-way between-groups ANOVA revealed there was no significant 
difference between means (Table 3) across condition for OA, F(1, 79) = 0.00, p = 0.96. 
Similarly, there was no significant difference found for OP, F(1, 79) = 0.13, p = 0.73. 
Furthermore, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed there was no 
significant difference between how participants performed across subgroups (OA and 
OP) in each condition, Wilks’ Lambda = .10, F(3,77) = 0.06, p=0.98; partial eta squared 
= .002. 
 
Table 3 
Mean Performance Scores on Modified Snowy Picture Task for Study 1 Subgroups 
  Low Control   High Control 
MSPT Subgroup Mean SD   Mean SD 
OA 8.00 2.80  8.20 2.42 
OP 7.30 2.13   7.27 1.85 
Note. OA = object absent correct responses; OP = object present correct responses 
 
Moderation Analysis 
Previous research (e.g. Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) has suggested that level of 
perceived control is associated with illusory pattern perception, however in this study 
no significant differences were found in Apophenia between different levels of 
control using MANOVA. Thus it was hypothesised that the strength of the 
relationship between Apophenia (measured by perception on MSPT) and level of 
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control might be accounted for in some way by a third variable (a moderator 
variable), and by not investigating the contribution of this third variable, some of the 
relationship that may actually exist between level of control and Apophenia may be 
masked. It was hypothesised that this third variable might be MI. As described earlier, 
Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found that those who held superstitious beliefs (an 
aspect of MI) in their low-control condition were more likely to make meaningful 
connections between unrelated stimuli than those in their high-control condition. 
Thus it was hypothesised that in the current study, those in the low-control condition 
who also reported higher levels of MI may be more likely to perceive an object when 
it does not really exist (on the MSPT). It was considered that it might be possible that 
there was a joint effect of MI and condition that was over and above that of their 
separate effects. In order to investigate this hypothesis, multiple linear regression 
analysis was conducted using the recommendations for moderation analysis by Baron 
and Kenny (1986). The enter method was used to analyse each potential model.  
A moderator variable affects the strength of the relationship of an independent 
variable on a dependent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Kraemer, Kiernan, Essex, & 
Kupfer, 2008). Moderation analysis can be conducted when the dependent and 
independent variables are categorical, continuous, or a combination of the two. In this 
study both the variables (condition and MI respectively) were continuous in nature. A 
third variable was constructed which was a composite combining the responses on 
the MI subscale of the SPQ by condition (low-control versus high-control). As would 
be expected, use of the composite variable condition by MI generated a very strong 
positive Pearson’s correlation between the composite variable and condition of 0.952, 
with a tolerance value of 0.022 and variation inflation factor (VIF) of 45.1723. To 
                                               
3 Leahy (2000) recommends a tolerance cut-off value of 0.20, therefore values below this cut-off 
indicate multicollinearity. Leah (2000) further suggests that VIF’s greater than 4.0 indicate 
multicollinearity. 
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account for the multicollinearity the data were centred first (Baron & Kenny, 1986), 
where the mean MI score was subtracted from each MI data point4.  
For OA, MI scores and condition were entered first, however the model was 
not significant (F(2, 74) = 0.80, p = 0.45, R2 adjusted = -0.005). A significant model 
emerged with the second step of the regression analysis using MI scores, condition, 
and the composite variable of condition by MI (F(3, 73) = 2.95, p < 0.05, R2 adjusted = 
0.07). When the identical models were analysed for OP, neither was significant (F(2, 
74) = 0.28, p = 0.76, R2 adjusted = -0.02; F( 3, 73) = 0.70, p = 0.55, R2 adjusted = -0.01 
respectively). None of the OP beta regression coefficients were significant at the 5% 
level, similar to the first model for OA. However, in contrast, beta regression 
coefficient for the second OA model with regard to the moderating variable, MI 
centred scores was significant (β = -.68, p < .05), as was the third step of the regression 
analysis which analysed the relationship between and the composite variable 
condition by Centred MI scores and Apophenia (β = .61, p <.05). Therefore, being in 
the low-control condition with high MI scores predicted Apophenia (perceiving non-
existent objects in the MSPT). As the inclusion of the MI by condition interaction 
term explained significant additional variance (ΔR2 = .09), this indicates moderation, 
i.e. MI interacts with condition to affect OA scores (but not OP). To understand the 
nature of the interaction, Modgraph was used. The interaction is shown in Figure 2. 
 
                                               
4 According to Dalal and Zicker (2011), centering the MI data may alter the size of the correlation of 
MI with other variables without affecting its significance. 
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Figure 2. Significant interaction of Magical Ideation by Condition on Apophenia. Low scores on y-axis 
indicate greater levels of Apophenia (objects that do not actually exist were perceived). 
 
Discussion 
 The primary aim of this study was to replicate the findings of earlier research 
(Whitson & Galinksy, 2008) that perceived low personal control induces illusory 
pattern perception – both visually and situationally. The analyses of the effect of 
perceived control on Apophenia led to the finding that MI moderates the strength of 
the relationship between these two variables. We turn now to discussion of the 
hypotheses (presented in the introduction) and whether support for them was 
obtained in this study.  
In this study it was hypothesised that participants in the low-control group 
would demonstrate higher scores on the conspiracy pattern perception (scenario) 
measure compared to participants in the high-control group. However, this 
hypothesis was not supported in the present study as no significant difference in 
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conspiracy pattern perception was detected between the low and high control groups. 
Thus this finding was not consistent with that of Whitson and Galinsky (2008) who 
found their low-control participants to perceive significantly more conspiracy than 
participants in their high-control condition.  
It was also hypothesized that participants in the low-control condition were 
expected to produce more incorrect responses (low scores) on the object absent 
dimension of the MSPT than participants in the high-control group. This hypothesis 
was not supported by the findings of the current study, which is consistent with the 
findings of Whitson and Galinsky (2008) who did not find a statistically significant 
difference. However, using a more relaxed confidence interval Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008) found that participants in the low-control condition perceived more objects 
that did not exist than participants in the high-control condition. In the current 
study, a significant difference between the two groups was not found, even using a 
more relaxed confidence interval. However, one of the key findings of the present 
study was that those who perceived low subjective control and who also reported 
high levels of MI (high belief in paranormal phenomena) were more likely to perceive 
objects that did not actually exist. Thus those who perceived low personal control 
experienced one form of Apophenia (specifically, MI - a moderating factor), were 
more likely to experience another form of Apophenia, specifically, visual illusory 
pattern perception. Research has suggested those who perceive low subjective control 
are more likely to experience MI (Pronin et al., 2006, Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). MI 
as measured by the SPQ is intended to identify a personality trait characterised by a 
relatively stable (as opposed to a state-like) tendency to hold paranormal beliefs 
(Raine, 1991; Meyer & Hautzinger, 1999); and thus MI could be considered a trait-like 
consequence of perceived low personal control, rather than state-like perception of 
low personal control. Thus it is possible that when low subjective control was made 
salient for participants with trait MI, they responded with illusory pattern perception 
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as a compensatory mechanism to re-establish a sense of personal control. Participants 
in the sample who did not demonstrate high levels of MI may be individuals who do 
not perceive low subjective control in an enduring fashion, and potentially presented 
with some resilience against the control prime intended to induce a sense of low 
personal control. As a result, these participants did not demonstrate illusory pattern 
perception.  
Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found that when they presented participants in 
their low control condition with the opportunity for self-affirmation (increased 
perceived subjective control), illusory pattern perception decreased to baseline levels. 
Similarly, in the present study, participants in the high-control condition presented 
with less illusory pattern perception regardless of level of MI. This suggests that 
individuals who reported high levels of MI, and who may perceive low subjective 
control in a trait like fashion, were less susceptible to visual Apophenia when given 
the opportunity to recall a situation in which they felt in complete control (which 
may have served a self-affirming function). Thus because another means of re-
establishing perceived control was already active, there was no need for illusory 
pattern perception to occur.  
The third hypothesis of this study was that there would be no statistical 
difference in performance on the object present dimension of the MSPT between the 
low- and high-control groups. Consistent with the findings of Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008), the present findings indicated that all participants were able to accurately 
identify visual objects that actually existed, regardless of the level of personal control 
they perceived. This suggests that level of perceived control does not affect the ability 
to detect patterns that actually exist. In addition, a magical thinking style did not 
affect participants’ ability to perceive real visual patterns. 
The fourth prediction for the findings was that participants in the low-control 
condition would score higher on a measure of MI compared to participants in the 
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high-control condition. In contrast to the findings of Fyfe et al. (2008), the current 
study found that participants in the high-control condition reported significantly 
higher levels of MI, as measured by the MI subscale of the SPQ, compared to 
participants in the low-control condition; therefore this hypothesis was not supported 
by the findings. The cause of this finding may lie in the methodology employed in the 
present study. Specifically, the order of presentation of measures may have played a 
role in the high MI scores in the high-control condition. The order of presentation 
was the same for all participants, beginning with the recall task, then the MSPT, and 
then the battery of questionnaires measuring various personality variables, including 
MI. The participants in the high control condition may have benefited from the self-
affirming recall task (recalling a situation in which they had complete control) to the 
extent that they did not demonstrate illusory pattern perception on the MSPT which 
was administered immediately after the recall task. However, mean total scores 
(number of total correct responses) on the MSPT across the two conditions were not 
significantly different, with participants achieving approximately 64% total accuracy 
across 24 items. So although both groups were incorrect approximately 36% of the 
time, the nature of the inaccuracies differed between the groups. When objects were 
not actually present in the visual stimuli, participants in the low-control condition 
who also reported high MI tended to perceive objects and even labelled what they 
saw, whereas participants in the high-control condition in general responded that 
they did not know if an object was present. Both types of responses were counted as 
incorrect. It is possible that for participants in the high-control group with high trait 
MI, the recall task was protective against visual illusory pattern perception. However, 
the total accuracy score for the high-control group suggests that these participants 
were exposed to a situation of uncertainty (not knowing if an object existed in some 
of the pictures or not) and potentially perceived low subjective control. Being 
subsequently presented with the MI subscale of the SPQ (and other measures of 
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personality variables), high control participants demonstrated high scores reflecting 
Apophenia (Giannotti et al., 2001; Pronin et al., 2006; Bell et al., 2007; Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008; Kay et al., 2009; Vannucci et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012). This could 
mean that high-control group participants with high trait MI no longer benefitted 
from the buffer of the self-affirmation task (because the MSPT exposed them to a 
situation of low-control). The high MI scores of the rest of the high-control group 
participants may reflect state (transient) high MI as a result of being exposed to a 
situation (the MSPT) of low personal control and high uncertainty.  Future research 
would benefit from counterbalancing the order of presentation of measures in order 
to provide more clarity as to how level of perceived control affects not just MI but 
responses on other measures.  
The fifth hypothesis of this study was that participants who scored highly on 
magical ideation, would also score highly on the Internal/External Locus of Control 
Questionnaire (reflecting a more external LOC of control), compared to low scorers 
on magical ideation. The findings of the current study supported this hypothesis 
where the higher participants scored on the magical/odd thinking subscale of the 
SPQ, the higher they were likely to respond on the I-E Locus of Control 
Questionnaire. This finding suggests that those who engage in magical thinking are 
more likely to have an external LOC. Hence, this study lends support for the 
argument that those who perceive low personal control may present with MI, which 
could be considered a proxy for Apophenia (Bell et al., 2007; Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008; Kay et al., 2009; Vannucci et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012). Glass and Singer 
(1972) found that an external LOC was more likely in those who experience low 
subjective control, and therefore, it could be reasoned that those who demonstrate MI 
are more likely to have an external LOC. Indeed, other research supports the notion 
that a key function of MI is to allow explanations of causality (Meehl, 1967, as cited in 
Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Essentially, the ability to provide an explanation 
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enhances the experience of controllability in uncontrollable situations (Giannotti et 
al., 2001; Pronin et al., 2006).  
Finally, it was expected that participants in the low-control group would have 
higher scores on scales measuring anomie, authoritarianism, and hostility, and lower 
scores on the self-esteem scale compared to participants in the high-control group. 
Contrary to expectation, there was no significant difference found between the two 
conditions on anomie, authoritarianism, hostility, or self-esteem, meaning that both 
groups responded fairly similarly on measures of these constructs. Similar to what 
may have occurred to high-control group participants with regard to MI scores, the 
protective buffer offered by the self-affirmation task may have been cancelled out by 
the subsequently presented MSPT, which potentially served as exposure to a situation 
of uncertainty and perceived low-control. Thus participants across both conditions 
responded fairly similar across the questionnaires measuring personality variables. 
However, as shown in Table 2, participants who felt higher levels of alienation from 
society (anomie), self-esteem, magical ideation, more external LOC, and closer 
alignment with established authorities (authoritarianism), were also more likely to 
experience more hostility.  Additionally, the more external participants’ LOC, the 
lower self-esteem and the more alienation they were likely to present with. However, 
high scores on the CPP measure were positively correlated with high scores on the 
Anomie measure and Hostility measure, suggesting that the higher the level of 
ascription to CTs, the more alienated one is likely to feel from society, and the more 
hostility they are also likely to present with. These findings relating to anomie and 
hostility are therefore consistent with the findings of previous research (Moscovici, 
1987; Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). 
 High levels of alienation were also associated with higher levels of situational 
illusory pattern perception (CPP scores). Stronger beliefs in conspiracies (CBS scores) 
were associated with higher levels of MI. That is, those who believe in paranormal 
81 
 
phenomena were also more likely to concede that a range of conspiracies occurred 
(thus the two forms of Apophenia were positively associated). However, belief in 
conspiracies (CBS scores) was not found to be correlated with situational illusory 
pattern perception (CPP scores). Therefore, it could be reasoned that belief in 
paranormal phenomena is associated with the tendency to believe in conspiracies, but 
not necessarily the tendency to form CTs. This contention is in line with my 
conceptualisation of CT affinity, which acknowledges that believers of CTs may not 
necessarily engage in conspiracy theorising, and also acknowledges the continuous 
nature of conspiracy thinking.  
 On balance, the findings of this study suggest that when people feel a lack of 
control and also experience high levels of magical ideation, they are more likely to 
also perceive illusory visual patterns. There was no support in this study for the 
contention that these findings can be extended to the situational realm. Furthermore, 
those who engage in magical ideation are also more likely to have an external 
attribution style. However, a direct link between perceived low personal control and 
an external attribution style has not been evidenced here. This suggests that also 
engaging in magical ideation has a contributing effect over and above that of lack of 
control on its own, in the development and maintenance of an external attribution 
style.  
I am wary of interpreting these findings too generally as some of the results of 
this study are not consistent with previous research. Whilst Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008) did not investigate the contribution of magical ideation and low subjective 
control in pattern perception, they did find some significant group differences where 
the current study did not. Of particular note is the finding regarding conspiracy 
pattern perception (CPP). In both their studies regarding CPP (studies 4 and 6), 
Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found participants in the low-control group perceived 
significantly more conspiracy (situational illusory pattern perception) compared to 
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those in the high-control group. This contradiction in the findings is interesting as the 
CPP scale used in the current study was identical to that used by Whitson and 
Galinsky (2008), as was the recall task used to manipulate sense of control in their 
sixth study. However, it is possible that this control prime was not effective for 
inducing a subjective sense of low control in our sample. In the current study, 
perceived level of subjective control was primed by asking participants to recall a 
situation where they felt they either had complete control over a situation or no 
control in a situation. However, the findings of this study were not as marked as seen 
by Whitson and Galinsky (2008). A flaw of both the Whitson and Galinsky (2008) 
study and the current study was that no manipulation check was undertaken; 
therefore there is no confirmation that the recall task was able to successfully induce 
a sense of low subjective control. If this study were to be replicated, a measure such as 
the powerlessness/mastery scale by Pearlin, Meaghan, Lieberman and Mullan (1981) 
would be important to ensure that perceived subjective control as an independent 
variable, has been manipulated to create the intended effect.  Therefore, I cannot say 
with certainty that the recall task was the most effective approach to manipulate 
perceived personal control.  
Review of the past literature as to other methods that have been used to 
manipulate level of control revealed that inducing mortality salience can be 
particularly effective. Mortality salience is a state experimentally induced in 
participants by increasing their access to death-related thoughts (Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). The most common mortality salience methods used 
in past research has been death essays, fear of death questionnaires, videos or 
vignettes themed with death (Burke et al., 2010). A review of the mortality salience 
literature follows, and then a replication of the current study with the control prime 
amendment is presented. A more thorough discussion that encompasses the findings 
of Studies 1 and 2 is then presented. 
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Study 2: Mortality Salience and Illusory Pattern 
Perception 
 No living thing is able to live on endlessly and remain untouched by death.  
Researchers have suggested that contemplation of death drives humans to achieve 
their goals, because of the awareness of a restricted time frame (e.g. Greenberg et al., 
1997; Arnt & Greenber, 1999; Arnt & Solomon, 2003; Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhanel, 
2008; Burke et al., 2010; Juhl & Routledge, 2010; Rogers, 2011). All the world’s 
religions have their own way of regarding death and what happens beyond death. 
Even secular regions of the world (e.g. the Netherlands) have been shown to 
demonstrate the same level of contemplation as to what happens after life ceases 
(Wojtkowiak & Rutjens, 2011). Historians, anthropologists, theologians, and religious 
scholars have discovered that ancient peoples also spent a considerable amount of 
attention considering the process of death, the afterlife, and the practices surrounding 
death, and indeed there is proof of this in eschatological texts such as the Egyptian 
book of the dead, the Tibetan book of the dead, the Maya book of the dead, the 
Nahuatl book of the dead, and even the Christian book of the dead (Ars Moriendi; 
Grof, 1994). For instance, in Egyptian custom, some believed that if they worshipped 
the sun god Amun Ra, in the afterlife they would journey with him and other deities 
on what they referred to as a sun barge (a special boat) – an esteemed privilege. 
According to Bowker (1991), the ancient Egyptians did not fear death, but rather 
viewed death as life continued in another world. They did however fear chaos in this 
world or any other, so in order to restore some semblance of control the process of 
mummification and entombment was in a way intended to streamline the transition 
between this world and the next so as to not allow chaos to insert itself during the 
journey.   
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Grof (1994) argues that Ars Moriendi was produced during a time of great 
uncertainty because of a substantial portion of the population dying almost en masse 
as a result of various epidemics, wars, and the holy inquisition. The purpose of the 
text was to shed some light on the subject of impermanence and provide the living 
with instruction on how to regard death, and also encourage readers to focus their 
goals in life and not be distracted by vanity and other harmful behaviours, but instead 
to live righteously (Grof, 1994). This type of guidance was aimed at reducing anxiety 
about death by providing auspices under which humans should operate. However, 
others such as Malinowski (1925, as cited in Bowker, 1991), argue that religion 
exploits people’s fear of death “…to exercise power, control and manipulation over 
oppressed and helpless humans” (Malinowski, 1991, p. 8). Whatever the case may be, 
death itself is inescapable, and the concept of death being unavoidable, the 
uncertainty of the circumstances it may take place can induce foreboding, anxiety, 
and a sense of no control in many people. Indeed Fritsche et al. (2008) claim that 
contemplating the certainty that one will die some day (mortality salience) 
undermines the sense of control one feels.  
 To describe the effects of acute terror that can be engendered with one’s 
awareness of their own mortality, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1986) 
conceptualised terror management theory (TMT). TMT also takes account of the 
strategies people use to manage this terror, thus increasing the sense of control they 
experience (control restoration), and are considered to serve a death-denying purpose 
(refusing to believe that human existence ceases at the time of biological death) by 
ensuring either symbolic or literal immortality (Deschesne et al., 2003).  For instance, 
symbolic immortality can be achieved in a number of ways. The first is the creation, 
maintenance, and defence of one’s belief systems, that is, their cultural worldview 
(Arnt & Greenber, 1999; Arnt & Solomon, 2003; Burke et al., 2010; Greenberg et al., 
1997; Juhl & Routledge, 2010; Rogers, 2011). The second is how well the person feels 
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they represent and live up to this belief system, that is, their self-esteem (Rosenblatt, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Strong ascription to a cultural 
worldview, and the feeling that one represents this worldview well, are said to in 
combination have an anxiolytic effect for mortality salience as they instil a sense of 
meaning and order – a state known as death transcendence (Fritsche et al.,2008). 
Symbolic immortality can also be achieved through the continuation of oneself 
through their children or monetary investments and so on. 
According to a number of researchers (e.g. Deschesne et al., 2003; Greenberg 
et al., 1997; Vail, Rothschild, Weise, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2010), 
people believe that literal immortality can be secured by attaching oneself to the more 
spiritual ideas such as the idea of the soul continuing beyond death into the afterlife 
or reincarnation.  If people were not able to manage their terror related to death-
awareness, this could severely affect their ability to function on a daily basis, thus 
increasing the sense of control experienced is an important task. Terror management 
then, enables continued functioning despite the knowledge of inevitable death.  
The methodology of most research investigating TMT, is often to first induce 
mortality salience and then study how this affects a range of dependent variables (e.g. 
self-esteem). The mortality salience hypothesis predicts that once people have 
invested in their belief system / worldview, by increasing their access to death-related 
thoughts (mortality salience), their allegiance to their worldview will strengthen, 
which they will then defend strongly as it has implications for their self-esteem and 
symbolic immortality (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010) and thus the level of 
perceived control one experiences. In fact, Fritsche et al. (2008) state that the above 
TMT strategies play a vital role in perceived control restoration. For instance, studies 
researching worldview defence as a TMT strategy have confirmed that if people are 
reminded of their mortality, and then exposed to those who disagree with their belief 
systems or are neutral on the matter, they will evaluate such individuals with more 
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negativity. However, if people are exposed to people who voice agreement with their 
belief systems, these individuals would be evaluated more favourably (Arnt & 
Greenberg, 1999; Arnt & Solomon, 2003; Harmon-Jones, Simon, Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, Solomon, & McGregor, 1997). One interpretation (Fritsche et al., 2008) 
of this finding has been that the level of control an individual perceives their ingroup 
to possesses is considered an expression of the level of control they also possess at an 
individual-level. Thus a strong sense of ingroup can lead to a greater sense of control 
at the individual level. This pattern of findings was not replicated by increasing 
accessibility to non-death topics (e.g. social rejection or pain), or the idea of self-
determined death, thus providing discriminant validity for the mortality salience 
hypothesis, which relates to unpredictable death (Burke et al., 2010). The current 
study builds on this suggestion that mortality salience elicits a sense of powerlessness, 
and utilises the Multidimensional Fear of Death Scale (MFODS; Hoelter, 1979) to 
induce mortality salience.  
Death anxiety has also been investigated specifically in those who believe CTs 
Newheiser et al. (2011) found that after mortality salience occurred, participants were 
more likely to endorse CTs (relating to the Da Vinci Code). The researcher reasoned 
that an enduring belief system such as that characterised by CTs can be considered a 
form of worldview. Therefore, when faced with an experience of perceived low 
personal control, people with a belief system consistent with CTs will be more likely 
to endorse CTs in order to eradicate a sense of meaningless or low control (Newheiser 
et al., 2011). Endorsement of this particular worldview then provides an individual 
with a sense of symbolic immortality that would transcend their death (Newheiser et 
al., 2011). Death-anxiety was measured in their study using a fear of death 
questionnaire (Collett-Lester Fear of Death Scale; Lester, 1994). 
Similarly Sullivan et al. (2010) also argue that endorsement of CTs is an 
attempt to re-establish perceived personal control. They argue that by ascribing 
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causality for negative events to perceived powerful others, order is restored to their 
system. Sullivan et al. (2010) found that those presented with a fear of death scale 
were more likely to ascribe causality for aversive events to enemies or political 
officials. The researchers concluded that the ability to identify risk in one’s 
environment led to a perception of increased personal control. We can make sense of 
this finding by reflecting on Swami and Cole’s (2010) assertion that CTs strengthens a 
sense of certainty in uncertain times. The certainty offered by ascribing causality to 
powerful others provides some certainty, serving to re-establish a sense of perceived 
personal control.  
 Mortality salience manipulations have long been used as an independent 
variable to measure the influence of death awareness on a range of dependent 
variables compared to control groups (Burke et al., 2010). The dependent variables 
investigated in the past have included attitudes towards a particular person, a non-
person oriented attitude, behaviour, cognition, and affect. Most relevant to the 
present research, Fritsche et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between mortality 
salience and the sense of control. According to these researchers, at the core of fear of 
death is a sense of lack of control, and the behaviours one displays when mortality 
salience occurs are ultimately to restore a sense of control. In the current study, 
mortality salience was induced (to create a sense of low personal control), and then 
illusory pattern perception both in visual and situational realms were measured.  
 Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found that when they experimentally 
manipulated perceived personal control, participants in the low control condition 
demonstrated significantly greater illusory pattern perception: both visually (as 
measured by the MSPT) and situationally (as measured by the CPP scale) compared to 
those in the high control condition. In Study 1 I was unable to replicate the findings 
of Whitson & Galinsky (2008) despite using the same experimental manipulation (a 
recall task) as they did. The exception to this was when I considered the role a more 
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stable form of illusory pattern perception (MI) and found that the higher participants 
in the low control condition scored on the MI subscale of the SPQ the more likely 
they were to demonstrate visual illusory pattern perception. This was not the case 
however, with situational illusory pattern perception where no significant difference 
between the two conditions were found. I considered that the experimental 
manipulation used in Study 1 was not powerful enough to induce a sense of 
powerlessness for participants in the low control condition. Therefore, in the current 
study, an alternative method of experimentally manipulating perceived personal 
control is trialled. That is, induction of mortality salience. The literature review above 
suggests that when mortality salience is induced people are more likely to feel 
powerless and consequently are more likely to utilise compensatory strategies to re-
establish a sense of control (Fritsche et al., 2008). As outlined earlier, other research 
has also investigated the role mortality salience can play in belief in CTs (Newheiser 
et al., 2011; Sullivan et al., 2010).  
 In the current study in the Multidimensional Fear of Death Scale (MFODS; 
Hoelter, 1979) was used to increase access to death-related thoughts (mortality 
salience). The MFODS has been successfully used in previous research to induce 
mortality salience (Wilson, 2005). Furthermore, Ochsmann (1984) used a similar 15-
20 minute survey (the Thanatos Questionnaire) of death-related questions and was 
able to successfully induce mortality salience. The premise underlying such 
questionnaires is that participants are exposed to death-related topics for 
approximately 20 minutes thus inducing mortality salience. Other methods of this 
level of exposure also exist such as asking participants to write about dying for a 
period of time. The MFODS was used in the current study as the finite number of 
questions imposes some structure to the length of time participants spend on that part 
of procedure. To my knowledge the MFODS has never before been used specifically 
to experimentally manipulate perceived personal control.  
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Hypotheses 
Based on the literature discussed, the following hypotheses were generated. 
The first hypothesis was that participants in the low-control group would have 
significantly higher scores on the CPP measure (situational illusory pattern 
perception) compared to participants in the high-control group. The second 
hypothesis was that participants in the low-control group would demonstrate more 
visual illusory pattern perception (on the MSPT) compared to those in the high-
control group. The third and last hypothesis was that participants in the low-control 
group would demonstrate higher levels of anomie, authoritarianism, hostility, and 
lower levels of self-esteem compared to those in the high-control group.    
Method 
Participants 
 The sample for this study comprised 256 participants (82 females), aged 
between 18-55 years (M = 23.56, SD = 6.65). Participants were university students in 
undergraduate or postgraduate study. The ethnic breakdown of the sample was as 
follows. The majority of the sample was New Zealand-European/Pakeha (61.82%), 
followed by Asians and Europeans (10% of the sample each). Bi-ethnic Pakeha/Maori 
participants made up 3.64% of the sample, whereas American and Maori made up 
2.74 % of the sample each. Bi-ethnic European/Pakeha participants and those who did 
not wish to disclose their ethnicity each comprised 1.83% of the sample. Each of the 
following ethnicities comprised 0.91% of the sample: Canadian, Chinese-European, 
Hispanic, New Zealand-Indian, Pacific Island, and South African-European. 
Participation was voluntary, and the portion of the sample who were introductory 
psychology students received credit towards a mandatory course research 
requirement in exchange for their participation. The exclusion criteria for 
participation were not being fluent in English, and uncorrected impaired vision. 
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Materials 
 Because the focus of this study was to trial an alternative experimental control 
prime to which was used in the previous study, and investigate its consequent impact 
on conspiracy pattern perception; the same measures that were administered in Study 
1 were also administered in the current study (with the exclusion of the MI subscale 
of the SPQ, and the CBS). The only additional measure was the Multidimensional 
Fear of Death Scale (MFODS; Hoelter, 1979). 
 The MFODS (see Appendix D) is a measure of fear of death consisting of 58 
items. Participants are asked to respond by selecting which option ranging from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ on a 7-point Likert scale represents how they 
feel about each item. The Cronbach’s alpha for this sample was α = .93, which reflects 
excellent internal reliability. The MFODS has had wide usage in a range of studies 
(e.g. Long, 1985; Holcomb, Neimeyer, & Moore, 1993; Clements, 1998; Roff, 
Butkeviciene, & Klemmack, 2002; Floyd, Coulon, Yanez, LaSota, 2004; Sowe, Sears, 
Walker, Kuhl, & Conti, 2007). This measure was used to induce mortality salience 
(and consequential low perceived personal control).  
Procedure 
 The same procedure as used for study 1 was also employed in the current study 
with two exceptions. The first difference is that in the information sheet, potential 
participants were forewarned about one of the questionnaires containing questions 
regarding death-related topics. If participants were concerned they may be distressed 
by such questions, they were encouraged not to participate in the study. Potential 
participants were also told that they could withdraw from the study at any time 
during the questionnaire if the questions became too distressing for them, or for any 
other reason. They were also assured they could withdraw their participation at any 
time during the testing session with no questions asked and no consequences.  
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The second key difference between study 1 and the current study was that the 
order of presentation of the measures was counterbalanced to determine whether 
there was a significant effect of the MFODS (mortality salience). In block 1, the order 
of presentation began with the MFODS, the purpose of which was to induce a sense 
of low subjective control. The sequence of presentation for the low control group was 
as follows: MFODS, MSPT, Anomie Scale, Authoritarianism Scale, Hostility scale, I-E 
Locus of Control Questionnaire, Self-Esteem scale, and CPP. In block 2, the sequence 
of presentation ended with the MFODS rather than beginning with it, and this was 
taken as proxy for the high control group. The order of presentation of measures was 
as follows: MSPT, Anomie Scale, Authoritarianism Scale, Hostility scale, I-E Locus of 
Control Questionnaire, Self-Esteem scale, CPP, MFODS. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either the low or high control condition. 
 Following the administration of these measures, a debrief sheet appeared 
onscreen, outlining the full nature of the experiment (see Appendix E). The debrief 
sheet also emphasised support services available to the participants, should the 
content of the study have been distressing to them in any way.  
Results 
Analysis of Variance 
For each measure used in this study, means and standard deviations were 
compared across the two conditions low-control and high-control (see Table 4). One-
way between-groups ANOVA revealed significant differences between the conditions 
(low versus high-control) for Anomie, Conspiracy Pattern Perception, Self-Esteem, 
and Locus of Control measures; but not for MFODS, Hostility, Authoritarianism, and 
overall performance on the MSPT. Interestingly, the high-control group 
demonstrated significantly higher levels of each of the personality variables compared 
to the low-control group, except for authoritarianism. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients were also calculated between all the measures used in the present study 
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(Table 5). Of note, the Hostility subscale correlated significantly with all other 
measures. Furthermore, CPP was positively associated with each of the personality 
variables.  
 
Table 4 
Mean Scores on Scales and ANOVA’s by Condition 
 Low Control  High Control  α =  F(1, 79) =  p =  
Measure Mean SD   Mean SD           
MFODS 4.39 0.75  4.23 0.75  .94  2.66  0.10 
            
Conspiracy Pattern Perception 10.21 4.92  11.36 3.72  .41  4.19  0.04 
            
MSPT 12.55 6.31  12.80 4.66  .81  0.12  0.73 
            
Hostility 19.59 8.84  20.90 5.55  .81  1.89  0.17 
            
LOC 37.54 14.44  42.50 4.80  .12  12.45  < .01 
            
Self-Esteem 20.15 7.85  22.99 3.13  .37  13.30  < .01 
            
Anomia 14.28 5.91  16.45 3.44  .62  12.08  < .01 
            
Authoritarianism 17.39 6.79   18.47 3.70  .67   2.32   0.13 
 
 
The mean total score for the MSPT showed no significant differences across 
condition. However, as in Study 1, performance on the MSPT was broken down by 
object-absent correct responses (OA), and object-present correct responses (OP), and 
then compared across condition (level of control).  
 A MANOVA revealed that there was a significant difference between how 
participants performed across subgroups (OA and OP) within each condition (F(2, 
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248) = 3.90, p=0.02; Wilks’ Lambda = 0.97; partial eta squared = 0.03). Further 
investigation using between-groups ANOVA found a significant difference between 
means (see Table 6) across condition for OP (F(1, 249) = 4.80, p = 0.03), but not OA 
(F(1, 249) = 0.69, p = 0.41). 
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Table 5 
Correlations Between Study 2 Measures 
Measure 
Conspiracy 
Pattern 
Perception MFODS Anomie Author Self-Esteem 
Locus of 
Control Hostility 
Conspiracy Pattern Perception  0.10 0.39** 0.45** 0.61** 0.67** 0.65** 
MFODS   -0.12 -0.05 -0.01 0.20 0.23** 
Anomie    0.82** 0.72** 0.74** 0.40** 
Authoritarianism     0.75** 0.75** 0.48** 
Self-Esteem      0.92** 0.61** 
Locus of Control       0.71** 
Hostility        
Note. **p <0.01 
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Table 6 
Mean Performance Scores on Modified Snowy Picture Task for Study 2 Subgroups 
  Low Control   High Control 
MSPT Subgroup Mean SD   Mean SD 
OA 6.25 4.28  5.81 4.12 
OP 6.30 2.91  6.99 1.85 
 
 
Regression Analysis 
Similar to Study 1, multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to explore how 
much of the variation in performance on each of the MSPT subgroups could be accounted for 
by scores on the MFODS and condition (level of control). Using a similar methodology to Study 
1, the composite variable was added to the second model as an interaction term to investigate 
whether the joint effect of MFODS scores and condition was over and above that of their 
separate effects.  
As would be expected, use of the composite variable condition by MFODS scores 
generated a very strong positive Pearson’s correlation between the composite variable and 
condition of 0.97 (tolerance value of 0.03 and variation inflation factor (VIF) of 34.025)6. To 
resolve this issue of multicollinearity the data was centred (Baron & Kenny, 1986), where the 
mean MFODS score was subtracted from each MFODS data point7.  
The enter method was used to analyse each potential model. When the regression 
analysis was conducted using the centred data, the first model for OA, where MFODS (centred) 
                                               
5 Leahy (2000) recommends a tolerance cut-off value of 0.20, therefore values below this cut-off indicate 
multicollinearity. Leahy further suggests that VIF’s greater than 4.0 indicate multicollinearity.  
6 Non-centred data analysis: For OA, MFODS scores and condition were entered first, however the model was not 
significant, (F(2, 245) = 0.45, p = 0.64, R2 adjusted = -0.00). The second model of MFODS scores, condition, and a 
composite variable of condition by MFODS scores was also not significant (F(3, 244) = 0.37, p = 0.77, R2 adjusted = 
0.00). 
7 According to Dalal & Sicker (2011), centering the MI data may alter the size of the correlation of MI with other 
variables without affecting its significance.  
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scores and condition were entered did not reach significance (F(2, 245) = 0.45, p = 0.64, R2 adjusted 
= -0.00). Similarly, the second model where MFODS (centred) scores, condition, and the 
composite variable MFODS (centred) by condition were entered, also did not reach significance 
(F(3, 244) = 0.37, p = 0.77, R2 adjusted = -0.00). When the identical models were analysed for OP 
using the centred data, neither of the models were significant at the 5% level (F(2, 245) = 2.39, 
p = 0.0, R2 adjusted = 0.01, and F(3, 244) = 1.69, p = 0.17, R2 adjusted = 0.01 respectively). This means 
that neither mortality salience, nor mortality salience in combination with condition had any 
effect on the strength on the relationship between condition (low-control versus high-control) 
on illusory pattern perception (non-existent patterns on the MSPT).   
Discussion 
 The aim of the present study was to identify whether conspiracy pattern perception, a 
form of illusory pattern perception (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) is more likely when perceived 
low subjective control is experienced. The key difference between the current and the previous 
study is how perceived personal control was manipulated. In the present study the low-control 
group was presented with a fear of death scale in order to induce mortality salience. According 
to the literature, when mortality salience occurs people tend to feel a low sense of subjective 
control (Fritsche et al., 2008). As a compensatory mechanism, they will then take measures to 
bolster their perceived control. For instance, people may endorse CTs that are consistent with 
their worldview/belief system (Newheiser et al., 2011).  Each of the hypotheses will now be 
discussed in turn.  
 The first hypothesis of the current study was that participants in whom mortality 
salience was induced prior to administration of other the measures, would demonstrate more 
conspiracy pattern perception compared to those who were administered the MFODS after the 
other measures. This hypothesis was not supported by the findings. In fact, those who were 
administered the MFODS last (considered the high-control group) demonstrated a significantly 
higher level of conspiracy pattern perception compared to the low control group (those who 
were administered the MFODS first). This means that in those whom mortality salience had 
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not yet been induced were more like to create CTs compared to those in who mortality salience 
had already been induced.  
 The second hypothesis of the current study was that participants in whom mortality 
salience was induced prior to administration of the other measures would demonstrate more 
visual illusory pattern perception compared to those who were administered the MFOFS after 
the other measures. This hypothesis was not supported by the findings, as no significant 
differences in visual illusory pattern perception were found between those in whom mortality 
salience had been induced compared to those who had not mortality salience induced. 
 The final hypothesis of the current study was that participants in whom mortality 
salience was induced at the beginning of the experiment were more likely to demonstrate 
higher levels of anomie, authoritarianism, hostility, and lower self-esteem compared those in 
who mortality salience was induced after administration of the other measures. Only limited 
support for this hypothesis was gleaned from the present study. Self-esteem was found to be 
significantly lower among those with induced mortality salience; however, in contrast to 
expectation those in whom mortality salience had not been induced scored higher on each of 
the other personality variable scales. However, only the difference for anomia was significant 
between the two groups.  
Whilst the current findings are by and large quite different to what was expected, there 
are a number of ways they may be accounted for by referring back to the mortality salience 
research. Examination of these findings suggests that some mechanism is at play whereby 
making death-related thoughts salient to participants elicited a buffer against conspiracy 
theorising. One such mechanism may be a proximal defence response suppressing access to 
death-related to thoughts. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999) asserted a dual-process 
model of defence against conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts. The dual processes 
theorised to defend against the typically deleterious effects of eliciting a fear of death. This 
extension of terror management theory supposes that when the concept of mortality is made 
salient, the initial response (or proximal defence response) is to actively suppress ones attention 
to death-related thoughts. One of the ways access to these types of thoughts can be 
98 
 
 
 
circumvented is by distracting ones attention elsewhere (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997; Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Arndt, Routledge, & Goldenberg, 2006). 
Moreover, suppressing access to death-related thoughts immediately following mortality 
salience induction is typically only possible in conditions where individuals distract themselves 
with a low cognitive load or simple task. This active suppression would not be possible in 
conditions where a high cognitive load also burdened an individual (Arndt et al., 1997). A high 
cognitive load would typically be characterised by tasks that activate working memory (which 
requires more cognitive effort) such as mathematical processes, or the Stroop task. However, 
this is a relatively temporary defence mechanism, and eventually access to death-related 
thoughts is boosted (Arndt et al., 1997). In the current study, the MSPT characterises a low 
cognitive load as it merely requires participants to view images; therefore, this further supports 
the assertion that proximal defences may have been mobilized. Similarly, the CPP task may not 
be cognitively effortful enough to prevent death-thought suppression. Potentially, if the CPP 
scenarios has been presented using the auditory modality rather than visually, working 
memory may have been more heavily relied upon, which may have made death-thought 
suppression difficult.  However, it remains unclear how heavy the cognitive load is for the CPP 
task.  
It may be possible that the active death-thought suppression hypothesized by 
Pyszczynski et al. (1999) is too effortful to sustain over time. After time has elapsed, 
accessibility to death-related thoughts increases (Arnt et al., 1997). This may be because, after a 
little time, the mind becomes hypervigilant in trying to detect any weakness in this defence 
intruding death-related thoughts. As a result of this, attention gets inadvertently drawn to 
death-related thoughts thus demonstrating increased access to death-related thoughts 
(Pyszczynski et al., 1999). When delayed death-focus occurs, people then engage in 
compensatory strategies to restore a sense of personal control.   
 Another possible explanation for the findings of this study is that contemplation of 
death inspired a focus on what an individual would miss about the world if they were to die. In 
other words it is possible that contemplation of death can in fact give way to contemplation of 
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life, and what makes life meaningful. For instance, a sense of attachment to the world and 
society may thus temporarily be strengthened, thus softening the level of anomie an individual 
feels. To this end, Pyszczynski et al. (1999) asserted that by an individual protecting themselves 
from death-related thoughts they are able to “…construe himself or herself as a valuable 
participant in a meaningful universe” (p.835). 
 A limitation of the present study was that a manipulation check was not conducted. A 
manipulation check at the end of the MFODS would have allowed identification if the measure 
had successfully induced perceived low personal control. Sullivan et al. (2010) conducted a 
manipulation check that asked participants to rate how much control in general they felt they 
had in their lives. It would be important for future research using fear of death as a proxy for 
low-control to conduct such a manipulation check. Another important consideration is that in 
the present study I, as many researchers do, hoped to find generalizable results in a 
convenience sample. That is, in the last two studies, level of control was artificially 
manipulated rather than using an organic source. The results may differ quite significantly if 
participants with predispositionally low sense of control were asked to complete different types 
of pattern perception tasks. Indeed, Pyszczynski et al. (1999) have suggested that some 
individuals may have a tendency to defend against death-related thoughts through cognitive 
distortions. It is quite likely that the type of people likely to do so, are people who either have a 
psychopathological tendency towards cognitive distortions, or those who at a trait-level tend to 
feel a low sense of control much of the time. Moreover, previous review of the literature in 
chapter two, strongly suggested that a high PNS was typically implicated in information-
processing deficits, such as prematurely arriving at decisions, such as that characterised by 
illusory pattern perception. Neither in this study nor in the previous one was PNS empirically 
tested. Therefore, it is quite possible that the type of people (tertiary students) captured by 
these studies are relatively high functioning, and either do not have a high PNS, or have 
adaptive coping styles in response to PNS; and thus are less likely to experience significant 
aberrations of perception.  
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 A final aspect worth due consideration is the level of self-esteem reported in both 
groups. Whilst, the high-control group demonstrated a significantly higher level of self-esteem, 
the mean self-esteem score for the low control group (20.15) was still considerably higher than 
the median possible score (15), and therefore I would not consider this group to have low self-
esteem. One of the main tenets of terror management theory is that self-esteem operates as 
buffer against anxiety or fear induced when faced with mortality salience (Harmon-Jones, 
Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & McGregor, 1997; Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Therefore, on the basis of the work of previous 
researchers, it is plausible to reason that the strong sense of self-worth demonstrated by the low 
control group prevented the deleterious effects of mortality salience.  
 
Summary 
 In this chapter I reviewed the literature on how people explain their surroundings, 
particularly when faced with situations of low personal control. LH is a phenomenon that occurs 
when a person is repeatedly exposed to situations of low control (Abramson et al., 1978; Kelley & 
Michela, 1980; Lieder et al., 2013; Seligman et al., 1971). The consequences of this extreme form 
of low personal control perception can and elicit cognitive, motivational, and affective deficits 
(Klein & Seligman, 1976). Those with a high PNS may be resilient against developing LH by 
seeking out ways to re-establish a sense of control (Roth & Bootzin, 1974).  
The basic argument in the literature is that most people experience low subjective control as 
an aversive state, and thus take measures to restore their sense of control. One way we see this is in 
the causal explanations people make (their attribution style; Harvey & Weary, 1984). Another 
form suggested form of control restoration is illusory pattern perception (Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008). In my first study, I found that participants in the low-control condition (who were asked 
to recall a situation where they had no control) who showed high levels of MI demonstrated 
illusory pattern perception for visual stimuli. However, I did not find conspiracy illusory 
pattern perception in the low-control condition. In the second study I induced mortality 
salience as means of experimentally inducing low perceived personal control (Fritsche et al., 
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2008). However, in this study participants in the high-control condition demonstrated 
significantly more conspiracy pattern perception (CT creation) than the low-control condition. 
The high-control group also reported greater anomie, self-esteem, and an external LOC. It was 
concluded that active death-thought suppression may have led to significantly less CT creation 
in the low-control group. The greater CT creation demonstrated by the high-control group is 
consistent with research that conspiracy theorists have a more external attributional style and 
higher levels of alienation from society (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994). A number 
of methodological limitations were identified that could be accounted for in future research.  
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Chapter Three 
Public Perception of Conspiracy Theorists 
 
Introduction 
Despite evidence that conspiracies have taken place in the past (Keeley, 1999), even 
within academic communities conspiracy theorists have been sometimes treated dismissively 
(Clarke, 2002; Miller, 2002) and considered “nutty” (Bale, 2007, p. 47).  Similarly, a range of 
websites  make assumptive statements that describe conspiracy theorists as having abnormal or 
psychopathological traits; including odd, arrogant, nutty, restless, and suspicious people in 
general. One website (Ferrentes, 2009) has even deemed conspiracy theorists "conspiraloons', 
'tinfoil hatters', 'loonspuds', 'fruit'n'nut jobs". Such comments imply attributions of abnormal 
mental functioning among those who have a tendency to believe in conspiracies, however, 
very little research examined the psychopathological link to CT belief (Darwin et al., 2011; 
Swami et al., 2013) and so this assumed link has not been confirmed. Despite the derogatory 
nature of the comments made about conspiracy theorists in the literature and online material 
(cited above), it still remains unclear whether negative stereotypes of conspiracy theorists are 
common among the general population or a mere few given that no research (in New Zealand 
or internationally) has as yet investigated this.  Overall, the current thesis is intended to 
provide a clearer picture on the perceived link between CTA and psychopathology, and the 
actual link between the two areas. The key purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the 
tendency to believe and theorise about conspiracies (strong CTA) is in fact related to 
psychopathology (compared to weak CTA), and add to the pool of research aimed at 
understanding conspiracy theorists, and what if any psychopathology would make an 
individual more likely to be a conspiracy theorist.     
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In order to explore these stereotypes, the semantic differential technique first 
introduced by Osgood (1952) was used. Since its introduction, the semantic differential 
technique has been used most commonly to identify the meanings individuals attribute to 
concepts by presenting a visual continuum-type scale anchored at each end by antonymic 
descriptors (Osgood, 1952). Generally, any descriptor where a polar opposite descriptor (e.g. 
restless - calm, strong - weak, insincere – sincere) can be generated is suitable to the semantic 
differential technique.  
One area of research that has taken advantage of the semantic differential methodology 
has been attitudinal research investigating stereotypes about those with mental illness. Judd 
and Park (1993) define social stereotypes as a set of attributes thought to characterise different 
groups of people. A particularly stable finding across these studies has been that Mental 
Patients are judged as unpredictable, tense, dangerous, worthless, delicate, slow, weak, and 
foolish. Insane People are judged very similarly to that of a Mental Patient, with the additional 
judgements of cold and dirty (Blizard, 1968; Blizard, 1969; Blizard, 1970; Bryson & Wilson, 
unpublished; Green, McCormick, Walkey, & Taylor, 1987; Nunnally, 1961; Olmstead & 
Ordway, 1963; Olmstead & Durham, 1976; Walkey, Green & Taylor, 1981). These studies also 
found that Ex-Mental Patients are judged only a little negatively compared to the Average 
Man, and a lot less negatively than Mental Patients and Insane People, perhaps reflecting the 
fact that the public consider Ex-Mental Patients as mostly “reformed” but with some residual 
repugnance still held towards them. Green et al. (1987) also found relative favourable attitudes 
towards doctors and psychiatrists in relation to The Average Man. Furthermore, in their New 
Zealand study, Green et al. (1987) found that these attitudinal patterns towards mental illness 
were not strongly associated with demographic variables such as gender, age, or socioeconomic 
status; therefore, these judgements were found to be fairly stable across social class.   
More recently, Bryson and Wilson (unpublished) replicated the findings of earlier 
research on societal attitudes towards mental illness in New Zealand. Bryson and Wilson 
(unpublished) conducted their study in 2004, and recruited a non-clinical sample to investigate 
stereotypes of mental illness in a more detailed manner than earlier studies, by including more 
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specific targets which participants were asked to describe using the semantic differential 
technique. Their targets included: me, the average man, insane people, depressed people, an 
average woman, ex-mental patient, schizophrenic people, mental patient, most people, bipolar 
people, multiple personality disordered people, and mentally ill people. The findings revealed 
that participants judged mental illness targets (e.g. schizophrenic people) significantly more 
negatively compared to more normative targets (e.g. average man). Participants characterised 
mental illness targets as being significantly more unpredictable, tense, and dangerous compared 
to normative targets. Furthermore, they found that attitudes towards ‘mental patient’ and 
‘insane people’ as targets were largely similar to previous studies in New Zealand of this nature 
(Olmstead & Durham, 1976; Green et al., 1987; Walkey et al., 1981).  
   
Study 3a: Semantic Differentials of Conspiracy Theorist 
Descriptors 
 Previously the semantic differential technique (Osgood, 1952) has been successfully 
used in the past to measure attitudes towards mental illness; and based on early evidence that 
conspiracy theorists may be stereotyped to have some form of psychopathology (Darwin et al., 
2011; Swami et al., 2013), I considered that the semantic differential technique might be 
appropriate to explore attitudes about conspiracy theorists. No such established questionnaire 
exists that assesses attitudes towards conspiracy theorists; thus for the purposes of the present 
research, construction of such a measure was necessary. The Bryson and Wilson (unpublished) 
descriptors were to be used as the basis of the questionnaire, however, in order to be relevant 
to attitudes towards conspiracy theorists, the target of Conspiracy Theorist would be added, as 
would be descriptors presently used in media and literature pertaining to CTs. The ultimate 
purpose was to compare if people judged conspiracy theorists and the other mental health-
related targets similarly.  
The first part of the measure construction process required compiling descriptors of 
conspiracy theorists from different forms of written material. Media publications, peer-
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reviewed journal articles, as well as a number of websites were scrutinized for mentions of or 
references to conspiracy theorists (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Bale, 2007; Feldman & Suzek, 
2008; Ferrentes, 2009; Harrison & Thomas, 1997; Ross, Essien, & Torres, 2006; Swami et al., 
2010). As a result a large array of derogatory terms and very few positive terms used to describe 
conspiracy theorists were identified. However, the semantic differential technique presents 
participants with bipolar extremes of descriptors, thus eliminating the possibility of 
inadvertently priming participants to only make negative appraisals of conspiracy theorists. 
 A small sample of participants were presented with the CT-relevant descriptors, and 
were asked to generate what they considered the extreme opposite (antonym) of each 
descriptor to be (e.g. sincere – insincere; foolish; wise). The most frequently used antonym for 
each descriptor was then used in the final semantic differential study (Study 1b) to investigate 
attitudes towards conspiracy theorists. 
Method 
Participants 
 Fifty participants (19 males), were recruited from outside a busy supermarket in Lower 
Hutt, New Zealand. Participants were only asked to provide their gender, and to tick a box to 
confirm that they were over the age of 18 years. Participants received a treat-sized chocolate 
bar in exchange for their time. This research, and all other research reported in this thesis was 
approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee.  
Materials 
A list of 26 characteristics (Table 7) used to refer to conspiracy theorists in relevant 
literature and websites was compiled (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Bale, 2007; Feldman & 
Suzek, 2008; Ferrentes, 2009; Harrison & Thomas, 1997; Ross, Essien, & Torres, 2006; Swami et 
al., 2010).  Space was provided on the list for participants to write down what they regarded to 
be the opposite (antonym) of each descriptor. A clipboard with attached pen was supplied so 
that participants could write their responses while standing up.  
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Procedure 
Potential participants were approached and asked if they were over the age of 18 years and had 
five minutes to spare to fill out a very short questionnaire, and that a summary of the results 
would appear in a doctoral thesis or peer-reviewed journal. They were also told they could 
withdraw their participation at any time, and would receive a treat-sized chocolate bar in 
exchange for their time as a token of appreciation. Participants were given an opportunity to 
have any questions they had about participation answered. 
If an individual agreed to participate, they were told that completing the questionnaire would 
indicate their providing consent for their responses to be used in this research. Participants 
were then given a clipboard with the quiz and pen attached to it. They were allowed to take as 
long as they needed to complete the quiz, but were told that participation would most likely 
not exceed 5 minutes. 
Once each participant had completed the quiz, the participant was thanked for their 
time, and was given a treat-sized chocolate bar as a token of appreciation. If participants had 
any further questions about the research at this point, their questions were answered. 
Results 
The results were analysed using Microsoft Excel software. In order to calculate which responses 
were most commonly given for each characteristic, the more frequent response for each target 
descriptor was calculated (Table 7).The resulting antonyms had frequencies greater than 30, 
although two had some missing responses. 
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Table 7 
Mode Responses for Target Descriptors. 
Target Descriptor Most Frequent Response Frequency 
Powerless Powerful 50 
Alienated Included 43 
Untrustworthy Trustworthy 50 
Hostile Friendly 39 
Angry Calm 42 
Distrustful Trusting 48 
Aggressive Peaceful 48 
Malevolent Benevolent 31* 
Arrogant Humble 49 
Restless Relaxed 38 
Agreeable Argumentative 41 
Cynical Accepting 32 
Imaginative Unimaginative 49 
Curious Uninterested 39 
Masculinist Feminist 49 
Discontent Content 50 
Diabolic Good 41 
Egoistic Humble 46 
Narcissistic Unselfish 37** 
Mistrusting Trusting 50 
Suspicious Trusting 50 
Irrational Rational 50 
Emotional Objective 40 
Innocent Guilty 50 
Nutty Sane 44 
Note. * = seven missing responses. ** = nine missing responses. 
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Table 8 
Key for Mapping Current Study Descriptors with Goldberg’s (1990) Taxonomy of Traits. 
 
Goldberg Factor Pole 
Goldberg Categories 
Current Study Descriptors Valence 
Positive Negative 
1: Surgency Spirit, Talkativeness, 
Sociability, Spontaneity, 
Boistrousness, Adventure, 
Energy,  
Conceit, Vanity, 
Indiscretion, Sensuality 
Lethargy, Aloofness, Silence, 
Modesty, Pessimism, 
Unfriendliness 
Connected/Alienated 
Friendly/Hostile 
Humble/Arrogant 
Avoids Attention/Attention-seeking 
Content/Discontent 
2: Agreeableness Trust, Amiability, 
Generosity, Agreeableness, 
Tolerance, Courtesy, 
Altruism, Warmth, Honest 
Vindictiveness, Ill humour, 
Criticism, Disdain, 
Antagonism, Aggressiveness, 
Dogmatism, Temper, 
Distrust, Greed, Dishonesty 
Simple/Complicated 
Relaxed/Tense 
Delicate/Rugged 
Warm/Cold 
Sincere/Insincere 
Trustworthy/Untrustworthy 
Peaceful/Aggressive 
Relaxed/Restless 
Accepting/Cynical 
Trusting/Suspicious 
Agreeable/Argumentative 
Innocent/Guilty 
Not manipulative/Manipulative 
3: Conscientiousness Industry, Order, Self-
discipline, Evangelism, 
Consistency, Grace, 
Reliability, Sophistication, 
Formality, Foresight, 
Religiosity, Maturity, 
Passionless, Thrift 
Negligence, Inconsistency, 
Rebelliousness, Irreverence, 
Provinciality, Intemperance 
Predictable/Unpredictable 
Fast/Slow 
Rational/Irrational 
Compliant/Rebelliousness 
 
4: Emotional 
    Stability 
Durability, Poise, Self-
reliance, Callousness, 
Candor 
Self-pity, Anxiety, 
Insecurity, Timidity, 
Passivity, Immaturity 
Strong/Weak 
Valuable/Worthless 
Objective/Emotional 
Sane/Nutty 
Mentally Healthy/Mentally Ill 
Normal/Abnormal 
5: Intellect Wisdom, Originality, 
Objectivity, Knowledge, 
Reflection, Art 
Imperceptivity Imaginative/Unimaginative 
Curious/Uninterested 
Note. For an exhaustive list of examples of each category, see Goldberg (1990). 
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Discussion 
In this study the semantic differential technique was used in the design of a 
questionnaire to be used in the next study. The descriptors included in the measure were 
gleaned from previous studies on attitudes towards mental health, as well as terminology used 
to describe conspiracy theorists in academic circles but also online.  The complete list of 
descriptors map well onto Goldberg’s (1990) taxonomy of personality traits. Goldberg proposed 
five personality trait factor poles which include surgency, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
emotional stability, and intelligence. Each factor pole describes both the positive and negative 
aspects of the incumbent traits. Table 8 provides a summary list of Goldberg’s trait factor poles 
as well as categories within each factor pole according to valence; however, for the exhaustive 
list of examples Goldberg gives for each category that was used to map each descriptor in this 
study onto Goldberg’s factor poles, see Goldberg (1990). All descriptors (each with a continuous 
nature) to be used for the next study were accounted for by Goldberg’s factor poles, with the 
majority of descriptors falling under agreeableness, and only two descriptors falling under 
intellect. This means that the attitudes the semantic differential task was going to measure, 
were going to reflect stereotypes about the disposition (personality traits) of the targets. 
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Study 3b: Attitudes Toward Conspiracy Theorists 
The research aim of the second part of this study was to determine if people's 
stereotypes of a conspiracy theorist is more similar to their stereotypes to people with 
various psychopathology (e.g. schizophrenia, paranoia, delusional disorder) than their 
stereotypes of people without psychopathology (e.g. The Average Man).  
As a basis for the current study, the same 12 targets used by Bryson and Wilson 
(unpublished)  were used here, however, in order to include the element of public 
attitude towards conspiracy theorists, the term “conspiracy theorists” were added as a 
thirteenth target. Furthermore, in addition to the descriptors used by Bryson and Wilson, 
characteristics used to describe conspiracy theorists (see Study 3a) were incorporated into 
the final measure. Correspondence analysis was used to analyse the degree of distinction 
or similarity between the judgements of a range of target people, including “conspiracy 
theorist”.  
Hypothesis 
Storti (2000, as cited in Doey & Kurta, 2011) states that correspondence analysis is 
an exploratory data technique that does not require hypotheses to have been formulated. 
However, based on the terms used to describe conspiracy theorists (across academic 
literature and on websites), it was hypothesised that the distance between participants’ 
judgements of conspiracy theorists would be closer to that of their judgements of those 
with psychopathology, compared to those without psychopathology. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and fourteen individuals took part in studies 3b, 3c, and 4. Response 
sets for thirteen participants were incomplete and were removed from analysis resulting 
in two hundred and one (120 females) participants included in the final analysis. Of this 
final sample, ninety-four participants were general members of the public recruited 
through posters, Facebook, and email (see procedure section). The study was also open 
internationally, and some of the participants were likely to have been non-New Zealand 
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based. This portion of the total sample were eligible to provide their contact details to go 
into a prize draw to receive Motor Trade Association vouchers (to use in exchange for 
fuel or mechanical services) as a token of appreciation for their time in participating. The 
remaining participants were undergraduate psychology students enrolled at Victoria of 
University of Wellington, who received credit towards a mandatory course research 
requirement in exchange for their participation.  
Overall, participants were aged between 18-67 years with a mean age of 27.85 
years (SD = 12.31 years). 60.2% of the sample identified as New Zealand 
European/Pakeha, 9.5% Maori, 8% Asian, 8% European, 4% New Zealand Pacific 
Islander, 2% Pacific Islander, and 1.5% Indian. Six percent of the total sample comprised 
the “other” ethnic category (including South African, New Zealand Asian, and New 
Zealand Indian). Ethical approval for all the studies in this thesis was granted by the 
Victoria University of Wellington School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee.  
Materials 
Using the most frequent antonyms for a list of 26 descriptors, in combination with 
10 of the descriptors used by Bryson and Wilson (unpublished) in their semantic 
differential study, a total list of 36 descriptors were compiled to comprise the final 
semantic differential scale (see Appendix F). The final scale was administered to 
participants through a short online survey using Qualtrics (an online survey tool), and on 
average took no longer than 10 minutes to complete. Participants simply selected (by a 
mouse-click) a point within the 7-point scale that best described each target person (13 
target people in total) along each semantic differential.  The target people that 
participants were asked to consider are also presented in Appendix F, but included targets 
such as the average man, people with schizophrenia, a convicted criminal, the conspiracy 
theorist and so on. 
Procedure 
Recruitment of participants for this study who were general members of the 
public (non-Victoria University of Wellington undergraduate psychology students) was 
conducted in a number of ways: through social media, posters and flyers, and email. The 
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participants recruited for this study using these methods also completed other measures 
used for Studies 4 and 5.  
Recruitment using Facebook 
The social network Facebook was used to provide potential participants with 
information on how to participate in the study, and was also used to employ snowball 
sampling to advertise the study. Facebook has been used internationally in the past to 
invite people to participate in various types of research (Anonymous, 2008; Anonymous, 
2010; Bhaskaran, 2010; Taylor, 2010; also see Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012 for a 
review). Recruitment of participants through this medium was undertaken using two 
Facebook tools. The first tool that was used was a Facebook ‘group page’. “Groups can be 
created by any user and about any topic, as a space for users to share their opinions and 
interest in that subject” (Facebook.com, 2010). Therefore a group page was set up where I 
could post the link for the online survey (see Appendix G for wording used on the group 
page) which was accessible through a separate website. Wilson et al. (2012) outlines three 
key ways Facebook can be utilised in social science research. The method employed in 
this thesis is most similar to the method Wilson et al (2012) refer to as ‘recruitment of 
participants in offline contexts’. That is, Facebook was solely used to advertise the 
research taking place, and to invite potential participants to seek more information on a 
separate website which hosted the secure online questionnaire. 
The second Facebook tool that was used in the recruitment phase of this study was 
the profile page of the lead investigator. Every user of Facebook must first sign up for a 
Facebook account. When a person signs up to open an account, one is not received 
immediately. Facebook administrators first ratify each request for an account to ensure 
that it comes from an actual person with a real name, as opposed to companies or groups 
(including research groups) etc. Therefore, the research team could not open an account 
solely for the use of this research. Therefore, the personal profile page of the primary 
investigator was used to post the electronic link to the online survey, and also the group 
page for the study (see Appendix H for wording used on the profile page to advertise the 
study). The rationale for posting the link to a personal profile page was two-fold. First, it 
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is one of the fastest ways to advertise that a group page exists. Second, the snowball 
sampling method (Kendall et al., 2008) was employed. According to Biernacki and 
Waldorf (1981, as cited by Kendall et al, p. 98), “Snowball sampling increases efficiency, 
identification, and inclusion of hidden populations by having members of the target 
population recruit other members”. In this case, people who saw the survey link on the 
profile page and group page could then pass the link forward to people on their contact 
list and so forth.  
One of the potential ethical pitfalls of snowball sampling is that relying on others’ 
to provide accurate information regarding the study is less than ideal. This potential flaw 
was limited in the current research however, as the information sheet appeared onscreen 
as the first page to the survey when potential participants clicked on the electronic link to 
the survey. Such a quality assurance measure was put in place to ensure that all 
participants received consistent and accurate information about what was involved 
should they wish to participate in the study. This information sheet also provided detailed 
information about what the research would require from participants should they wish to 
take part in the research, their right to ask questions before consenting, their right to 
withdraw from the questionnaire at any time, and how the consent process worked. The 
information sheet also required participants to confirm they were over the age of 18. The 
data collection for this research took place prior to the publication of Wilson et al. (2012), 
however, the procedures just described are consistent with their recommendations for 
conducting ethical research using Facebook. Smith and Leigh (1997) also make similar 
recommendations for ethical research using virtual participants, although their 
recommendations were not specific to Facebook. The snowball sampling method was also 
used to recruit participants using emails sent initially within Victoria University of 
Wellington (VUW), so that potential participants could also forward the electronic link 
to their contacts (both nationally and internationally (see Appendix I for wording used in 
the initial email). An ethical issue associated with how the snowballing sampling method 
was used in this study was that information about the study was distributed initially via 
the lead investigator’s personal profile page and student email account at VUW. One of 
115 
 
 
 
the consequences of such an approach then is that at least some of the sample are likely to 
be associates of the lead investigator with some common areas of interest, and then these 
associates advertised the study to their associates with whom they have common 
interests, therefore they final sample may not have been as diverse if alternative methods 
of participant recruitment had been used (that is, the sample may have in fact been more 
homogeneous than intended). Furthermore, the participants who were potentially known 
to the lead investigator may have responded in socially desirable ways for fear their 
responses could be traced back to them.  
Posters and flyers were also distributed throughout the greater Wellington (New 
Zealand) region, directing potential participants to the electronic link for the online study 
(see Appendix J for wording used on posters and flyers). 
Student Participants 
Additional participants were recruited through a subject student pool. Using a 
website where these participants were able to sign up for a range of experiments they, 
were also given information about what the research involved, and if they were 
interested in participating.  Instructions on how to access the website for this study were 
also provided. As mentioned earlier, this group of participants received credit towards a 
mandatory course research requirement in exchange for their participation. From this 
stage onwards, the information provided regarding the research, instructions, and the 
tests themselves were identical for the two participants groups. All participants were 
informed that the battery of tests for this research was estimated to take 30-45 minutes to 
complete. A small group (five post-graduate psychology VUW students) completed the 
study first in order to inform the completion time estimation as well as to identify any 
procedural obstacles in the design of the study.  
The Online Survey 
When participants first visited the online survey, they were presented with an 
information sheet (see Appendix K) which outlined what the research was about and 
what was required of them should they choose to participate. Participants could not 
proceed any further at this stage until they confirmed that they had read the information 
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sheet thoroughly (by way of selecting a box with a mouse-click). The School of 
Psychology Human Ethics Committee (Victoria University of Wellington) required that 
participants be over the age of 18 years. Therefore, participants had to confirm they were 
18 years or over (by way of selecting a box with a mouse-click). As the survey was 
anonymous, names of participants and their signatures were not collected, therefore, 
completion of the survey was taken as consent to participate (this was also outlined to 
participants in the information sheet). If any potential participant had questions they 
wanted answered before taking part in the study, they were provided with an email 
address for the research team whom they could contact. Any questions sent to this email 
address were replied to within 12 hours. After the last question in the survey, debrief 
information (see Appendix L) was presented onscreen which outlined the purpose of the 
study in greater detail. Deception was not overtly used in this study, however, 
participants were not told the specific aims of the study prior to testing. However, the 
debrief information presented at the conclusion of the survey was thorough.  Again, 
participants were provided with the email address for the research team should they have 
had any questions at this stage.  
In order to allow for comparison of findings with previous studies (Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), measures used in previous studies were also 
selected for use in this present study. Participants were then presented with each measure 
in the following order: the semantic differential task, the Conspiracy Beliefs Scale 
(Wilson, 2007), the Peters Delusion Inventory (Peters, Joseph, Day & Garety, 2004), the 
Modified Snowy Pictures Task (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), the Schizotypy Personality 
Questionnaire (Raine, 1991), the British Inventory of Mental Pathology – 36 (Bedford & 
Deary, 2006), the Powerlessness Scale (Pearlin, Menagham, Lieberma & Mullan, 1981), 
the Paranoia Checklist (Freeman et al., 2005), and the Conspiracy Pattern Perception 
Scale (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). As the first measure listed above is the only measure 
relevant to the present study, the rest of the measures are not described here and instead 
are described the study 4 in chapter 4.  
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A debriefing sheet (see Appendix L) then appeared outlining the purpose of the 
study and how each research question was investigated. Participants were also provided 
with details of support services to contact should they be experiencing any distress 
elicited by the study. Additionally, the VUW sample was also provided with the contact 
details for support services within the university. At the end of the debrief information 
participants were thanked for their time.  
In exchange for their time, non- psychology-VUW participants involved in studies 
3b, 4, and 5 could choose to email the research team with their details once they had 
completed the survey (the instruction to do so appeared onscreen during the debriefing 
phase) if they wish to enter a prize draw to win 1 of 25 Motor Trade Association vouchers 
(which could be presented to a wide range of petrol stations and mechanic garages 
throughout New Zealand in exchange for goods or services including fuel) valued at 
NZ$20 each. The prize draw was only open to participants living in New Zealand (this 
point was clearly made on the information sheet). As participants interested in entering 
the prize draw emailed the research team their contact details, this process ensured that 
anonymity of their responses on the survey was protected (as the responses and contact 
details were kept separate and were not linkable).  
Results 
Rennie (1982) recommends that in order to minimise an agreement or 
disagreement response set (that is participants responding in a particular direction 
regardless of the content of the items), some of the items in a rating-style questionnaire 
be reversed in direction (e.g. by changing the wording in a typical Likert-type style 
questionnaire).  Therefore, in this study, 12 of the items for each target from the final 
semantic differential scale were reversed so that positive descriptors were presented at the 
left end of the scale, and negative descriptors were presented at the right end of the scale. 
The remainder of the 36 items for each target were anchored with negative descriptors at 
the left end of the scale. Therefore, prior to any analysis taking place, the 12 reverse 
scaled items were reverse coded so that all negative descriptors were anchored to the left 
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side of the scale. Therefore high scores reflect a more positive opinion of the target 
person.  
Correspondence Analysis 
Correspondence analysis (CA) also known as optimal scaling, reciprocal averaging, 
and homogeneity analysis (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2007) was then used 
to analyse the attitudinal data in this study. CA allows for complex data to be displayed 
visually in categorical terms in a simplified and descriptive format. This method is 
particularly useful when working with a large amount of data, as when the data is 
tabulated, associations between variables could be obscured (Doey & Kurta, 2011). In the 
case of this study, CA allowed target persons judged similarly to be grouped close together 
in dimensional space, whereas larger distances between biplots would suggest that the 
target persons in question were judged to be quite different from each other. Such a 
graphical mapping technique allows for simultaneous comparisons to be drawn between a 
number of targets overall, and finer analysis allows for graphical mapping of attributes 
judged similar and dissimilar to each other in regards a minimum of one target at a time 
(Hair et al., 2007; Doey & Kurta, 2011).  
The means of all descriptors for the 13 targets across all participants were 
calculated and then CA was conducted on these means. Figure 3 depicts the 
correspondence matrix for all the targets and descriptors. Three targets in particular 
appear to sit apart from clusters of the other targets; Average Man, Conspiracy Theorist, 
and Convicted Criminal. Targets of those with mental illnesses sit in the top-right 
quadrant, targets representing normalized characteristics were distributed in the two-left 
quadrants, and Conspiracy Theorist and Convicted Criminal can be seen in the bottom-
right quadrant. In order to understand/identify the two dimensions, I analysed the spatial 
placement of the descriptors.  This allowed identification of which descriptors were most 
prominent in differentiating between the targets. The distances between the descriptors 
are magnified in Figure 4 so that their distribution across the quadrants may be examined 
more closely. The descriptors appear to be dispersed more in the top- right and bottom-
left quadrants, and more closely spaced in the top-left and bottom-right quadrants. The 
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targets Me, The Average Woman, and Ex-Mental Patient were more likely to be judged 
trustworthy, peaceful, sincere, good, agreeable, clean, accepting, friendly and clean. The 
targets representing current mental health concerns (Depressed, Mentally Ill, Bipolar 
Disorder, Multiple Personality, Schizophrenic, Insane People) were more likely to be 
considered abnormal, tense, misunderstood, mentally unhealthy, and attention-seeking. 
The Conspiracy Theorist and Convicted Criminal targets were more likely to be seen as 
rebellious, guilty, slow, unsafe, weak, cold, indelicate, unimaginative, and uninterested. 
The Average Man and Most People targets were more likely to be seen as objective, 
powerful, simple, included, predictable, sane, rational, relaxed, and content.  
Spatially the strongest distinction appears to be in how the targets are distributed 
on the x-axis, suggesting that Dimension 1 accounts for the greatest variance (inertia) in 
the grouping of the targets. One possible interpretation is that Dimension 1 represents the 
perception of how well adjusted each target is. That is, the placement of the targets on the 
right side of the x-axis possibly reflects the perception by the sample that these targets are 
poorly adjusted individuals resulting in mental health and criminal issues. However the 
targets on the left side of the x-axis may reflect the perception by the sample that these 
targets are better adjusted compared to the targets on the right side of the x-axis. Spatially 
the targets on the left side of the figure appear to be distributed more closely on the y-axis 
compared to the targets on the right side of the figure. However, overall the same degree 
of spatial distribution as seen with Dimension 1 is not seen with Dimension 2, suggesting 
that it does not account for as much of the variance in the sample’s perceptions compared 
to Dimension 1. Dimension 2 was hypothesised to relate to level of culpability each target 
could be held to, i.e how much responsibility can be ascribed to each target for their 
actions. The interpretation of each dimension is elaborated on in the Discussion section. 
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Dimension 1: Well Adjusted versus Poorly Adjusted 
 
Figure 3. Correspondence matrix of target stereotypes.      = Targets.     = Descriptors. 
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Figure 4. Magnification of correspondence matrix for descriptors of targets. 
 
Cluster Analysis  
 In order to understand participants’ responses on the semantic differential task 
in more detail, cluster analysis was conducted (Johnson & Wall, 1969) using a 
hierarchical agglomerative cluster method (Hummert, 1990; Schmidt & Boland, 
1986). Cluster analysis is considered a bottom-up procedure as in this process each 
observation (or target) is considered a cluster in its own right. Progressively moving 
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with increasingly relaxed similarity criteria moving further along the dendrogram. 
Ward’s variance method using a hierarchical clustering process which incrementally 
groups targets (or objects) together so that each addition to each cluster causes the 
least within-cluster variance, compared to other linkage methods (Blashfield, 1976). 
The within-cluster variance is identified by calculating the mean for each cluster. The 
squared Euclidean distance between each target to the cluster mean is then summed 
across all targets. At each stage, the targets are grouped together in the way that 
causes the smallest increase in the sum of squares. In this case, Ward’s linkage 
revealed two obvious clusters as illustrated in Figure 5. The first cluster combines 
targets representing current mental health issues (Multiple Personality Disordered, 
Mentally Ill, Schizophrenia Disordered, Bipolar Disordered, Insane Person, and 
Depressed Person stereotypes) at its most base level (first stage), but as the similarity 
criteria is relaxed to the next stage (second stage), Conspiracy Theorist and Convicted 
Criminal are added to this cluster (referred to as the ‘mental-health’ cluster for the 
remainder of this thesis), and once the criteria are relaxed to the third stage, Ex-
Mental Health Patient is also absorbed into this cluster. In contrast, the second cluster 
groups Average Man and Average Woman at the first stage, and then at the third 
stage incorporates the Most People and Me stereotypes. This second cluster will be 
referred to as the non-mental health cluster for the remainder of this thesis. All 
targets combined could only be considered as one cluster at the 25th stage (after 
greatly relaxing the similarity criteria).  
Analysis of Variance 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was calculated on participants’ 
responses on each of the 13 targets which revealed there was a significant within-
groups difference of how participants judged the targets, Wilks’ Lambda = .16, F (1, 
209) = 91.16, p < .001. Looking at the pairwise comparisons for only the Conspiracy 
Theorist stereotype against all the other targets, it is evident that conspiracy theorists 
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were judged to be more similar to different forms of psychopathology compared to 
more normative targets (Table 9). Estimated marginal means for each target were 
then plotted on a line graph (Figure 6) which illustrates how conspiracy theorists 
were judged to be similar to targets representing some form of psychopathology as 
well as convicted criminals; but were judged to be quite dissimilar from normative 
targets such as Me, Average Woman, Average Man, and Most People (higher 
estimated marginal means reflect more positive ratings). 
 
 
Figure 5. Dendrogram showing distances between clusters as they are combined. 
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Figure 6. Estimated marginal means of judgements of thirteen targets.  
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Table 9  
Mean Differences Between the Stereotype of Conspiracy Theorist to Twelve Other 
Targets. 
Conspiracy Theorist Stereotype 
compared to 
Mean Difference 
(Conspiracy Theorist stereotype – 
second stereotype) 
 
p 
Me stereotype -1.18 < .001 
Average man stereotype -.77 < .001 
Insane stereotype .02 = ns 
Depressed stereotype -.10 < .001 
Woman stereotype -.87 < .001 
Ex-mental patient stereotype -.35 < .001 
Schizophrenic stereotype -.02 = ns 
Most people stereotype -.75 < .001 
Multiple personality disorder 
stereotype 
-.03 = ns 
Mentally ill stereotype -.05 = ns 
Bipolar disorder stereotype -.06 = ns 
Convicted criminal stereotype .10 < .001 
 
Discussion 
 The aim of the current study was to examine the dominant stereotype of 
conspiracy theorists. A semantic differential questionnaire was used where 
participants made judgements of targets including Conspiracy Theorist. These 
judgements were then analysed using correspondence and cluster analyses across 
targets, as well as across descriptors. Two obvious clusters emerged, one with a theme 
of current mental health issues; and the other with non-mental health issues. 
Conspiracy Theorist belonged to the current mental health cluster, as did Convicted 
Criminal. Based on this categorisation, but also the distances between biplots 
(correspondence analysis), it became clear that that Conspiracy Theorist was 
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considered similar to those who with psychopathology, than those without 
psychopathology (e.g. Average Man). This finding supports the hypothesis that 
conspiracy theorists would be considered more similar to those with psychopathology 
than those without psychopathology.  
The findings of this study provide strong support for the contention that the 
public tends to judge conspiracy theorists similarly to stigmatised groups , such as 
those with current mental health issues (Bryson & Wilson, unpublished; Olmstead & 
Durham, 1976; Walkey et al., 1981; Green et al., 1987). This suggests that there is 
stigma associated with being a conspiracy theorist. Additionally, conspiracy theorists 
were also judged to be characteristically similar to convicted criminals.  
If the descriptor findings are interpreted in the context of Goldberg’s (1990) 
taxonomy of personality traits (Table 8), then in terms of Goldberg’s factor poles, the 
majority of participants deemed the normative cluster to be characterised by people 
who are agreeable, emotionally stable, conscientious, and confident by nature. In 
contrast however, the targets comprising the anti-normative cluster (which also 
includes Conspiracy Theorist and Convicted Criminal) were primarily judged as 
people who are low on emotionally stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness, but are 
also creative.  
 
How were the groups differentiated? 
Based on two-dimensional analysis of the spatial distribution of the targets and 
correspondent descriptors, Dimension 1 (x-axis) of Figures 3 and 4, appeared to 
account for the greatest spatial variation. Two main clusters were apparent with one 
cluster grouping all targets relating to current mental health issues, as well as two 
other targets relating to criminality and conspiracy theorising. The second cluster 
grouped all the remaining targets which were characterised by non-current 
psychopathological attributes. Thus it could be argued that one key aspect in how 
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participants’ judged the targets was the level of psychological adjustment they 
perceived their stereotype of each target to be.  
According to Shock (1952), psychological adjustment relates to a person’s 
competence in satisfying their needs and wants keeping within the constraints of 
their culture. Research has tended to define poor psychological adjustment in terms of 
psychological phenomena. For instance, Juvonen, Nishina, and Graham (2000) 
defined psychological maladjustment as loneliness, depression, and poor self-worth). 
Therefore, we can extrapolate that psychological adjustment refers to how able an 
individual is able to psychologically (internally) adapt to their changing environment 
(external circumstances). Based on synthesis of the relevant literature, well-adjusted 
individuals have greater distress tolerance thresholds and are able to adaptively cope 
with stress (Kasl, Gore, & Cobb, 1975; Durlak & Wells, 1992; Colvin, Block, & 
Funder, 1995; Hackney & Sanders, 2003). The literature also suggests that well-
adjusted individuals are more effective in being able to understand the consequences 
of their social behaviour, and who are fairly honest with themselves or self-enhancing 
(inflated self-impressions) about the type of person they are (Kasl, Gore, & Cobb, 
1975; Colvin et al., 1995; Gold, Issenman, Roberts, & Watt, 2000; Taylor, Lerner, 
Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003).  
Different methods of measuring psychological adjustment have been employed 
in past research, including measuring their degree of life satisfaction (Hackney & 
Sanders, 2003), or more commonly measuring the level of psychopathology within an 
individual. Therefore, it is possible that participants judged the targets with current 
mental health issues, as well as Convicted Criminal and Conspiracy Theorist as unable 
to adapt to their environment and function in an adaptive way; whereas the 
normative targets may have been considered by participants to be relatively better 
adjusted.  
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Distinguishing what Dimension 2 of Figure 3 and 4 relates to may assist in 
understanding the basis for the stereotypes held about conspiracy theorists. As 
mentioned above. Juoven et al. (2000) defined psychological adjustment in terms of 
psychopathology. According to Lewis and Whitley (2012), prior to the nineteenth 
century, mental illness was considered to be a result of moral weakness, but since 
psychiatry has become a branch of medical science, the general populous has come to 
view those with mental illness as sick rather than bad. Based on examination of target 
placements on Dimension 2 (y-axis), it could be reasoned that this dimension relates 
to the degree of culpability each figure is thought to possess by participants. That is 
Dimension 2 may relate to differences in how participants attribute responsibility for 
their undesirable behaviour. More specifically, Figure 3 shows that Convicted 
Criminal sits at the most extreme negative position, potentially relating to the greatest 
degree of culpability, whereas the majority of the targets relating to current mental 
health issues (Depressed, Mentally Ill, Bipolar Disorder and Multiple Personality) sit 
in the most positive positions reflecting that these targets cannot be considered 
culpable for their actions. Normative targets Me, Average Woman, Ex-Mental 
Patient, Most People, and Average Man sit between Convicted Criminal, and the 
current mental health related targets. Conspiracy Theorist sits slightly lower than the 
normative target, but closer to the normative targets than Convicted Criminal. When 
one considers what dimension might differentiate a Convicted Criminal from those 
with current mental health concerns, the degree to which these targets can be held 
responsible for their actions is hypothesised to account for this. For instance, when a 
crime is committed and a person is indicted, it is the responsibility of the defence 
team to bring to light any mitigating circumstances for their client’s actions. Those 
with a mental illness that is thought to have had a deleterious effect on their ability to 
deem whether their actions or behaviour are legally reprehensible are sometimes 
considered to be not guilty by reason of insanity (Reznek, 2013).  
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Reznek (2013) outline four key ‘insanity defences’ that are legally used as 
defence strategies when a defendant is considered to suffer a mental illness: cognitive 
defence, volitional defence, causal defence, and character change defence. A cognitive 
defence would be one that would reason the defendant was not able to judge their 
actions as wrong due to their mental illness. A volitional defence would be one that 
would suggest that due to a mental illness the defendant was not able to control their 
impulses and were not able to stop themselves from committing a criminal act. A 
causal defence would be one that would attribute the cause of the defendant’s 
criminal actions to be their mental illness. And lastly, the character change defence 
would be one that would explain the defendant’s actions by saying their mental 
illness caused a moral change leading them to commit a criminal act. Underlying each 
of these defences is the belief that those who are mentally ill have a diminished 
capacity to such an extent that they should not have to serve a prison sentence for 
their criminal actions. By contrast, based on Figures 3 and 4, it could be reasoned that 
a person who commits a criminal act but does not suffer a mental illness would be 
considered to be more culpable for their actions. In the case of the current study, the 
Convicted Criminal target was considered to be high in culpability (how responsible 
they can be held for their actions), and to represent poor psychological adjustment. 
Some forensic clinical psychology research (Ward & Birgden, 2007) has suggested that 
offenders are often considered moral strangers. That is, convicted criminals are a 
coterie that the majority of society considers a moral outgroup; and people would 
consider themselves to be morally superior to offenders. Unfortunately, because of 
this tradition, at times in correctional settings, “moral transgressors” are not afforded 
the same range of human rights as the rest of society (Ward & Birgden, 2007). That is, 
by committing crime; a large group of people believe that offenders have given up 
their entitlement to be treated equivalently to non-convicted criminals.  
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Those with current mental health concerns were also considered to be poorly 
adjusted individuals, but not culpable for their actions. As the majority of the sample  
was female, it is possible that the targets Me and the Average Woman  were rated 
positively (low culpability and well adjusted) due to the respondents being favourably 
biased when considering themselves (Me) and those they are most similar to (Average 
Woman). Due to having a history of mental illness, Ex-Mental Patient could have also 
been considered to have somewhat less diminished responsibility for their actions, 
due to residual illness that may slightly diminish their ability to operate in prosocial 
ways . In terms of the Conspiracy Theorist it appears respondents may have judged 
this target as being poorly adjusted but as responsible/culpable for their actions as the 
Average Man.  
The propositions above also make conceptual sense in the context of the 
fundamental attribution error (Clarke, 2002) where participants appeared to ascribe 
culpability for negative events based on their stereotypes of the dispositional 
characteristics of each target. However, in this study the extent to which participants 
consider situational factors was not examined, which would be needed in order to 
make clearer interpretations regarding the fundamental attribution error. Future 
research could take advantage of a scenario-based methodology where participants 
could rate the relative causal contribution of dispositional versus situational factors 
for the outcome. The findings of such research could elucidate whether those who 
stereotype conspiracy theorists consider situational factors influencing conspiracy 
theorists to generate CTs (e.g. historical evidence of purposeful harm towards a 
particular ethnic group; Thomas & Quinn, 1991). This would be compared to whether 
people tend to focus on dispositional explanations at the expense of considering 
situational influences when appraising conspiracy theorists.  
 According to Stangor and Schaller (1996), stereotypes are cognitive 
representations that can serve a number of functions including providing 
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explanations of others’ behaviour. The type of stereotyping seen here appears 
consistent with perceived symbolic threat discussed by Stephan and Stephan (2000).  
Symbolic threat perception relates to perceived differences in “morals, values, 
standards, beliefs, and attitudes (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 25). When an ingroup 
asserts that their moral code or system of behaviour is right, any deviation from this 
by outgroups is perceived as threatening. Therefore, when symbolic threat from 
socially deviant/different groups is perceived, this social comparison can serve a 
distancing function between the groups.  
 
Summary 
The findings of this study regarding the non-mental health cluster compared 
to those with current mental health concerns are consistent with previous studies on 
community attitudes towards mental health (Bryson & Wilson, unpublished; 
Olmstead & Durham, 1976; Walkey et al., 1981; Green et al., 1987), where the two 
groups were considered separate from each other. That is, targets within the non-
mental health cluster were considered more positively compared to the mental-health 
cluster. However, this is the first study of its kind to also include conspiracy theorists 
and convicted criminals, and these target additions have provided further empirical 
evidence for the generalising nature of stereotypes. Furthermore, the current study 
also allowed for international participation, demonstrating that stability of such 
findings is not geographically or chronologically confined. That is, the stigma 
associated with having some level of psychopathology (poor psychological 
adjustment) is consistent across time and the world. Moreover, it is possible that 
conspiracy theorists were considered to be similarly poorly psychologically adjusted 
as those with current mental health concerns; and therefore the stigma attached to 
having some form of psychopathology likely also extends to conspiracy theorists. 
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Similarly, conspiracy theorists, and those with current mental health issues may not 
be considered too unwell to be culpable for their actions.  
 
Study 3c: How Conspiracy Theorists Judge Other 
Conspiracy Theorists 
In study 3b it was found that conspiracy theorists are judged by society to be 
similar to those with active mental health concerns, as well as convicted criminals, 
and very far removed from the respondent. Additionally, earlier I suggested that 
moral classification of targets in study 3b may account for some of the disparity seen 
in the judgement of the targets. That is, the majority of society may consider 
conspiracy theorists to be moral strangers. This idea of the us-them dichotomy lends 
itself to early research on social identification theory (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979) 
which was discussed in chapter one. The predominant finding relating to social 
identification theory has been that ingroups are rated more positively than outgroups. 
Therefore, in the context of study 3b, the majority of respondents perceived that 
morally and dispositionally, conspiracy theorists were the outgroup, whereas the 
targets within the normative cluster were considered the ingroup. But what about the 
perspective of conspiracy theorists? How do they perceive the label of conspiracy 
theorist? From the perspective of the conspiracy theorist, do they rate the target 
Conspiracy Theorist more favourably compared to the ratings of those with low CTA? 
If they do, this might suggest that conspiracy theorists do have some awareness of 
their membership to the label of conspiracy theorists and thus judge their ingroup 
more favourably. However, such a finding would be in opposition to previous 
research that has suggested that in some cases it is possible that conspiracy theorists 
are not overtly aware of their tendency to believe in CTs (Clarke, 2002; Douglas & 
Sutton, 2008). It is therefore also possible that whilst those with high CTA may not 
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consider themselves to be conspiracy theorists, they are still able to appreciate the 
positive aspects of the questioning style held by conspiracy theorists. Therefore, it was 
hypothesised that people who have a tendency to believe in conspiracies or who 
engage in conspiracy theorising, would then be likely to judge conspiracy theorists 
favourably compared to non-conspiracy theorists. Such a finding would imply that 
conspiracy theorists do not regard psychopathology to underlie how they perceive the 
causes of the events around them (if they are aware of their group membership). Or 
alternatively, if they are not aware of their group membership, they still appreciate 
the characteristics of conspiracy theorists, and do not consider belief in CTs to be 
associated with psychopathology.  
 In this study the responses of the LC/LP group and the HC/HP group (as 
defined in Study 4) on the semantic differential questionnaire (as outlined in Study 
3b) with relation to the target of Conspiracy Theorist were examined.  
Hypothesis 
It was hypothesized that people who have a tendency to believe CTs or who 
create CTs would be likely to judge the Conspiracy Theorist target more favourably 
compared to those who do not believe or create CTs. The operationalized hypothesis 
for this study was that the HC/HP group (as defined by Study 4) would have a 
significantly higher (indicating more favourable) mean compared to the LC/LP group 
in relation to the Conspiracy Theorist target. 
Method 
Participants 
Please refer to Study 3b for details of the participants used in the current 
study.  
Materials 
Participants were administered both the CBS and CPP. Please refer to the 
methodology section of Study 1 for a description of these scales.  
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Procedure 
 Please refer to Study 3b procedure section for these details.  
 
Results 
 In order to be able to compare different levels of CTA, participants’ responses 
were analysed after categorising participants into four groups of varying levels of 
CTA. The group allocations were based on participant scores on the CBS and CPP 
(Table 10). 
 
Table 10 
Conspiracy Theory Affinity Group Allocations. 
 CBS score < 4 (low score) CBS score ≥  4 (high score) 
CPP score < 4  (low score) Low creation  / Low plausibility 
(LC/LP) 
Low creation  / High plausibility 
(LC/HP) 
 
CPP score  ≥ 4 (high score) High creation  / Low plausibility 
(HC/LP) 
High creation / High plausibility 
(HC/HP) 
 
Note. CPP = Conspiracy Pattern Perception. CBS = Conspiracy Beliefs Scale.  
 
The groups defined in Table 10 sit on the continuum at various positions 
depicting varying strengths of CTA (Figure 8). The HC/HP group reflects strong CTA. 
The LC/LP group reflects low CTA. The two remaining groups indicate moderate 
CTA. 
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Figure  7. Conspiracy Theory Affinity conceptualised dimensionally in terms of perceived 
plausibility of conspiracy theories, and conspiracy theory creation.  
 
In order to test the hypothesis that the HC/HP the Conspiracy Theorist target 
more favourably compared to the LC/LP group, an ANOVA was calculated to 
examine group differences. Descriptive statistics by group are presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Target ‘Conspiracy Theorist’ by Level of 
Conspiracy Affinity. 
Conspiracy Affinity Group M (SD) 
LC/HP 3.74 (.35) 
LC/HP  3.69 (.44) 
HC/LP 3.79 (.34) 
HC/HP 4.04 (.54) 
Overall 3.75 (.43) 
Note. LC = Low conspiracy creation. LP = Low perceived plausibility of conspiracy 
theories. 
  
The between-subject difference effect (calculated using MANOVA) was 
significant suggesting that there is a significant difference in judgement of the 
Conspiracy Theorist target (F (3, 197) = 4.25, p = .01). Post-hoc Tukey HSD revealed 
that the High Conspiracy Affinity Group was significantly differentiated from not 
Low creation/ 
Low plausibility 
Low creation/ 
High plausibility 
High creation/ 
Low plausibility 
High creation/ 
High plausibility 
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only the Low Conspiracy Affinity Group (p < .01), but also Moderately Low 
Conspiracy Affinity Group (p < .01) with more favourable ratings. However, there 
was no significant difference between second highest conspiracy affinity group and 
any of the other groups.   
 Furthermore, a correlation was calculated to determine the relationship 
between subscale score on the semantic differential task with regard to the target 
‘conspiracy theorist’, and how participants scored on the CPP scale and CBS. A 
significant relationship was not found between the semantic differential conspiracy 
theorist score and scores on the CPP scale, r (199) = -.01, p = .90. However, a 
significant relationship was identified between semantic differential conspiracy 
theorist scores and scores on the CBS, r (199) = .22, p < .01. This suggests that those 
who believed a range of CTs were also more likely to judge conspiracy theorists more 
favourably.  
Discussion 
 Partial support for the above hypothesis was garnered from the favourability 
ratings of the target Conspiracy Theorist. When considering CTA, a composite of 
ascription to CT beliefs and CT creating, the highest CTA group (HC/HP) rated 
Conspiracy Theorist significantly more favourably compared to the two lowest CTA 
groups (LC/HP and LC/LP). Finer analysis separating responses on the CBS and CPP 
suggested that there was a significant relationship between responses on the CBS (but 
not the CPP scale) and Conspiracy Theorist target. This means that the higher the 
level of belief in CTs, the more favourably an individual was likely to rate Conspiracy 
Theorist. However, a significant relationship was not found between level of CT 
creation and valence of judgement of Conspiracy Theorist. 
This finding could be interpreted in a number of ways. First, the CPP scale 
may be a measure that actually does tap into conspiracy theorising, but the conspiracy 
theorists in our sample had poor self-awareness or did not regard themselves as 
conspiracy theorists and were fairly neutral in their perception of the characteristics 
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of a conspiracy theorist (not negative, but also not favourable). Second, the CPP scale 
may not be a robust measure of conspiracy theorising. Third, there may be no stable 
pattern in how those with strong CTA judge “conspiracy theorists” compared to those 
with low CTA.  
In this chapter, I established that those with lower levels CTA consider 
conspiracy theorists to have a similar disposition to those with known 
psychopathology. In contrast, those with higher levels of CTA perceive the target 
Conspiracy Theorist in a significantly more favourable light. The next key area of 
investigation in this thesis explores to what extent those with high CTA have 
psychopathological associations as the ‘conspiracy theorist’ stereotype assumes. That 
is, are those with stronger CTA likely to score significantly higher on various 
measures of psychopathology compared to those with weaker CTA. Chapter 4 
empirically tests a range of hypotheses pertaining to these overall research questions, 
and explores the type of psychopathology that may be implicated in strong CTA, and 
whether there is any statistical evidence for such a link.  
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Chapter Four 
Conspiracy Thinking as an Expression 
of Psychopathology? 
 “Persecutory delusions arise because the person 
notices that other peoples’ actions have become 
opaque and surmises that a conspiracy exists”. 
(Freeman, 2007) 
 
Introduction 
Verifying an Anecdotal Connection 
Previous research has shown that those with current mental health concerns 
are regarded more negatively than those with mental health issues and those with 
resolved mental health issues (Olmstead & Durham, 1976; Walkey et al., 1981; Green 
et al., 1987; Bryson & Wilson, nd).The results of study 3b suggests that, in general, the 
stereotype of conspiracy theorists is more consistent with psychopathology (e.g. 
targets such as Bipolar Disorder, Multiple Personality Disorder, and Schizophrenia) or 
abnormal mental health, a stereotype that is laden with negative connotations. On the 
internet, derogatory references to conspiracy theorists include terms such as 
“…conspiraloons, tinfoil hatters, loonspuds, fruit ‘n’nut jobs” Ferentes (2009), and 
“…stupid…mental…hair brained…paranoid” (McDonald, 2013); all implying some 
form of mental disorder.  
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Very little empirical research has explored the potential association between 
psychopathology and conspiracy thinking. This chapter draws on both the literature 
on conspiracy thinking as well as key research in various aspects of psychopathology 
to identify if conceptual parallels between these two concepts exist.  
The literature suggests that the variables most commonly associated with CT 
belief are anomie, hostility, powerlessness, poor moral reasoning, and 
authoritarianism (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999, Goertzel, 1994; Hofstadter, 1958; 
Moscovici, 1987). It is important to emphasize that the literature refers to these 
variables as stable features of personality, rather than transient or fast-changing 
symptoms. It is possible however, that transient manifestations of psychopathology 
are also involved in the in the etiology and maintenance of conspiracy thinking. 
Possible syndromes that may be implicated include depression, anxiety, psychosis, 
and substance/alcohol misuse. Certainly, there is some evidence to suggest that 
personality disorders can be etiological for some clinical syndromes, in that 
maladaptive coping strategies are common in individuals with personality disorders, 
leading other types of psychopathology (Bayon, Hill, Svrakic, Przybeck, & Cloninger, 
1996; Koenigsberg, Kaplan, Gilmore, & Cooper, 1985; Leaf, Alington, Mass, 
DiGiuseppe, & Ellis, 1991). For this reason, some psychometric instruments identify 
personality profiles that consider the relationship between personality patterns and 
clinical syndromes for each responder (e.g. Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III; 
MCMI-III; Millon, 1994). Clinical syndromes experienced by those with personality 
disorders can augment the typical response style of the individual (Millon, 1994). 
Such a conceptualisation is consistent with both the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders – Fourth Edition – Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) and DSM-5 (Fifth Edition; American Psychiatric 
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Association, 2013)8 , where the American Psychiatric Association acknowledges the 
relationship between clinical syndromes and personality disorders (DSM-5; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Accordingly, the DSM-5 has done away with the 
multiaxial system of classification (previous editions of the DSM classified difficulties 
across five axes; American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
For the purposes of this research, I was largely interested in stable 
psychological presentations, such as established personality traits, that may implicate 
a tendency for conspiracy thinking, rather than a one-off belief in a CT (which may 
be caused by transient symptomology). Conclusions drawn from the latter form of 
data would likely be more reliable and stable across time, than those drawn from 
syndrome measures. However, ideally, this research would have used a measure such 
as the MCMI-III which examines how stable personality styles are affected by clinical 
syndromes and vice versa. Unfortunately, measures such as the MCMI-III can be 
quite lengthy (MCMI-III has 175 items) and thus require significant time 
                                               
8 I submit my thesis in a year where clinicians transition to a new edition of the DSM. There is much 
debate surrounding the DSM-5, with some in support of its restructure and inclusion of new diagnoses. 
Other researchers and clinicians oppose implementation of the DSM-5 particularly with respect to 
diagnosis of personality disorders (e.g. Widiger, 2011). In most cases I have chosen to reference the 
DSM-5 over the DSM-IV-TR a) in accordance with the Code of Ethics for Psychologists working in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand (2002), Principle 2 Responsible Caring, Competence Value (2.2.4) which states 
that “Psychologists utilise and rely on scientifically and professionally derived knowledge, and are able 
to justify their professional decisions and activities in the light of current psychological knowledge and 
standards of practice”. In particular, the removal of the multiaxial system from the DSM is in line with 
the dimensional conceptualisation of mental disorders suggested by some researchers (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013; Herbert, Hope, & Bellack, 1992; Livesley, 2003; Livesley, Schroeder, 
Jackson & Jang, 1994; Widiger, 2003). However, in some cases I have cited the DSM-IV-TR where the 
DSM-5 lacks specificity without justification. Therefore, I have cited one or the other edition as 
appropriate.  
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commitment from participants, in addition to the other measures that are required for 
this research. Issues such as the effects of fatigue on the data would then need to be 
considered. Therefore, in the present research, selected measures that tap into both 
personality traits, but also delusions (particularly of a paranoid theme) were utilised. 
Thus whilst the association between syndromal symptomology and conspiracy 
thinking could be important to explore in future research, such investigation was 
outside the scope of the present research.  
How psychopathology should best be described has led to a wide and varied 
debate, particularly in the transition from the DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5. Of 
particular concern to some researchers is the lack of acknowledgement of normal 
variants of personality traits. That is, scoring low on a particular personality trait does 
not necessarily reflect normal functioning, but merely a low level of a maladaptive 
trait (Widiger, 2011). For instance, a low score for inappropriate affect does not 
necessarily reflect appropriate affect, just low inappropriate affect. Therefore, in this 
chapter I will also discuss the non-clinical variants of delusions and schizotypy, and 
how they may be associated with the lower end of the CTA continuum.  
The following study is intended to explore whether there are 
psychopathological features associated with CT beliefs and conspiracy theorising, and 
does not conceptualise CTA as its own unique form of psychopathology. One area of 
psychological difficulty that the CT literature has focused some research attention is 
delusional thinking (Darwin et al., 2011). Delusions are considered a key feature of 
psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia, delusional disorder, brief psychotic 
disorder, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and 
substance/medication-induced psychotic disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Schizotypal personality disorder (described in detail later in this chapter) has 
also been suggested to be implicated in CTA (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013). 
Schizotypal personality disorder is also considered part of the schizophrenia spectrum 
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of disorders, further emphasising the relationship between clinical syndromes and 
personality disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; cite).  
In this chapter, both these forms of psychopathology are discussed and 
investigated empirically. This chapter will discuss the key features of delusions and 
schizotypy, how these features are most commonly expressed clinically and non-
clinically, as well as associated information-processing biases. The basis for the 
following study is then justified by a synthesis of material concerning the 
psychological mechanisms involved in CTA, and the psychopathological features they 
conceptually correspond with. There are therefore a range of non-correspondent 
psychopathological features (e.g. impulse control, intellectual disability, memory 
impairment, etc.) that are beyond the scope of this thesis, and accordingly are 
excluded due to their lack of theoretical basis for inclusion.   
 
Delusions 
Fundamental Features 
 Delusions can be symptomatic (concurrent with other symptoms) of a range of 
possible mental disorders, but generally are considered the cornerstone of psychosis 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Some refer to a delusion as a false or 
unfounded belief (Freeman et al., 2001), and in fact, the American Psychiatric 
Association (2000) succinctly defines delusions as distorted thought content, and also 
as “...erroneous beliefs that usually involve a misinterpretation of perceptions of 
experiences” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000. p. 299). However, what makes 
a delusion problematic may not just be the presence of the delusion, but also related 
auxiliary factors. David (1999) argues that a delusional thought can be distinguished 
from a non-delusional thought not only because delusional thoughts are not based 
upon by normal reasoning processes, but that second-tier factors feed into the 
existence of a delusion. These second-tier factors can include the individual’s attitude 
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towards a particular thought, how much credence they give the thought, and how 
distressing the thought is to them. In line with this contention, tools used in the 
current research measuring problematic personality traits also account for these 
second-tier auxiliary factors (e.g. Peters’ Delusion Inventory – 21; PDI-21). 
Furthermore, as with all other types of thoughts, delusions exist in a context of wider 
belief systems which are influenced by a person’s own values, and which may be 
juxtaposed against the values and beliefs systems of others. That is to say, delusions 
make sense to the person thinking them, but not anyone else (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 
2006). Therefore, a person with very high CTA may have a delusion that makes sense 
to them but not others, due to their belief system which supports the delusion. 
 Despite the immense potential variability and complexity delusions, delusional 
thinking is a feature that clinicians are able to identify when working with clients. In 
a clinical sense, what constitutes a delusion would be a range of thoughts which 
revolve around a theme that has no evidence to support it, or when the particular 
theme is not culturally or religiously consistent for that particular individual (Bell, 
Halligan, & Ellis, 2006; Freeman & Garety, 2000). The level of psychological 
impairment caused by the delusion may be related to the level of conviction the 
delusion is held with, the level of distress elicited by the delusion, as well as the 
persistence of a delusion, all which will affect how much a person is impeded in the 
ability to function on a day-to-day basis (Freeman, 2007; Peters, 1999).   
Consistent with Armador et al.’s (1999) multidimensional conceptualisation of 
delusions, Freeman (2007) outlines seven key characteristics of delusions which 
individuals can vary on according to level of impairment. The first characteristic is 
how unfounded the delusion is, ranging from truth being exaggerated to impossible 
and fantastical beliefs which have no basis in reality. The second characteristic relates 
to the level of conviction that the delusion is real, ranging from the delusion only 
being strong in certain circumstances (for instance, when they are stressed). The third 
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characteristic concerns how resistant an individual is to acknowledging that there 
may be some truth to conflicting or alternative explanations other than their 
particular belief. The fourth characteristic revolves around how preoccupied an 
individual is by their delusion. That is, how much time do they spend thinking or 
ruminating on the delusion? Some individuals may only contemplate the delusion 
very rarely, whereas others may spend considerable amounts of their time focused on 
their delusion. The fifth characteristic is how distressing an individual finds the 
content of their delusion. For instance, grandiose delusions can be flattering to an 
individual, however, other delusions such as severe persecutory delusions may leave 
an individual in fear of their safety from some powerful other. The sixth way 
delusions can be characterised is by how much the delusion interferes with an 
individual’s ability to function interpersonally. Some people may cease engagement in 
activities where they may have to interact with others, for instance by not 
maintaining employment. Others may be able to continue to keep important 
relationships going.  The final characteristic of delusions is who the delusion refers to. 
For instance, some delusions are focused solely on the person that holds the delusion. 
An example of such a delusion may be that a person believes that they alone have the 
ability to communicate with extra-terrestrials.  Others may be in fear for the safety of 
those they love due to their delusional beliefs. Consideration of these factors in the 
assessment of a client’s delusions is essential in order to understand the impact the 
delusional thinking has on their ability to function across different contexts (e.g. 
interpersonally, occupationally, and so on). 
 
Persecutory Delusions 
Consistent with the idea of thematic belief systems, the DSM-IV-TR notes 
some delusional themes may be “persecutory, referential, somatic, religious, or 
grandiose” in nature (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 87), reflecting that 
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not all delusions are of a paranoid-theme. Persecutory delusions are the most 
commonly seen delusion clinically (for example, persecutory delusions are seen in 
approximately 50% of patients with schizophrenia; Freeman, 2007). To summarise an 
abundance of literature, Freeman and Garety (2000) define persecutory beliefs as 
those where a person believes they are being harmed or will be harmed by someone 
who has the power to exact this harm. Freeman (2007) mentions however, that there 
is a great deal of variance within the subcategory of persecutory delusions itself, such 
as who the victim and persecutor are, and the timing of threats and so on. To further 
conceptualise the continuous nature of this variance, Freeman and colleagues 
(Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith, Rollinson, Fowler et al., 2005) proposed a 
hierarchy of paranoia (Figure 8) where severe paranoid beliefs refer to significant 
harm of some kind. Of particular note, in this model, Freeman et al. (2005) has 
classified CTs as severe threat beliefs, reflecting that they are less commonly held by 
the non-clinical population, but cause the belief-holder a significant level of distress. 
At the lowest level of the hierarchy, are concerns regarding being socially vulnerable 
to rejection and such, reflecting that they are more common in terms of paranoid 
thought, but do not cause as severe distress to the belief-holder, compared to those 
who perceive a conspiracy against them (Freeman et al., 2005).   
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Figure 8. The hierarchy of paranoid thoughts (reproduced from Freeman et al, (2005).  
 
Another important aspect of the persecutory delusion literature is that 
persecutory delusions, paranoia, and persecutory beliefs are terms which are often 
used interchangeably. Persecutory beliefs can be held at non-clinical levels, however 
when the level of conviction they are held with, the level of distress caused by them, 
and the persistence of the belief develops to such a degree that it begins to impede a 
person’s ability to function as they normally would, they become delusional 
(Freeman, 2006). In addition, if a person continues to hold the thought with strong 
 
Severe threat 
(e.g. people trying to 
 cause significant physical, 
or social harm, 
conspiracies, known to the 
wider public) 
Moderate threat 
(e.g. People going out of their way to get 
at you) 
Mild threat 
(e.g. People trying to cause minor distress such as 
irritation) 
Ideas of reference 
(e.g. People talking about you, being watched) 
Social evaluative concerns 
(e.g. fears of rejection, feelings of vulnerability, thoughts that the world is potentially 
dangerous) 
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conviction even in the presence of contradictory of alternative explanations, this adds 
further impetus to the classification of the thought as a delusion. Paranoid belief is 
seen to be similar to a persecutory belief, due to the anticipation of potential threat or 
harm. The main exception to this parallel is that according to Freeman (2007), a belief 
cannot be considered persecutory if the belief is only about others being hurt. If the 
belief includes the believer as also being targeted for harm, it would then be 
considered persecutory. That is, paranoia can be self and/or other-focused.  
 
Clinical and Non-Clinical Presentation 
 In clinical cases, delusions can be seen in patients suffering psychotic disorders 
such as brief psychotic disorder, delusional disorder, psychosis due to a general 
medical condition, psychosis not otherwise specified, schizoaffective disorder, 
schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, shared psychotic disorder, and 
substance/medication-induced psychotic disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Delusions can also be seen in other conditions where psychotic features are 
only sometimes seen, such as both unipolar and bipolar major depressive episodes, 
manic episodes, and mixed mood episodes (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Persecutory delusion in the context of psychosis is also be associated with post-
traumatic stress disorder (Morrison, Frame, Larkin, 2003; Shaw, McFarlane, Bookless, 
Air, 2002; Read, Agar, Argyle, & Aderhold, 2003). When there is a long-standing 
history of a paranoid style of thinking to the extent that there is pervasive 
misinterpretation of others behaviour as suspicious, an individual may meet the 
diagnostic criteria for paranoid personality disorder (DSM-5; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  
 In order to explore the prevalence of delusional thinking  (as opposed to full 
disorder) in the general (non-clinical) population, a number of researchers have 
administered a variety of screening measures for psychosis to non-clinical samples 
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and compared their findings to rates of delusional thinking in the clinical population. 
A review by Freeman (2006) suggested that at least 1-3% of the non-clinical 
population experienced delusions of a severity comparable to psychotic levels, with 
an additional 5-6% also experiencing delusions but not to such a severe degree. 
Furthermore, due to the continuous and hierarchical nature of paranoid thinking, 
Freeman (2007) estimates that approximately 10-15% of the general population 
experience paranoia on a regular basis. In one particular study, using the Psychosis 
Screening Questionnaire (Bebbington & Nayani, 1995), Johns et al. (2004) found that 
of their 8,580 participants (from the general population) aged between 16 and 74 
years, 21.2% reported that in the previous 12 months they felt as though other people 
were ‘against’ them. Of the total sample 9.1% felt that there were times when people 
have acted deliberately to harm them, and 1.5% of the total sample felt as though 
there have been times when a group of people were plotting to harm them. On the 
basis of these results Johns et al. (2004) suggested that paranoia is at least as widely 
experienced as anxiety and depression.  
 There has also been some evidence to suggest that sub-clinical (worse than 
normal, but not yet at clinical threshold) levels of paranoid thinking can be indicative 
of increased risk for later development of psychosis (Johns & van Os, 2003; Myin-
germeys, Krabbendam, & van Os, 2003; Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad, & 
Kinser, 1994). However, for this later development of psychosis to occur, there must 
at some stage also be the development of other psychotic features (for example 
auditory hallucinations) in addition to delusional thinking. Therefore, paranoid 
thinking could be more usefully considered a vulnerability marker for disorder 
development. That is not to say, that every person that has ever experienced a 
paranoid thought will later become psychotic. For a portion of the non-clinical 
population whose paranoia revolves around their perception of severe threat from 
conspiracies against them (Freeman et al., 2005), some may reach a threshold point, 
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beyond which more florid symptomology may emerge. The moderator factors for 
severity of illness will likely depend on the conviction, preoccupation, distress, and 
persistence of the symptoms (Johns & van Os, 2003).  
Another complicating factor in delusional cognitive processes, for both clinical 
(Chadwick, Trower, Juustic-Butler, & Maguire, 2005) and non-clinical (Johns et al., 
2004) populations, is concomitant affective conditions such as anxiety which is 
estimated to be a co-occurring problem in approximately 66% of those who 
experience persecutory delusions. Anxiety in this respect can relate to fear, stress, and 
worry. High levels of any of these types of anxiety can in fact amplify the level of 
distress a delusion causes for the individual and therefore also serve as a maintaining 
factor for their dysfunction (Freeman, 2007). For instance, if an individual with 
strong conspiracy belief genuinely believes they are in imminent danger, it follows 
that they may experience clinically significant levels of fear, stress, and worry about 
their safety. Other affective correlates of paranoia have been found to be high levels 
of depression, and low levels of self-esteem (Chadwick, Trower, Juustic-Butler, & 
Maguire, 2005).  
 
Cognitive Processes Associated with Delusions 
Theory of Mind Deficits 
Misinterpretation of interpersonal experiences can lead an individual with to 
believe that they are being targeted for harm by others (persecutory delusion), and 
thus this misinterpretation can escalate to the extent that it causes them clinically 
significant distress (Bentall et al., 2001). That is, paranoid individuals make 
maladaptive social inferences. Frith (1992) suggested that this clinical phenomenon is 
somewhat consistent with dysfunctional Theory of Mind. Theory of Mind (ToM) is a 
process whereby people are aware that others have their own thoughts and feelings 
which may be inconsistent with one’s own. The deficits in ToM discussed by Frith 
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relate to misinterpreting the intentions behind others’ behaviour to be malevolent in 
nature.  
A common way to assess ToM is through a hinting task whereby participants 
are presented with scenarios of interpersonal interactions, and are asked to explain 
what the people in the scenario meant when they dropped a hint (Corcoran et al., 
1995; Craig, Hatton, Craig, & Bentall, 2004). Another method of assessment is 
through emotion identification tasks (Craig et al., 2004). The findings of ToM deficits 
in delusional patients have not been consistent particularly with respect to patients 
with paranoid delusions. For instance, some studies have been able to find evidence of 
ToM deficits in the paranoid subgroup of their delusional samples (Corcoran et al., 
1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Corcoran et al., 1997; Craig et al., 2004); however, 
other studies have been able to replicate the findings of previous studies relating to 
schizophrenic participants demonstrating ToM deficits, but did not find ToM deficits 
in the paranoid subgroups (Sarfati et al., 1997; Langdon et al., 1997; Doody et al., 
1998; however the latter study did not break their sample down into symptom 
subgroups). Nevertheless, one consistent finding across these studies was that 
schizophrenic participants presenting with more negative symptomology (loss of 
normal functioning, e.g. avolition, alogia, flattened affect; Rector, Beck, & Stolar, 
2005) compared to positive symptoms (features which are additive to normal 
functioning such as delusions and hallucinations) showed greater deficits in an ability 
to infer others intentions compared to the paranoid subgroups, consistent with more 
recent studies of this nature (Harrington, Langdon, Seigert, & McClure, 2005; 
Harrington, Seigert, & McClure, 2005).  
ToM has also been investigated visually using animations of two moving 
objects (Blakemore, Sarfati, Bazin, & Decety, 2003). In half of the presentations, the 
movement of one object was contingent on the other, but in the other half of the 
presentations, there was no relationship between the movements of the objects. 
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Under different conditions, participants were required to respond as to whether they 
thought the movement of one shape had any relationship with the movement of the 
other shape, and were asked to rate the strength of the relationship. The key finding 
from this study was that paranoid participants perceived a relationship between the 
objects even in conditions where the movements of the objects were non-contingent, 
whereas non-paranoid participants did not. Additionally, Blakemore et al. (2003) 
concluded that when paranoid participants observe movements by objects which they 
perceive to be caused by other objects, they infer that these objects have intentions, 
motivations, and goals the same way humans and animals do (that they have agency; 
Blakemore et al., 2003). This may have important implications for how conspiracy 
theorists may connect unrelated situational stimuli, and based on the actions of others 
in those situations infer their intentions as malevolent. This is further discussed in 
chapter two. Therefore, the perception of non-existent relationships (or patterns), is 
argued to be due to over-attribution of a contingency between the objects (Blakemore 
et al., 2003).  
Because of the conflicting nature of these findings on the presence of ToM 
deficits in persecutory delusions, Freeman (2007) has suggested that ToM deficits may 
indeed be implicated in the development of such delusions, but that they are unlikely 
to be the only contributing factor. Craig et al, (2004), has also stated that dysfunction 
in ToM contributes to a paranoid delusional thinking style, but that an externally-
biased attribution style also plays an important role.                                                                                                
 
Information-Processing Biases 
Biases in the way individuals with persecutory delusions process information 
have received much empirical attention (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Garety 
& Freeman, 1999). One form of cognitive bias commonly demonstrated by this 
subgroup of delusional people is the tendency to make external attributions (ascribing 
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the causes of events to factors outside oneself; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Bentall, 
Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001), and thus serve to help develop 
and maintain a “paranoid worldview” (Bentall et al., 2001, p. 1143). Of particular 
note, a number of studies have managed to replicate (using a range of measurement 
tools for assessing attribution style) the finding that when paranoid patients try to 
make causal explanations for negative events, they are more likely to make external-
person-focused attributions rather than external-situation-focused attributions 
(Kinderman & Bentall, 1996a; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996b; Kinderman & Bentall, 
1997; Craig, Hatton, Craig, & Bentall, 2004; Martin & Penn, 2002.) That is, they are 
more likely to blame the causes for negative events on other people, rather than 
situational factors (e.g. the economy being on a down-swing). Therefore, an 
individual with conspiracy-driven paranoid delusions would be more likely to 
attribute the cause of a negative event to those they see as conspirators rather than to 
possible situational factors. 
A related finding regarding the cognitive style of those with paranoid 
delusions is the way they explain or justify the events around them. Paranoid thinkers 
tend to require fewer (compared to non-clinical samples) pieces of information in 
order to accept a particular explanation for an event (Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 
2007; Freeman, Pugh, & Garety, 2008), and thus have an incomplete reasoning style. 
This is known as the jump-to-conclusions (JTC) reasoning bias.  
In order to empirically test JTC in paranoia-deluded individuals, a simple 
probabilistic reasoning task is often employed, which is able to directly measure the 
number of pieces of information a participant requires before they will make a 
decision. The most commonly used task is one where participants are shown two jars, 
each with beads of two colours of opposite relative proportions (Garety, Hemsley, & 
Wessely, 1991). For example, one jar may contain 40 red beads, and 60 blue beads – 
the mainly blue jar; whereas the other jar will contain 60 red beads and 40 blue beads 
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– the mainly red jar. The jars are then hidden from the participant’s view, and they 
are then told that the experimenter has selected one of these jars. The participant’s 
task is to decide which jar was selected. The experimenter will draw one bead out of 
the selected jar at a time, and the dependent measure is how many drawn beads the 
participant will view before they arrive at a decision as to whether the mainly blue jar 
or mainly red jar had been selected. The fewer the beads drawn, the more hasty a 
participant’s data-gathering is said to be. 
There has been a bit of a “chicken and egg debate” about which comes first, 
JTC or delusions. Some argue that JTC acts as a vulnerability marker for later 
development of delusions, whilst others argue that the severity of delusions and JTC 
co-vary. For instance, some studies have found JTC to be more prominent in cases of 
paranoia where delusions are held with strong conviction (Freeman, Pugh, & Garety, 
2008). Other studies have also found JTC to still be a feature of data-gathering in 
those who are no longer actively psychotic, with delusions that have subsided to 
subclinical levels (Moritz & Woodward, 2005).  
Dudley and Over (2003) integrate the JTC seen in paranoia with the concept of 
confirmation bias. A confirmation bias is when an individual looks only for evidence 
which supports their notion, and not evidence that may contradict it (Freeman, 
2007). Using an example provided by Dudley and Over (2003); if a paranoid 
individual notices someone laughing, they may jump-to-conclusions and assume the 
laughter is directed at them in a disparaging way, which may then lead them to 
assume that there is a plot against them. The one piece of information would be 
sufficient for him to come to this conclusion. This confirmation bias would then mean 
that he would not consider other evidence as a possible explanation for the ambiguous 
situation.  
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Summary 
 Paranoid delusions are characterised by distorted thought content often based 
on misinterpretations of a range of experiences (situational and interpersonal), which 
can give rise to clinically significant distress depending on the level of credence they 
attribute to the delusion as well as how much harm they believe themselves to be at 
risk of. According to Freeman et al. (2005), CTs are delusions characterised by 
perceived severe threats to one’s wellbeing. Furthermore, when a negative event does 
take place, the cause of the event is attributed to external-person-focused factors 
rather than external-situational factors. Therefore, an individual with a high level of 
CTA will be more likely to assign the blame for a negative event to conspirators 
rather than to possible situational factors.   
 Whilst some of the features of delusional presentation bear resemblance to 
that of those with very high CTA, there are also other forms of psychopathology that 
have parallels with high CTA. Schizotypal-type traits also bear some likeness to 
conspiracy beliefs. 
 
Schizotypy 
Fundamental Features 
 Schizotypy is a term used to describe a family of personality traits seen in both 
clinical and non-clinical populations (Raine, Reynolds, Lencz, Scerbo, Triphon, & 
Kim, 1994; Vollema & Hoijtink, 2000). The most extreme presentation of these traits 
can be seen in schizotypal personality disorder, which relates to deficits in 
interpersonal functioning, eccentricities of behaviour, and cognitive-perceptuo 
abnormalities. Raine and colleagues (Raine, 1991; Raine et al., 1994) based their 
conceptualisation of schizotypy on the nine schizotypal personality features outlined 
in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), of which at least five 
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need to be present before a diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder can be 
justified: ideas of reference, odd beliefs or MI, unusual perceptual experiences, odd 
thinking and speech, suspiciousness or paranoid ideation, inappropriate affect, 
peculiar, odd or eccentric behaviour, excessive social anxiety, and lack of close friends 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
 For ideas of reference to be considered a significant clinical feature of 
presentation, an individual must be seen to have a tendency to misinterpret 
ambiguous events as being self-referential in nature. According to Wong et al. (2012), 
one of the most common presentations of ideas of reference is when an individual 
feels as though something they have witnessed in the mass media relates specifically 
to them. An important clinical consideration however, is that the referential ideas 
must not be of such severity as to be considered delusional (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000; Wong et al., 2012). 
 MI is one of the signature features of schizotypy. Please refer to chapter two 
for a full description. Briefly, MI is a state of belief in one or more magical influences 
(which are culturally-inconsistent) as being responsible for the outcome of events 
(Meehl, 1964, as cited in Eckblad & Chapman, 1983).  
 The schizotypal feature of unusual perceptual episodes can relate to out-of-
body-experiences (feeling experientially separate from one’s own body; McCreery & 
Claridge, 2002), or perceiving non-existing stimuli (Tsakanikos, 2006). The theory 
behind why unusual perceptual experiences take place, is that schizotypal individuals 
(or indeed schizophrenic patients with this form of positive symptomatology), 
misattribute internally generated stimuli to external sources, and additionally have 
acquired loose semantic networks, which can reinforce these external explanations 
(Tsakanikos, 2006). This may bear implications for paranormal CT belief. For 
example, Spanos, Cross, & DuBreuil (1993) suggest that reports of alien abduction 
could be explained instead by sleep paralysis, based on the similarity of physiological 
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symptoms reported. Another schizotypal feature which has been empirically linked to 
atypical and loose semantic knowledge and memory networks, is odd speech and 
thinking (Minor, Cohen, Weber, & Brown, 2011). According to Minor et al., 
individuals with schizotypically-odd thinking often make ambiguous references, 
experience loss of goal-directed thought, and demonstrate very loose associations 
between phrases in their speech. In conspiracy theorists, it is possible that these loose 
semantic networks may serve to make CTs seem more plausible, even in the face of 
disconfirming evidence.  
 Schizotypal individuals can also be suspicious and paranoid that other people 
(and in some cases, those known to the individual) have hostile intentions towards 
them (Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011). This believed hostility from others can be 
perceived to be manifested through disloyalty, deception, exploitation, and at the 
extreme end, potential physical harm (Darwin et al., 2011). Loughland and Williams 
(1997), suggest a link between suspiciousness and excessive social anxiety, in that 
those believing they are victim to the malice or mal-judgement (behavioural and 
cognitive expressions respectively) of others, as a response begin to withdraw socially 
as a defence mechanism, although they may be unhappy about their lack of 
friendships and so on (unlike for example, schizoid personality disorder, where the 
individual also experiences a lack of close friendships).  To capture the suspiciousness 
experienced by schizotypal individuals a number of measures ask questions that are 
designed to tap into suspicious and paranoid thoughts. Such measures include 
Persecutory Beliefs subscale of the British Inventory of Mental Pathology (Bedford & 
Deary, 2006), the Paranoia Checklist (Freeman et al., 2005), the suspiciousness 
subscale of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991). All three 
measures were utilised in the current thesis.  
Another feature of schizotypy relates to a constricted range of affect, or 
inappropriately timed and levels of expressions of emotion (American Psychiatric 
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Association, 2013). Thus, such individuals can come across as emotionally stunted or 
ambivalent (Kerns, 2006). Schizotypal individuals may also have eccentricities or 
oddities of behaviour that may present as “unusual mannerisms, an often unkempt 
manner of dress that does not quite ‘fit together’, and inattention to the usual social 
conventions (e.g., the person may avoid eye contact, wear clothes that are ink stained 
and ill-fitting, and be unable to join in and give-and-take banter of co-workers)” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 656).  
Social cognition research (e.g. Meyer & Shean, 2006) has suggested that 
magical ideation can account somewhat for the social/ToM challenges facing 
schizotypes, such as being unable to correctly interpret others’ thoughts, beliefs, and 
intentions during interpersonal situations. ToM deficits were also discussed earlier in 
relation to delusional thinking.   Cognitive slippage is considered the mildest form of 
formal thought disorder which is commonly seen in schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
(Gooding, Tallent, & Hegyi, 2001; Meehl, 1962). It is said to be characterised by an 
abnormal associative network (connections made between unrelated pieces of 
knowledge and memories; Tsakanisos, 2006), as well as a tendency to lose track of 
one’s own thoughts. Cognitive slippage has been identified has having the most 
influence on development of schizotypal traits, and potential escalation of these traits 
to a clinically significant level (Gooding, Tallent, & Hegyi, 2001; Meehl, 1990). This 
makes intuitive sense when considering that at least five of the nine key features of 
schizotypy have an obvious cognitive basis (ideas of reference, odd beliefs/magical 
ideation, unusual perceptual experiences, odd thinking and speech, and suspiciousness 
or paranoid ideation), and only five symptoms are required to satisfy the diagnostic 
criteria for schizotypal personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
In some studies researchers have considered MI a proxy for cognitive slippage and 
have measured cognitive slippage indirectly through measuring MI (Meyer & Shean, 
2006). Formal thought disorder has been implicated in the development of positive 
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and negative symptoms of schizophrenia (Andreasen & Olsen, 1982; Docherty, Shnur, 
& Harvey, 1988), a form of psychosis which has strong empirical support for being 
related to schizotypy.  
 
The Dimension Debate and Schizophrenia-Proneness 
Over the past 25 years debate has evolved regarding the dimensionality of 
schizotypy, and the most useful way to conceptualise the presentation of those with 
schizotypal traits. Investigation of the dimensionality of schizotypy is important for 
informing the types of cases likely to have poor prognosis and potential to develop 
into more serious forms of psychopathology such as psychosis (Vollema & Hoijtink, 
2000).  And indeed the susceptibility link between schizotypy and schizophrenia has 
been made as a result of evidence that schizophrenic individuals are highly likely to 
have schizotypal biological relatives, and vice versa (Torgersen, 1985).  The 
dimensionality of schizophrenia spectrum disorders is relevant to the study of CT 
belief as I propose that conspiracy belief can be conceptualised as continuous in 
nature; and that strong CTA may be associated with severity of schizophrenia-type 
symptomology.  That is, the stronger the CTA, the more severe the 
schizotypal/schizophrenia-like symptoms and vice versa. Similarly, weak CTA may be 
associated with lower levels of schizotypal/schizophrenia-like symptoms. 
Researchers have found MI and perceptual aberrations to be markers of 
psychosis-proneness, with MI being the strongest predictor of the two (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1987; Meyer & Hautzinger, 1999). Early work by Hewitt and Claridge 
(1989), subsequently replicated by Joseph and Peters (1995), initially suggested three 
factors to account for schizotypal traits seen non-clinically. These factors were 
identified as magical ideation, unusual perceptual experiences, and paranoid 
ideation/suspiciousness. However, the Hewitt and Claridge (1989) model was only 
able to account for approximately 28% of the variance in their sample. The 
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Schizotypal Personality Scale (Claridge & Brocks, 1984) which was used in their study 
did not adequately account for Ideas of reference and social anxiety in their sample, 
However, Hewitt and Claridge (1989) acknowledged the need to include items in 
their measurement scale that would reflect ideas of reference and social anxiety more 
satisfactorily.  
Other research has been more convincingly able to account for schizotypy 
seen in non-clinical populations.  For instance, Raine et al. (1994), found a three-
factor model to be particularly effective to account for such traits. The first factor 
relates to cognitive-perceptual deficits which account for ideas of reference, magical 
thinking, unusual perceptual experiences, and paranoid ideation. The second factor 
pertains to interpersonal deficits such as social anxiety, no close friends, constricted 
affect, and paranoid ideation again. The final schizotypal factor according to Raine et 
al. (1994), disorganisation, has to do with odd behaviour and speech. Raine et al. 
(1994) have also suggested that if any of these factors were to be considered as a major 
vulnerability marker for schizotypal personality, it would be the disorganisation 
factor. The disorganisation factor of course includes poverty of speech and content, 
which is in line with earlier mention that cognitive slippage is the most important 
vulnerability marker for schizotypy (Gooding et al., 2001). On a theoretical level, 
these three factors appear to be rather analogous to the three symptomatology factors 
underpinning schizophrenia (Arnt, Alliger, & Andreason, 1991). More specifically, 
the Raine et al. (1994) cognitive-perceptual factor seems akin to the positive 
(productive) symptoms of schizophrenia (such as hallucinations and delusions). 
Furthermore, Raine et al.’s (1994) interpersonal factor is similar to the negative 
symptomology (loss of functioning such as anhedonia, social withdrawal) seen in 
schizophrenia. And finally, Raine et al.’s (1994) disorganisation factor corresponds 
with the thought disorder and bizarre behaviour seen in schizophrenia. These 
findings and theoretical link made by Raine et al. (1994) are also supported by other 
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findings such as those of Vollema and Hoijtink (2000) who similarly found a three 
factor model to best account for schizotypal traits, in both clinical and non-clinical 
samples (however, they excluded actively psychotic participants from their clinical 
sample). Their resulting three factors were labelled positive schizotypy, 
disorganisation, and negative schizotypy, reflecting much the same categorisation as 
used by Raine et al. (1994).  
These findings suggest a continuous nature of schizotypal traits between non-
clinical and clinical populations (Raine et al., 1994; Vollema & Hoijtink, 2000). 
According to Vollema and Hoijtink (2000), psychotic symptoms seen in schizophrenia 
can be seen as an exaggeration of symptoms comprising the cognitive-
perceptual/positive factor of schizotypy, symptoms demonstrating formal thought 
disorder in schizophrenia can be seen as an exaggeration of the symptoms grouped 
into the disorganised schizotypal factor, and negative symptomatology seen in 
schizophrenia as an exacerbation of the interpersonal/negative factor of schizotypy.  
There is evidence to suggest that some within the non-clinical population with 
schizotypal traits are able to remain high functioning regardless of experiencing some 
features which would classically be considered psychotic such as hallucinations and 
out-of-the-body experiences. (McCreery & Claridge, 2002). These findings may then 
be applicable to the present research if an empirical relationship between Schizotypal 
traits and strong CTA is found, to account for why if these traits are present, such 
individuals are able to continue functioning at non-clinical levels.  In order to explain 
why such individuals are able to remain high functioning, McCreery and Claridge 
(2002) suggest that elevated scores on the positive trait factor are not sufficient to 
account for a psychotic break. Rather, when anhedonia is implicated on top of other 
schizoptypal traits, then the risk for psychosis becomes much more probable. That is 
to say, hedonism may act as a protective factor in those who have out-of-the-body 
experiences but do not present for the assistance of medical professionals (McCreery 
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& Claridge, 2002). Another interpretation of their findings by these researchers was 
that in the cases of problematic psychosis, elevations on more than one factor are 
likely to be present. More specifically, positive symptomology may relate to more 
transient psychological states, whereas the other two factors may be anchored much 
more as stable traits. Furthermore, McCreery and Claridge (2002) endorse the fully 
dimensional perspective of schizotypy, suggesting that only those who score fairly 
highly on measures of schizotypy (who are beyond a particular threshold), and who 
then develop psychotic features, are more likely to experience delusions and 
hallucinations of such severity that it impedes their level of functioning. 
  
Closing the Gap Between Delusional Thinking and 
Schizotypy: Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence 
Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) is considered an information-
processing deficit, whereby an individual will hold their initial hypotheses with great 
conviction, even in the face of contradictory evidence (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, 
Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002) BADE is most classically associated with clinical 
delusions, however, it is also evident in schizotypy (Buchy, Woodward, & Liotti, 
2007; Orenes, Navarrete, Beltran, & Santamaria, 2012) providing a plausible link 
between schizotypy and potential for development of clinical delusions (Zawadzki, 
Woodward, Sokolowski, Boon, Wong, & Menon, 2012). Such a link is consistent with 
McCleery and Claridge’s (2002) fully dimensional perspective. 
The presence of BADE is most commonly tested using tasks where pieces of 
information (either pictorial or details of a story) are sequentially presented to 
participants with decreasing levels of fragmentation, thus allowing less and less 
amounts of information to be obscured, or more details to be revealed (e.g. Orenes et 
al., 2012). BADE is typically defined by how long an individual maintains the same 
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response despite disconfirming details being revealed, and how plausible they thought 
their response was at each stage.  
 The general finding has been that delusional individuals have a greater 
tendency towards BADE compared to non-delusional participants (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2006; Riccaboni, Fresi, Buonocore, Leiba, Smeraldi, & Cavallaro, 2012; 
Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007; Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whitman, 
2006; Zawadzki, Woodward, Sokolowski, Boon, Wong, & Menon, 2012). More 
specifically, the deficit is in the ability to recognise the disconfirmatory nature of 
conflicting information, and then integrate this with their other knowledge in order 
to change their judgement (Woodward et al., 2006). 
 Another aspect of BADE  is that delusional individuals have a tendency to not 
be selective enough when deciding on a particular causal explanation (Woodward et 
al., 2006; Woodward et al., 2007; Zawadzki et al., 2012). Delusional individuals use 
fewer pieces of information before arriving at their decision (Garety et al., 1991; 
Freeman et al., 2008) compared to non-delusional individuals. Furthermore, 
Zawadzki et al. (2012) have tried to explain the underlying mechanism for this liberal 
acceptance bias as being due to a high need for closure in delusional individuals, 
demonstrated by a hasty decision making processing. Similarly, research has found 
that non-clinical individuals with high levels of schizotypal traits (as measured by the 
SPQ) took longer to change their initial explanation (on the BADE task described 
earlier), despite increasing amounts of disconfirmatory evidence being present, 
compared to low-SPQ scorers (Buchy et al., 2007; Orenes et al., 2012). According to 
Gray and Snowden (2005) schizotypes have more associative networks of knowledge 
and memory (which relates to odd beliefs and magical thinking), and are more hasty 
in their data-gathering and reasoning.  
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The Conceptual Link between Psychopathology and 
Conspiracy Theory Affinity 
The psychopathology literature bears some conceptual resemblance to the 
literature on CTA in a number of ways. In the first instance, I have discussed two 
major forms of psychopathology (schizotypy and delusional thinking) that are 
dimensional in nature. Similarly, I argued in the first chapter that CTA also likely 
exists on a continuum, with low levels of CT belief at one end, and a strong tendency 
to create CTs at the other. The key thing to note in both CTA and psychopathology is 
that in order for more extreme forms of the respective presentations to develop, an 
individual has to have worked their way up the continuum from the lower levels. 
That is, conspiracy theorising is unlikely to occur unless an individual is first open to 
believing CTs. Similarly, as discussed by Freeman et al. (2005) there is a progression 
from social evaluative concerns to paranoid delusions where severe threat is 
perceived.  
Second, the conception of what constitutes a CT assumes malevolent 
intentions of others’ (usually groups), which they intend to act out upon an individual 
or group of individuals (Moscovici, 1987; Pruitt, 1987; Zonis & Joseph, 1994; Keeley, 
1999). Indeed Freeman et al. (2005) conceptualised severe paranoid delusions to 
include conspiracy beliefs. Keeping their dimensional natures in mind, it may be 
possible that the stronger the paranoia, the greater the likelihood that one may be in 
transition from conspiracy belief alone, to belief in and generation of CTs. As 
mentioned earlier, previous research (Johns et al., 2004; Freeman, 2006) found that 
1%- 21.2% of their non-clinical samples had been affected by some level of paranoid 
thought in the previous twelve months. The severity of the paranoia varied across the 
sample (hence the argument that persecutory delusions are dimensional). A related 
interpretation might be that it is self-referential CTs (as opposed to CTs about others) 
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that contribute to paranoia. Freeman et al. (2005) has suggested that believing that a 
conspiracy against oneself exists, is experienced by a small portion of those who feel 
paranoid, but also represents experience of a severe level of threat. Thus, based on 
these findings part of the experience of severe paranoia could be perception of a 
conspiracy against oneself.  What is now needed is research that examines if there is 
empirical evidence of a link between CTA and paranoid delusions, which the current 
research aims to do. 
Third, if we are to follow Freeman et al.’s (2005) line of theory, then as with 
delusions, those with strong CTA may present with deficits in ToM ascription; the 
inability to accurately infer others thoughts (intentions) and emotions (Bentall et al., 
2001; Frith, 1992; Harrington et al., 2005a; Harrington et al., 2005b; Rector et al., 
2005). A fourth conceptual parallel is paranormality. According to Groh (1987) CTs 
can represent irrational beliefs about malevolent paranormal or non-paranormal 
forces exacting harm. For example, historical paranormal CTs about witches were 
characterised by both malevolent intentions. Therefore this CT relates both to 
paranoia, but also magical thinking.  Additionally, Pronin et al. (2006) have suggested 
that odd/magical thinking may be a heuristic style of reasoning used to infer causality, 
where similarly natured circumstances are judged to be causally-related. Certainly 
this has been found in CTA literature where Crocker et al. (1999) found that African-
Americans, a marginalised group with a history of victimisation, were more likely to 
believe CTs relating to discrimination of their racial group compared to White 
Americans. This may be at least in part due to awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
study that was responsible for the death of thousands of African-Americans (Bates, 
1990; Thomas & Quinn, 1991). Therefore when African-Americans are presented 
with a situation that resembles the Tuskegee study (e.g. high prevalence of AIDS 
among African-Americans), they may be more likely to believe a conspiracy of ethnic 
cleansing is at play.  
166 
 
 
 
 A particularly important aspect of MI is that it allows an individual the ability 
to preserve a sense of control over the outcomes of a situation in uncontrollable 
situations (Pronin et al., 2006). Similarly, a very salient finding and theoretical 
underpinning of conspiracy belief is that those who feel a low sense of control or 
powerlessness are more likely to believe CTs and to engage in conspiracy theorising 
themselves (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Groh, 1987; 
Hofstadter, 1965; Leman, 2007; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; Swami et al., 2013; 
Sullivan et al., 2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).  
The sixth parallel between strong CTA and psychopathology relates to 
information-processing biases. A stable information-processing bias seen in 
conspiracy theorists is external attribution style (which likely becomes more 
prominent as CTA increases), where they often demonstrate the fundamental 
attribution error (Clarke, 2002). That is, conspiracy theorists will focus blame on the 
disposition of the conspirators, to whom they can ascribe culpability for the low level 
of perceived control, at the exclusion of considering situational factors. This process 
can operate outside the conspiracy theorist’s awareness (Douglas & Sutton, 2008), or 
may be an overt strategy to create greater psychological distance between oneself 
(part of the ingroup) and the malevolent personalities of the conspirators (the 
outgroup). By emphasising the differences from the outgroup, by identifying them 
and increasing the awareness of their malicious nature, their power to influence the 
ingroup weakens, that satisfying one of the key responsibilities of being a conspiracy 
theorist (Mugny & Papastamou, 1982; Turner et al., 1979). Similarly, paranoid 
individuals have also been found to have an external-person-focused attribution style, 
rarely blaming situational factors for negative events (Craig et al., 2004; Kinderman & 
Bentall, 1996a; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996b; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997; Martin & 
Penn, 2002). 
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Review of the PNS literature in chapter two suggests that when one feels a low 
sense of control, or powerlessness, one’s response to this state can take one of two 
forms. A person may either show response inhibition or apathy towards their 
situation, or they may instead demonstrate high levels of response initiation. The 
latter group of people are likely to have a heightened PNS. If CTs as simple causal 
explanations are considered a form of response initiation, then some of the 
information-processing biases seen in conspiracy theorising could possibly be 
interpreted in the context of paranoia and schizotypy. First, Leone et al. (1999) found 
high PNS was related to a strong need for closure, dogmatism, and intolerance of 
ambiguity. Similarly, research in psychopathology has found that paranoid individuals 
also have a high need for closure. Furthermore, at least one study has found a 
negative correlation between tolerance for ambiguity and paranormal beliefs (Houran 
& Lange, 1996). Tobacyk and Milford (1983) also found that believers in some forms 
of paranormal belief (e.g. witchcraft and spiritualism) were also dogmatic in their 
beliefs, which therefore restricts their scope for attribution. 
In order to summarise the conceptual parallels between conspiracy thinking, 
paranoia, and schizotypy (which are all continuous in nature), Table 12 presents a 
tabulation of the related concepts outlined above.   
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Table 12 
Conceptual Parallels seen in Conspiracy Thinking and Psychopathology. 
 Conspiracy Thinking Paranoia Schizotypy 
Dogmatism    
Intolerance of ambiguity    
Need for closure    
External-person-focused LOC    
Low sense of control    
Heuristic reasoning style    
Jump-to-conclusions    
Apophenia    
BADE    
Social alienation    
Monological belief system    
Association with low mood    
Association with anxiety    
  
Similar to conspiracy belief, magical thinking is conceptualised as a generalised 
ideological trait, where holders possess monological belief systems, where feedback 
loops bear no influence on the system, and the individual is unlikely to alter or revise 
the nature of their beliefs (Goertzel, 1993; Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007). 
For example, belief in one type of paranormal belief (e.g. clairvoyance), may then 
predispose that individual to hold other paranormal beliefs (e.g. telepathy). Similarly, 
belief in one conspiracy tends to cultivate openness to believing other CTs (Goertzel, 
1993; Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Swami et al., 2010). An 
underdeveloped but related area of research has been the apparent immunity to 
disconfirming evidence seen in conspiracy theorists (Clarke, 2002; Groh, 1987; 
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Keeley, 1999; Leman, 2007; McHoskey, 1995; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Such a 
reasoning bias bears close resemblance to the BADE seen in paranoid and schizotypal 
individuals. If paranoia and schizotypal traits are empirically implicated in conspiracy 
belief, this may suggest that conspiracy theorists possess a general cognitive tendency 
to disregard contradictory information, whereby they do not fully process alternative 
explanations for events and are not fully able to accept their disconfirming nature. 
Another obvious similarity between conspiracy theorists and schizotypy is the 
sense of alienation and lack of close friends seen in both cases (Abalakina-Paap et al., 
1999; American Psychiatric Association, 2000; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013; Goertzel, 1994; Melley, 2000; Nefes, 2012; Srole, 1956; Volkan, 1985). A 
conspiracy theorist’s alienated lifestyle may therefore be because of both a weak 
attachment to society (feeling a low level of integration with society), but also 
rejection by peers because of odd behaviour and stereotyped speech. Fear of rejection 
may thus feed into development and maintenance of excessive social anxiety. To my 
knowledge, no research has investigated how conspiracy theorists feel about other 
conspiracy theorists. That is, examining whether they are dismissive of other 
conspiracy theorists, or whether they feel connected to them. 
Furthermore, Mirowsky and Ross (1983) have suggested that when a sense of 
powerlessness interacts with a sense of alienation, it becomes the first step in a 
developmental sequence of traits that may escalate to a paranoid personality. 
Researchers have suggested that paranoia is one of the factors likely to be implicated 
in the beliefs of conspiracy theorists (Hofstadter, 1966; Darwin et al., 2011).  
The second stage of the sequential trait development process is mistrust, which 
moderates the relationship between powerlessness and paranoia. Mirowsky and Ross 
(1983) proposed that this developmental sequence is really a stepwise progression in 
how alienated an individual feels in relation towards others, with paranoia signifying 
the greatest degree of alienation. These researchers defined mistrust as a loss of, or ill-
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developed, faith in others, and a developed proclivity to misinterpret the intentions 
and behaviours of others as being in the spirit of exploitation. Indeed, only a weak 
direct statistical relationship was found between a sense of powerlessness and 
paranoia, with moderate positive relationships between these variables and mistrust. 
When their data was entered into a path model, the findings revealed a weak positive 
relationship between powerlessness and mistrust, and a moderate positive 
relationship between mistrust and paranoia, suggesting that mistrust does bear some 
influence in the link between developing paranoia from a generalised sense of 
external control, even if only to a small-moderate degree.  
One of the most interesting links that can be made between conspiracy 
theorising and mechanisms of psychopathology is illusory pattern perception in both 
cases. Illusory pattern perception (or apophenia) refers to a phenomenon where an 
individual perceives meaningful connections between unrelated stimuli (see chapter 
two). For instance, apophenia has been implicated in MI, where MI individuals have a 
tendency to perceive connections between unrelated stimuli. According to Pronin et 
al. (2006) and Giannotti et al. (2001), MI individuals are more likely to make odd 
causal connections between stimuli that non-MI individuals would perceive as 
coincidental. Young, Bentall, Slade, and Dewey (1987) suggested that findings related 
to illusory pattern perception should not however be construed as a phenomenon 
seen pathologically, and that it more likely to be continuous in nature, where those 
experiencing psychotic symptoms are likely to show stronger illusory pattern 
perception. Consistent with this notion, Merckelbach and van de Ven (2001) reported 
that approximately 32% of their non-clinical sample demonstrated auditory illusory 
pattern perception, where they indicated they had heard Bing Crosby’s White 
Christmas  song, when in actuality all they were presented with was white auditory 
noise (a methodology first introduced by Barber & Calverley, 1964). These 
respondents scored higher on a self-report measure of hallucinations, and also 
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demonstrated a propensity for fantastical thinking which could be considered related 
to an odd or magical thinking style. Similarly, using a contingency judgement task, 
Brugger and Graves (1997) found that MI individuals did not require as much 
information as non-MI individuals to arrive at a hypothesis, and these hypotheses 
tended to be apophenic in nature.  
Apophenia has also recently been linked to delusions as well as schizotypy, 
where high scorers on scales of delusion and schizotypy (e.g. Peters Delusional 
Inventory and Schizotypy Traits Questionnaire respectively), were more likely to 
connect unrelated visual stimuli compared to non-delusional participants and non-
schizotypal participants (Fyfe, Williams, Mason, & Pickup, 2008). Fyfe et al. 
interpreted the findings pertaining to delusions as high delusion scorers having a 
tendency to over-mentalize contingency-related information, and that this may due 
to a hyper-associative processing style. Congruently, Vannucci et al. (2011) concluded 
that those who feel a low sense of control employ a more “liberal response criterion” 
(p. 529), requiring only a minimal amount of information in order to feel comfortable 
in making a judgement. This idea is consistent with research presented on JTC. 
Furthermore, these interpretations are very much in line with research conclusions 
that have been drawn regarding magical ideation, anamolous perceptual experiences, 
and cognitive slippage as a loose association network, where odd connections are 
made between unrelated stimuli.  
 The nature of the meaning-making processes seen in conspiracy theorising has 
also been attributed to apophenia. Dixon (2012) argues that apophenia is a type of 
experience which is formative of conspiracy theorising, and has a presence in both 
non-clinical and clinical populations. Accordingly he suggests that in mental illness a 
more extreme form of apophenia is seen, where an individual will be particularly 
stubborn in their abductive reasoning style, not altering their conclusions regardless 
of the type of information they have access to. With regard to the non-clinical 
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population, Dixon (2012) explains that a substantial part of life is the perception of 
patterns; however, people do not always get the opportunity to see if their 
interpretations of events are accurate. Therefore, without this feedback loop, CTs and 
paranoid ideation can perpetuate, and it can be difficult from a subjective point of 
view to construe what a real pattern is and what an illusory pattern is. Therefore, the 
lack of reciprocity with ones context through feedback and re-evaluation, can mean 
common-sense or rationality can be thwarted because such individuals do not allow 
opportunities for their perception to be adjusted.  
Indeed, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that those who generate 
CTs are vulnerable to illusory pattern perception, with regard to both visual patterns 
and situational perception (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Whitson and Galinsky (2008) 
assigned experimentally manipulated the level of subjective control their participants 
felt. Participants were then presented with visual stimuli of pictures. Half of the 
pictures contained a degraded image of an object (e.g. chair), whereas the other half 
of the pictures contained no objects, just “noise” like snow on television. High control 
participants did not perceive non-existent objects. Participants in the low control 
group perceived images even when there was no object in the picture, as a result of 
perceiving meaningful connections between unrelated visual stimuli. CT generation 
was measured by presentation of scenarios containing ambiguous information about a 
situation. Low control participants perceived meaningful connections between 
ambiguous pieces of information in the scenarios in order to explain the cause of the 
outcome described. High control participants did not present with this situational 
apophenia. Whitson and Galinsky (2008) concluded that when one experiences low 
subjective control, they are more likely to present with illusory pattern perception. 
Illusory pattern perception was interpreted by the researchers as an attempt to re-
establish some semblance of control but making order out of chaos.    
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Study 4: Psychopathology and Conspiracy Theory 
Affinity 
 The review above suggests that there are some conceptual and theoretical links 
that can be made between conspiracy belief and theorising and aspects of 
psychopathology such as schizotypy and persecutory delusions. However, very little 
research has examined an empirical links between psychopathology and CTA 
(Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013). Therefore, the key research aim of the 
current study was to elucidate to what extent believing in conspiracies is associated 
with markers of psychopathology such as delusional and schizotypal traits.  
Paranoid thinking was measured using three measurement tools: the Peters 
Delusions Inventory (Peters, Joseph, Day & Garety, 2004) which examines the 
presence of delusions as a general category. The Paranoia Checklist (Freeman et al., 
2005) and suspiciousness subscale of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; 
Raine, 1991) were used to allow focussed examination of persecutory beliefs and its 
psychometric presentation amongst conspiracy theorists versus non-conspiracy 
theorists. Schizotypal personality traits were measured using the SPQ. To allow 
examination of general psychopathological traits, the British Inventory of Mental 
Pathology (BIMP; Bedford & Deary, 2006) was administered. The BIMP also measures 
paranoia. Furthermore, in order to determine the association between conspiracy 
belief and a low sense of control, the Powerlessness/Mastery Scale (Pearlin, 
Menaghan, Lieberman, & Mullan, 1987) was administered to participants.  
In order to encourage diversity in the sample, an international online 
approach was taken towards data collection. Due to the potential stigma associated 
with being a conspiracy theorist (as evidence by the findings of Study 3b), this 
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methodology was employed to ensure the anonymity of respondents, thus excluding 
the effects of social desirability as much as possible.  
Hypotheses 
Based on extensive review of the literature, the following hypotheses were 
predicted. It was hypothesised that those with strong CTA will perceive lower levels 
of subjective control compared to those with low CTA. It was also hypothesised that 
those with strong CTA will demonstrate significantly higher levels of general mental 
pathology, paranoia, general delusions, and schizotypal traits compared to those with 
low CTA. 
 
Method 
Participants 
In total, two hundred and one (120 females) participants took part in this 
study. Ninety-four participants were general members of the public recruited through 
posters, Facebook, and email (see procedure section). The study was also open 
internationally, thus some of the participants are likely to have been non-New 
Zealand based. This portion of the total sample were eligible to provide their contact 
details to go into a prize draw to receive Motor Trade Association vouchers (often 
used in New Zealand to in exchange for fuel) as a token of appreciation for their time. 
The remaining participants were undergraduate psychology students enrolled at 
Victoria of University of Wellington, who received credit towards a mandatory 
course research requirement in exchange for their participation. Overall, participants 
were aged between 18-67 years with a mean age of 27.85 years (SD = 12.31 years). 
60.2% were New Zealand European/Pakeha, 9.5% Maori, 8% Asian, 8% European, 
4% New Zealand Pacific Islander, 2% Pacific Islander, and 1.5% Indian. Six percent of 
the total sample fell into the “other” ethnic category (including South African, New 
Zealand Asian, and New Zealand Indian). Ethical approval of this study was granted 
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by the Victoria University of Wellington School of Psychology Human Ethics 
Committee.  
Materials 
 See Appendix M for a full set of the measures used in this study. 
 British Inventory of Mental Pathology -36 (BIMP-36). This measure was 
designed by Bedford and Deary (2006) as a screening measure for general 
psychopathology, can be used as a tool for monitoring change in self-reported 
symptomatology. This measure (with the exception of one subscale – Euphoric mood) 
has been shown to accurately differentiate between clinical patients and non-clinical 
subjects and was designed primarily for use in clinical samples (Bedford & Deary, 
2006). Unfortunately there has been no publication of BIMP-36 norms to which we 
can compare the responses in the current study. The BIMP-36 is comprised by six 
subscales each with six items encompassing psychological distress, euphoric mood, 
persecutory beliefs, intrusive thoughts and acts, grandiose beliefs, somatic distress. 
Participants are presented with 36 statements tapping into a range of mental states, to 
which they respond true to indicate they experience that symptom, or false to 
indicate they do not experience that symptom. If the participant responds with ‘true’ 
for any items, they then answer an additional question about how much the symptom 
affects them on a three-point Likert-type scale. An example item is “Recently there 
have been people trying to poison me or do me very great harm”. The follow-up sub- 
question for this item is “If true, how sure are you?”, to which participants can 
respond by selecting one of the following options: ”not very, fairly, certain”. Each 
‘true’ response scores a 1, with the sub-question response choices scoring between 1-
3, depending on the severity of the self-reported effect. The degree of impairment for 
each subscale is also scored based on responses to the sub-questions administered only 
for items where participants responded ‘yes’. Although no norms for this clinical 
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measure are available, Bedford & Deary (2006) note that endorsement of 2 or more 
items on any of the scales qualifies as clinical disturbance.  
 Paranoia Checklist. Freeman et al. (2005) adapted this measure of paranoia 
from Fenigstein and Vanable’s (1992) 20-item measure of paranoia, in order to 
measure what would be defined as clinical levels of paranoia through a multi-
dimensional approach. The measure was designed in order to provide information to 
clinical samples about the epidemiology of paranoia-related thoughts in the general 
population. That is, the Paranoia Checklist was designed for use in non-clinical 
samples to screen for clinical levels of paranoia. The measure is comprised by 18 items 
tapping into the presence of paranoid thoughts, to which participants respond yes or 
no (yes responses receive a score of 1). Participants report the frequency of the 
paranoid thoughts, the amount of conviction with which these thoughts are held 
with, and the level of distress these thoughts cause them. Participants use a five-point 
Likert-scale is to respond the latter three sub-questions. 
 Peters Delusion Inventory -21. This inventory (PDI-21) was devised by Peters, 
Joseph, Day, and Garety (2004) to measure delusions that are not considered by most 
cultures to be normative. The PDI-21 was designed for use in the general population. 
Like the Paranoia Checklist, the PDI-21 takes a multi-dimensional approach to 
measuring this form of psychopathology. The measure is comprised by 21 items, and 
yields four subscale scores: the affirmative scale score (labelled such in this research 
for clarity), a distress score, preoccupation score, and conviction score. Therefore, this 
measure not only measures the presence of a range of delusional thoughts, but also 
the severity of the delusion in terms of how much a person believes their delusion, 
how much they think about it, and how much distress it causes them. Each ‘yes’ 
response scores a 1 (each ‘no’ response receives a 0) in order to comprise the 
affirmative scale (score range 0-21). Responses to the other three subscales were given 
using a five-point Likert-type scale to give a maximum score for each subscale of 105. 
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 Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ). This questionnaire devised by 
Raine (1991), measures the degree to which respondents possess schizotypal 
personality traits across nine subscales: ideas of reference, excessive social anxiety, 
odd beliefs or magical thinking, unusual perceptual experiences, odd or eccentric 
behaviour, no close friends, odd speech, constricted affect, and suspiciousness. These 
subscales correspond with the DSM-IV-TR nine core traits of schizotypy. This 
questionnaire is the most commonly used measurement tool for schizotypal trait 
identification in non-clinical populations, and has well known criterion validity for 
correctly distinguishing between those with clinically diagnosed schizotypal 
personality disorder (Wuthrich & Bates, 2005). Participants respond yes or no to 74 
items. ‘Yes’ responses score 1, with ‘no’ responses scoring 0. 
 Conspiracy Beliefs Scale. This measure was constructed by Wilson (2007) to 
gauge general beliefs in a range of common CTs (in the general population) 
encompassing both ones specific to New Zealand as well as more internationally-
known CTs. The questionnaire asks participants how plausible they think the CTs are. 
The questionnaire contains 30 items (e.g. “The All Blacks were deliberately poisoned 
before the 1995 rugby world cup final”). Participants rate how likely they believe 
each statement reflects actual descriptions of events using a 7-point Likert-type scale 
(response options range from “Not at all likely” to “Very Likely”). Possible total scores 
can range from 30-210. Higher scores reflect greater belief in the presented 
conspiracies. 
 Conspiracy Pattern Perception Scale. Conspiracy pattern perception was 
measured using this scale created by Whitson and Galinsky (2008). This measure was 
designed for use in non-psychiatric populations. This mode of measurement involves 
presenting three scenarios, each outlining an ambiguous situation. Participants were 
required to then rate to what extent they believed the events or other actors in the 
scenario were connected to the outcome for the protagonist. Participants responded 
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using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal”. A high 
score on this measure reflects stronger conspiracy theory generation.   
Modified Snowy Pictures Task (MSPT). The MSPT (Whitson and Galinsky, 2008) 
was used to assess visual pattern perception in the general population. Twenty-four items 
(plus two practice items) of granulated images (that visually looked similar to a snowy 
television screen) were presented to participants. In 12 of the items, objects were present, 
however even though the images were grainy, the objects were still discernible, e.g. 
chair. In the remaining 12 items there was no object present. Participants were told that 
some items may not contain an object. Participants were required to write one or two 
words to describe each item. They were told to simply write ‘none if they could not see 
an object. A further instruction for this measure was to not spend too long on any one 
item. Consistent with Whitson and Galinsky (2008), scores on this scale are calculated in 
three ways: total number of correct responses; object present correct responses (saying an 
object is present in an image when it really is; OP); and object absent correct responses 
(saying an object is present in an image when it is not; OA).  
Powerlessness/Mastery Scale. This 7-item measure was devised by Pearlin et 
al. (1981) to measure to what extent people believe they control the external forces 
that affect their lives. The scale was designed to examine the effects of stress in the 
general population. Participants rate how strongly they agree or disagree with items 
using a 5-point Likert scale.  
Procedure 
The same subject pool was used for both this study and Study 3b. Please see 
the procedure section of Study 3b for details.  
Results 
 Prior to analysis, all the measures were scored according to the scoring 
guidelines of the authors of each measure. The Cronbach’s alpha for each measure 
used in this study was then calculated (presented in Table 13). All measures 
demonstrated excellent internal reliability with the exception of the CPP scale and 
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the powerlessness scale. An alpha level of 5% (α = 0.05) was used for all statistical 
tests in this study. 
 
Table 13 
Internal Reliability of Study 4 Measures. 
Measure Number of items α = 
Conspiracy Beliefs Scale 30 .91 
Peters Delusion Inventory 21 .92 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 74 .95 
British Inventory of Mental Pathology 36 .90 
Powerlessness Scale 7 .39 
Paranoia Checklist 18 .95 
Conspiracy Pattern Perception Scale 3 .56 
 
Conspiracy Theory Affinity  
A first step to examining the data was to explore whether the two measures of 
conspiracy theorising (CPP and CBS) correlate. A significant relationship was not 
found between these two measures (r (199) = .09, p = .20). This may reflect that the 
two measures are in fact measuring two different constructs: one examines believed 
plausibility of CTs (CBS), whereas the other measures level of CT creation (CPP). And 
indeed when the two were combined and treated as a singular construct, this resulted 
in extremely poor internal reliability (α = .16). Therefore, rather than conglomerating 
the CPP and CBS into one global measure of CTA, a more prudent approach was to 
examine variations perceived plausibility and CT creation. A simple median split (two 
groups) across both measures may have obscured important relationships with 
moderate levels of CTA with psychopathology. Therefore, the data was analysed 
comparing the groups defined in Table 10.  
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Between-Group Differences 
Table 14 shows the means and standard deviations for each group by 
psychopathology measure. The means (and standard deviations) appear very low, but 
this is a result of the majority of participants responding that they do not have these 
areas of psychopathology, thus the means represent the small portion of participants 
who reported markers of psychopathology. 
A one-way between-groups multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
performed to investigate group differences in psychopathology. Twenty-six 
dependent variables were used (see Table 14), with the independent variable being 
group (level of conspiracy affinity). Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to 
check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted 
(Field, 2009). Using Wilk’s statistic, there was a significant effect of level of 
conspiracy affinity considering psychopathology on the whole (all dependent 
variables which were various measures of psychopathology), Λ = .42, F (69, 524) = 
1.98, p < .001; partial eta-squared = .25. Subsequent univariate tests revealed that most 
differences reached significance (see Table 14), with the exception of the persecutory 
beliefs and grandiose beliefs subscales of the BIMP-36. The intrusive thoughts, 
somatic distress subscales of the BIMP-36, as well as the constricted affect subscale of 
the SPQ almost reached significance with significance values equal to or below .056. 
 In order to specifically identify where the significant group differences lay, 
post-hoc Tukey Honestly Significant Difference test (HSD) were performed on each 
of the measures of psychopathology shown to have significant group (therefore 
excluding persecutory beliefs, grandiose beliefs, intrusive thoughts, and somatic 
distress subscales of the BIMP, as well as the constricted affect subscale of the SPQ). 
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Only significant group differences (using a confidence interval of 95%) are reported 
and presented in Table 14.  
With respect to general psychopathology, the LC/LP Group was significantly 
less psychologically distressed and demonstrated significantly lower overall levels of 
mental pathology than other groups. In terms of euphoric mood, significant group 
differences were found between the HC/LP group and the two lowest CTA groups. 
However, level of somatic distress was not significantly differentiated between any 
groups, and no other subscale group differences were found. Turning now to 
paranoia, the LC/LP Group reported significantly lower levels of paranoia in terms of 
frequency, conviction, distress, and overall paranoia compared to all other groups, 
except in terms of distress when compared to the LC/HP Group. No other group 
differences were found. The LC/LP Group reported significantly less delusions, 
experienced them significantly less frequently, which were held with significantly 
less conviction, and therefore causing significantly less distress compared to all other 
groups. Otherwise, the HC/LP Group experienced significantly more delusions held 
with significantly more conviction compared to the LC/HP Group; but significantly 
less delusions held with significantly less conviction compared to the HC/HP group. 
No other significant differences were found. The only significant difference in 
perceived powerlessness was seen where the LC/LP experienced significantly less 
feelings of powerlessness compared to the HC/LP. The most pronounced finding with 
regard to schizotypal personality features was that the LC/LP demonstrated 
significantly lower levels of most schizotypal traits compared to the other groups.  
The other notable finding was that the two moderate conspiracy affinity groups were 
significantly differentiated in terms of magical ideation and unusual perceptual 
experiences, with the HC/LP scoring higher in both respects.  
 Figure 9 presents the relative average level of paranoia of each CTA group. 
Figure 9 shows that the HC/LP Group demonstrated higher means compared to all 
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other conspiracy affinity groups on the Paranoia Checklist total score as well as the 
Suspiciousness Subscale of SPQ. The LC/LP group was visually distinct (lower than) 
from all other conspiracy affinity groups on these measures also. However, the 
Persecutory Beliefs subscale of the BIMP-36 shows no real differentiation across level 
of conspiracy affinity. Indeed, when Pearson’s correlations were calculated 
convergent validity was not established between these three measures of 
suspiciousness, indicating that they were not all tapping into the same construct. The 
Paranoia Checklist total score and the SPQ Suspiciousness subscale were strongly 
correlated at the .05 level (r(199) = .95, p < .05), however, the Persecutory Beliefs 
subscale was not correlated to either of the other two measures.  
 Given that the current study utilised a subclinical sample and none of the 
measures used were diagnostic in nature, it is not possible to make a determination of 
whether any of the groups reached clinical thresholds (e.g. on the BIMP-36) – 
particularly in the absence of normed data.  
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Table 14 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Between-Group Differences by Measure of Psychopathology. 
Measure 
Conspiracy Theory Affinity Group 
F (3, 197) 
Partial Eta-
Squared 
LC/LP 
n = 82 
LC/HP 
n = 86 
HC/LP 
n = 11 
HC/HC 
n = 22 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
BIMP-36           
Psychological Distress                .12a  (.19) .22b  (.27) .33b  (.38) .27b  (.24) 5.01*          .07 
Degree of 
Impairment 
 
.16a  (.29) .37b  (.48) .62bd  (.74) .42ab  (.47) 6.50          .09 
Euphoric Mood .07a  (.15) .11a  (.18) .24bc  (.28) .17ac  (.20) 3.93* .06 
Degree of 
Impairment 
 
.15a  (.31) .22a  (.36) .56bc  (.65) .37ac  (.43) 5.29 .08 
Persecutory Beliefs .01a  (.08) .01a  (.04) .02a  (.05) .01a  (.04) .19 .00 
Degree of 
Impairment 
 
.03a  (.16) .01a  (.08) .03a  (.10) .02a  (.11) .17 .00 
Intrusive Thoughts .06a  (.14) .13a  (.21) .12a  (.17) .16a  (.20) 2.70 .04 
Degree of .15a  (.36) .33a  (.52) .33a  (.50) .36a  (.43) 2.50 .04 
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Measure 
Conspiracy Theory Affinity Group 
F (3, 197) 
Partial Eta-
Squared 
LC/LP 
n = 82 
LC/HP 
n = 86 
HC/LP 
n = 11 
HC/HC 
n = 22 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Impairment 
 
Grandiose Beliefs .03a  (.11) .04a  (.08) .08a  (.16) .09a  (.20) 1.84 .03 
Degree of 
Impairment 
 
.05a  (.18) .08a  (.20) .12a  (.26) .18a  (.35) 2.12 .03 
Somatic Distress .16a  (.20) .20a  (.22) .33a  (.21) .23a  (.27) 2.22 .03 
Degree of 
Impairment 
 
.20a  (.27) .26a  (.32) .45a  (.31) .36a  (.54) 2.80 .04 
Overall Level of General 
Psychopathology 
.08a  (.10) .12ac  (.10) .19bc  (.13) .15bc  (.14) 5.87* .08 
Degree of Overall 
Impairment 
 
.12a  (.20) .20b  (.20) .34b  (.24) .27b  (.28) 6.30 .09 
Paranoia           
Frequency .09a  (.15) .28b  (.42) .45b  (.55) .38b  (.70) 6.37* .09 
Conviction .10a  (.17) .32b  (.46) .58b  (.69) .40b  (.67) 7.17* .10 
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Measure 
Conspiracy Theory Affinity Group 
F (3, 197) 
Partial Eta-
Squared 
LC/LP 
n = 82 
LC/HP 
n = 86 
HC/LP 
n = 11 
HC/HC 
n = 22 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Distress .09a  (.16) .28b  (.42) .38ab  (.43) .35bc (.65) 5.37* .08 
Total Scale 
 
.09a  (.16) .29b  (.43) .47b  (.55) .38b  (.67) 6.44* .09 
PDI           
Affirmative .18a  (.12) .25b  (.14) .41c   (.16) .27bcd  (.16) 10.70* .14 
Frequency .42a  (.37) .64b  (.43) .98bc  (.50) .77bd  (.57) 9.15* .12 
Conviction .54a  (.43) .80b  (.50) 1.56c  (.72) .89bd  (.63) 11.20* .15 
Distress .41a  (.34) .63b  (.47) .90bc  (.54) .75bd  (.54) 7.76* .11 
Total Scale 
 
.38a  (.30) .58b  (.37) .96c   (.44) .67bcd  (.46) 10.70* .15 
Power 
 
19.02a  (2.69) 20.73bc (3.14) 20.45ac (3.67) 20.77ac (2.33) 5.47 .08 
SPQ           
Ideas of Reference 
 
1.30a  (1.82) 2.87b  (2.47) 4.09bc  (2.63) 2.86bd  (2.80) 9.78* .13 
Excessive Social Anxiety 
 
2.40a  (2.27) 4.05b  (2.45) 3.27ab  (2.41) 3.95b  (3.20) 6.76* .09 
Odd/Magical Beliefs .72a  (1.09) 1.08ac  (1.35) 3.18b  (1.78) 1.91bc  (1.95) 13.35* .17 
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Measure 
Conspiracy Theory Affinity Group 
F (3, 197) 
Partial Eta-
Squared 
LC/LP 
n = 82 
LC/HP 
n = 86 
HC/LP 
n = 11 
HC/HC 
n = 22 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
 
Unusual Experiences 
 
1.48a  (1.50) 2.02ac  (1.69) 4.00b  (2.86) 2.72bc  (2.73) 7.75* .11 
Eccentric Behaviour 
 
1.33a  (1.79) 2.21b  (2.25) 3.36b  (2.42) 2.86b  (2.59) 5.73* .08 
No Close Friends 
 
1.56a  (1.96) 2.66bc  (2.66) 2.09ac  (2.07) 2.91ab  (2.65) 3.75* .05 
Odd Speech 2.29a  (2.24) 3.84b  (2.57) 4.64c  (2.46) 4.77cd  (2.81) 9.59* .13 
Constricted Affect 
 
1.43a  (1.49) 2.02a  (1.80) 2.08a  (1.87) 2.32a  (1.94) 2.60 .04 
Suspiciousness 1.15a  (1.63) 2.59b  (2.24) 2.91bc  (2.02) 2.73bd  (2.81) 8.53* .12 
Total Scale 13.66a(10.87) 23.35b(13.13) 29.64bc(15.29) 27.05bd(19.09) 12.23* .16 
Note. Means with differing subscripts within rows indicate significant difference at the p < .05 level. * indicates that p < .05. LC = low conspiracy theory creation. 
HC = high conspiracy theory creation. LP = low perceived plausibility of conspiracy theories. HP = high perceived plausibility of conspiracy theories.  
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Figure 9. Mean responses on measures of suspiciousness by level of conspiracy theory affinity. BIMP = 
British Inventory of Mental Pathology; TS = Total Score; SPQ = Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire. 
LC = low conspiracy theory creation. HC = high conspiracy theory creation. LP = low perceived 
plausibility of conspiracy theories. HP = high perceived plausibility of conspiracy theories. 
 
Illusory Pattern Perception 
In order to investigate illusory pattern perception within and across the 
HC/HP and LC/LP groups a MANOVA was calculated.  Using Wilks’ statistic no 
significant difference was found between the two levels of CTA (Wilks’ Lambda 
= .97, F(3,197) = 1.09, p =.37; partial eta-squared = .02). Examination of the means 
within each condition suggests that the HC/HP group showed a type II error 
where they were not able to identify objects that were actually present as well as 
they were able to identify when objects were absent (see Table 15). The opposite 
finding was true for the LC/LP group. No significant difference was found 
between the groups  
Correlations between the powerlessness scale and both object absent and 
object present groups were calculated. There was no significant relationship found 
between object absent (r(204) = -.07, p = .32), object present (r(204) = -.02, p = .77) 
and level of perceived control. 
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Table 15 
Mean Scores for Accuracy According to Level of Subjective Control. 
 Low control  High control 
 M (SD )  M (SD ) 
Object Absent .63 (.30)  .48 (.36) 
Object Present .56 (.19)  .56 (.22) 
 
Discussion  
 The aim of this study was to explore to what extent believing and creating 
CTs is associated with self-reported markers of psychopathology (general mental 
pathology, schizotypal or delusional symptoms). Two studies have previously 
considered psychopathology in the context of CTA, and have employed 
correlational methodologies to investigate this (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 
2013). A particular strength of the current study is that level of psychopathology is 
compared across various levels of CTA, thereby furthering our understanding of 
the role psychopathology may play in CTA development and maintenance.  
During the early stages of data analysis it quickly became apparent that 
more specificity in this research question was required as the CPP scale and CBS 
did not significantly correlate, and there are two possible explanations of this. 
First, either the measures were not representative of their underlying construct, or 
second, each measure may have been tapping into two different aspects of CTA (as 
conceptualised in Figure 1): conspiracy theory belief (CBS) versus conspiracy 
theory creation (CPP). Thus the findings regarding psychopathological markers 
were compared across four groups, each representing escalating strength of CTA. 
That is, the LC/LP reflects the lowest level of CTA, and the HC/HP reflects the 
strongest level of CTA. Comparative statistics showed that the majority of the 
dependent variables varied according to CTA. 
 It was hypothesised that compared to those with low CTA (LC/LP group), 
those with strong CTA (HC/HP group) would demonstrate significantly higher 
levels of general mental pathology, paranoid delusions, and schizotypal traits. 
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General psychopathology as measured by the BIMP-36 was found to be 
significantly lower in the LC/LP group compared to the other CTA groups, with 
the exception of somatic distress where no significant group difference was 
detected. Most importantly, the HC/HP group significantly differed from the 
LC/LP group in terms of psychological distress and overall mental pathology.  
Delusional ideation was first assessed using Peters Delusions Inventory 
(PDI; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004) to investigate presence of delusional 
thought, as well as conviction in the veracity of the delusions, frequency of the 
delusions, and the level of distress caused by delusions. In all respects the LC/LP 
group was significantly less delusional compared to all other groups. Of most 
relevance, the HC/HP group reported significantly more delusional symptoms 
than the LC/LP group in all respects, and experienced more and held more 
conviction in delusions than the HC/LP group. This provides support for the 
continuous nature of delusional ideation, at least in terms of the amount of 
delusions experienced, and similarly, when these delusions are experienced, the 
higher the level of CTA, and the higher the level of authenticity ascribed to 
delusions experienced. The PDI does not differentiate its results according to type 
of delusional theme experienced.  
According to the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 
delusions may embody one of five themes: persecution, self-reference, 
somatization, religiosity, or grandiosity; however, persecutory delusions are the 
most prevalent (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The literature has also 
suggested that conspiracy theorists (our main group of interest) are a particularly 
paranoid subgroup of the population; therefore paranoia was specifically measured 
in this study using the Paranoia Checklist (Freeman et al., 2005). The findings 
revealed that the HC/HP group was significantly more paranoid when compared 
to the LC/LP group with respect to frequency of experience, perceived 
authenticity, and distress elicited by the persecutory beliefs. In addition, with 
respect to paranoia, the LC/LP group was significantly less pathological than other 
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groups (with the exception of distress in one case – when compared with the 
HC/LP group). Finally, a greater presence of schizotypal traits was found in the 
HC/HP group compared to the LC/LP group, as reflected by a significant 
difference in the SPQ mean total scores.  
It was also hypothesised that within the context of schizotypy, those with 
strong CTA (HC/HP group) will demonstrate a higher presence of each trait 
compared to those with low CTA (LC/LP group). On the SPQ with the exception 
of the ‘no close friends’ subscale, a pronounced finding was that the HC/HP group 
was significantly differentiated from the LC/LP group. That is, the HC/HP group 
reported higher levels of eight of the personality traits associated with schizotypy 
(ideas of reference, excessive social anxiety, odd/magical beliefs, unusual 
perceptual experiences, eccentric behaviour, odd speech and thinking, and 
suspiciousness) compared to the LC/LP group. Of particular note, the finding 
regarding suspiciousness is consistent with findings pertaining to specific 
measurement of paranoia and delusions in general.  
Another expectation in the current study was that those with strong CTA 
(HC/HP group) would perceive lower levels of subjective control (as measured by 
the Powerlessness scale by Pearlin and colleagues, 1981) compared to those with 
low CTA (LC/LP group). Contrary to expectation, only the two lowest conspiracy 
affinity groups (LC/LP group and LC/HP group) were significantly differentiated 
in terms of how much subjective powerlessness was experienced. No other 
significant differences with regard to powerlessness were found. 
It was also hypothesised that those with strong CTA (HC/HP group) would 
demonstrate lower levels of accuracy in the ability to identify when a visual 
pattern does not exist compared to those with low CTA (LC/LP group). This 
prediction was not supported with no significant differences between the two 
groups in being able to accurate identify when visual pattern did actually exist. 
Finally, it was expected that there would be no significant difference between any 
CTA groups in accurately detecting that visual pattern that actually exist. Support 
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for this expectation was gleaned from the finding that both the HC/HP and LC/LP 
groups were relatively similar in their ability to accurately perceive visual patterns 
that did exist. 
 Overall in this study, psychopathology was defined as the presence of 
markers of schizotypy, paranoia, and general mental pathology. On balance, those 
who reported the highest level of CT plausibility and with the highest level CT 
creation (HC/HP group) showed a significantly higher level of psychopathology 
compared to those who do not CTs to be plausible and also do not create CTs. This 
finding is consistent with previous research suggesting that schizotypy and 
paranoid ideation are positively correlated with belief in CTs (Darwin et al., 2011; 
Hofstadter, 1966; Swami et al., 2013).  
 A number of researchers have asserted that belief in CTs is better 
conceptualised as a non-psychopathology motivation to understand one’s 
environment (Pratt, 2003; Raab, Ortlieb, Auer, Guthmann, & Carbon, 2013; 
Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009; Swami et al., 2013; Waters, 1997; Zonis & Joseph, 
1994). However, the findings of the current study suggest that psychopathology 
may play an important role in the development of maintenance of strong CTA. 
That is to say, belief in one CT is unlikely to be related to markers of 
psychopathology, however, those with a generalised ideological tendency to 
believe CTs (Goertzel, 1994; Leman & Cinnirella, 2007; Swami, et al., 2010) and 
also to create them are more likely to experience some form of psychopathology.  
 In this chapter I described literature that asserts that persecutory delusions 
and schizotypy (schizophrenia-proneness) is dimensional in nature (Chapman et 
al., 1994; Freeman et al., 2005; Freeman, 2007; Johns & van Os, 2003; Johns et al., 
2004; McCreery & Claridge, 2002; Mirowsky & Ross, 1983; Myin-Germeys et al., 
2003; Vollema & Hoijtink, 2000). Relatedly, the contention in this thesis is that 
CTA is also continuous in nature, where non-clinical populations can have low 
CTA and relatively low levels of psychopathology. Similarly, those with strong 
CTA are likely to be more vulnerable to some form of clinical disturbance. The 
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clinical disturbance is likely to take the form of odd/magical thinking, as well as 
paranoia about others’ intentions. Future research could investigate the covariance 
of CTA and psychopathology.  
Limitations  
There are some careful considerations required when interpreting the 
present findings. First, two of the measures used in this study had poor internal 
reliability: the CPP scale (devised by Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), and the 
Powerlessness Mastery Scale (Pearlin et al., 1987). However, it is important to note 
that measures with few items will often have low Cronbach’s alphas due to larger 
inter-item variance Cortina (1993). Therefore alphas of measures with few items 
should be interpreted with caution, as a low alpha does not necessarily reflect that 
the items of the measure do not all tap into the same dimension, and thus should 
not be discarded prematurely. Cortina (1993) discusses other methods of assessing 
the internal consistency of measures aside from Cronbach’s alpha, however, this 
was not undertaken in this thesis as previous research has been able to 
demonstrate the inter-group differentiation using the measures in question here. 
For instance, the CPP scale, had poor internal reliability in the current sample, 
although, while Whitson and Galinsky (2008) did not report the internal 
reliability of this measure for their sample, in their study, they found significant 
group differences (between their low control and high control groups) based on 
this measure. In this study it is unknown how much of a contribution the CPP 
made over and above that of the CBS, and particularly with regards to the HC/HP 
group, this could bear some influence on the interpretation of the findings. 
Additionally, the Powerlessness Mastery scale was administered in the present 
research with the purpose of measuring the extent of control participants 
perceived in their own lives, however, in this sample the internal reliability 
substantially below the recommended alpha of .70. In Pearlin and colleagues’ 
(1981) construction and testing of this scale, they did not report the internal 
reliability for their sample; however, they were able to demonstrate a significant 
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positive correlation between participants’ scores across two time points, which 
suggests the scale is stable across time. Cortina (1993) discusses how stability of 
responses over time is another important measurement of error important to 
consider when selecting measures for research. Ideally, a pre-existing measure of 
perceived personal control with excellent psychometric properties would be 
available; however, to the best of my knowledge, no such measure exists.  To 
circumvent this, typically researchers will randomly assign participants and 
attempt to induce low perceived personal control through some kind of activity. 
To confirm that this type of manipulation has been successful, researchers will 
sometimes conduct a manipulation check. For example after condition induction 
Sullivan et al. (2010) administered a short questionnaire asking participants how 
much control in general they felt they had over the direction of their life.  Given 
the fairly crucial requirement of a valid measure of perceived personal control to 
research like that reported here, future research should invest in development of 
such a measure.  
 A potential limitation of this study is that the order of presentation for the 
measures was the same for all participants. Whilst this was done due to the fixed 
parameters of the online survey tool used for this study, it is possible that the 
findings were affected by order effects where an earlier measure (e.g. the CBS) had 
a priming effect on the responses for later administered measures. Later versions of 
Qualtrics and other online survey tools such as Survey Monkey have a new feature 
where the order of presentation can be randomised across participants. Therefore, 
future research could capitalise on this randomisation function to prevent order 
effects. 
Another potential limitation worth acknowledgement is that in this 
research information regarding medical background or substance use was not 
gathered (e.g. through the use of a relevant psychometric).  Clinically speaking, a 
psychologist would typically collect this information to ascertain if the symptoms 
experienced by a client are a result of or influenced by a medical condition, 
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substance (including medication) or alcohol consumption, and whether these 
symptoms occur during intoxication or withdrawal from the substance or alcohol 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000; American Psychiatric Association, 2013; 
Kuipers, Peters, & Bebbington, 2006). Blood tests for toxin screens would also be 
recommended prior to any diagnosis being made. Because this information was 
not collected in this study, it is unknown whether high participant ratings on any 
of the measures were influenced by illicit substance or alcohol consumption, the 
effects of medication, or as a result of general medical condition.  
Summary 
In summary, the findings of this study support the contention that strong 
CTA is associated with significantly higher levels of psychopathology compared to 
low CTA. Future research will need to construct and test more reliable measures 
of CT creation in order to examine the extent to which conspiracy theorising is 
affected by underlying psychopathology. Although previous research has found a 
significant group difference in apophenia depending on perceived subjective 
control, when applying to this to strong CTA versus low CTA, a significant 
difference in illusory pattern perception was not found in the present study. Based 
on the contention that CTA can be conceptualised dimensionally, those with high 
CTA may have a stronger likelihood of developing a tendency to perceive illusory 
patterns visually, but also in their environment. Future research could seek to 
investigate this hypothesis using psychometrics with strong psychometric 
properties.  
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Chapter Five  
General Discussion 
“I’m only paranoid because they want me dead” 
- CT Motion Picture (Donner, 1997)  
  
 This body of work was born from the need to further our understanding of 
the role psychopathology plays in CTA. Previous research has suggested that 
schizotypy and delusional thinking are implicated in the tendency to ascribe to 
CTs (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013). One major underpinning of most 
CT research has been that perceived low personal control can entice 
compensatory strategies to restore a sense of control (LeBoeuf & Norton, 2012; 
Heider, 1958; Katz, 1960; Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010; McCauley & 
Jacques, 1979; Salt, 2008; Swami & Coles, 2010). Therefore a number of 
researchers have asserted that CTA may be better conceptualised as a rational 
process undertaken to re-establish perceived control, rather than a consequence 
of psychopathology. My overarching expectation in this research was that 
perceived low subjective control would be related to all CT endorsing degrees of 
CTA, and that psychopathology would be strongly associated with stronger levels 
of CTA as compared to weaker CTA.  
 I divided this work in to five broad categories: the facets comprising CTs; 
how people ascribe causality and why; the stereotype of “conspiracy theorist”; 
psychopathology; and what those with strong CTA think about “conspiracy 
theorists”. In chapter one I spent some time differentiating between those who 
may believe one CT compared to those who believe many CTs and also create 
CTs using a continuum I labelled CTA. I then went on to describe the content 
and structure of CTs; and perhaps most importantly, the function CTs serve for 
those who believe them. In chapter two I reviewed the literature on perceived 
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low subjective control, and how that can manifest with regards to how people 
ascribe causality for situations they encounter, and also how it can influence 
people to prefer situations characterised by certainty and closure.  
 
Key Findings 
 In my first two studies I examined illusory pattern perception, a 
phenomena sometimes seen in people who perceive low subjective control. In the 
first study I found that when a person perceives low subjective control and also 
has an odd/magical thinking style, they are more likely to perceive meaningful 
connections between unrelated stimuli. However, this finding did not extend to 
non-visual situational stimuli as has been shown in at least one previous study 
(Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). That is low-control participants did not perceive 
more CTs than high-control participants. Both findings were novel in that they 
were not consistent with previous research (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). 
 In the second study, I attempted to induce a perception of low subjective 
control in half of the participants by increasing their access to death-related 
thoughts (mortality salience), to see if this control prime induced more illusory 
pattern perception as compared to those in a high-control group. The key 
findings from this study were that those in the non-mortality salience group 
perceived significantly more conspiracies (situational illusory pattern perception) 
than the mortality salience group, and there was no significant difference 
between the groups in visual illusory pattern perception.  Additionally, self-
esteem was found to be lower amongst the mortality salience group compared to 
the non-mortality salience group, whereas the other personality variables 
(anomie, authoritarianism, and hostility) were fairly similar across the two 
groups.  
 In the third study I explored the stereotype of “conspiracy theorist” and 
the attributes people associate with the idea of a conspiracy theorist. Using 
correspondence analysis, cluster analysis, and analysis of variance, it was found 
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that people tended to consider conspiracy theorists similarly to those with 
current mental health issues. In contrast, conspiracy theorists were considered 
dissimilar to those without mental health issues. It appears plausible that people 
distinguish between these two groups based on how they well-adjusted they 
perceive the targets be, as well as how responsible people feel the targets are for 
negative events they have caused.   
 In study four I firstly measured the internal consistency of a CTA measure 
if we were to combine the CBS and CPP into one measure. The items of these two 
measures were not correlated possibly demonstrating that the two measures tap 
into different processes. This could provide support for the contention that CT 
belief and CT creation can be conceptualised as different positions on the same 
dimension (CTA). To my knowledge, this is the first time research has attempted 
to identify any differentiation between CT belief and CT creation, which have 
often been treated synonymously in previous research.  
 Furthermore, a key finding of study four was that those who strongly 
believe CTs to be plausible but also to create CTs were more likely to be 
experiencing symptoms of general psychopathology, psychological distress, 
overall delusional thinking, paranoia, and schizotypal traits, compared to those 
did not believe CTs were plausible and did not have a tendency to create CTs. 
The exceptions to this pattern of findings were that psychological distress 
expressed somatically (general psychopathology) and no close friends (schizotypal 
trait) were fairly equivalent between the two groups. This finding makes an 
important contribution to the literature regarding a) the continuous nature of 
psychopathological difficulties facing those with escalating degrees of CTA; b) 
that the psychopathology seen in strong CTA is not limited to paranoia, but also 
overall psychological wellness, as well as stable thinking styles (such as that seen 
in schizotypal personality disorder).  
 An important consideration born from the above finding is that with 
escalating affinity to CTs psychopathology is more likely. That is, the more likely 
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a person is to create CTs, the more likely they are also to experience some kind of 
psychopathology as compared to a) those who do not believe CTs; and b) those 
who believe CTs but do not create them. This finding is consistent with Freeman 
et al.’s (2005) perspective that persecutory delusions can be expressed through 
CTs, whereby CTs signify severe threat perception. The findings of the current 
research are also consistent with that of Darwin et al. (2011) who found that the 
stronger CT belief, the higher the presence of paranoid ideation and schizotypal 
traits. It is possible that in their sample, those who scored highly on CT belief 
may have also been individuals who also engage in CT creation, thus reflecting 
strong CTA. Similarly, Swami et al. (2013) also found that the greater the 
presence of schizotypal traits the higher the likelihood of CT endorsement. 
 Like the current research, both previous studies (Darwin et al., 2011; 
Swami et al., 2013) that have detected a relationship between strength of CTA 
and schizotypal traits have accounted for MI in their measurement of schizotypy. 
Furthermore, in the current research it was found that when MI and the 
experience of low subjective control interact, visual illusory pattern perception is 
more likely to occur. This suggests that those who are prone to an odd thinking 
style are more likely to make odd connections between unrelated stimuli, 
particularly in situations characterised by powerlessness in an attempt to re-
establish a sense of control. The findings of the present research may also suggest 
that low perceived subjective control in isolation is not sufficient to elicit illusory 
pattern perception. In contrast with the findings of Whitson and Galinsky (2008), 
in the current study illusory conspiracy pattern perception was not related to MI. 
One significant limitation of both the current study and Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008) was that no manipulation check was undertaken to ascertain if the control 
prime was successful. Therefore, it is difficult to identify if the findings of 
Whitson and Galinsky (2008) in relation to CPP were a result of perceived 
personal control, or some other unknown variable. Similarly, it is difficult to 
decipher whether the inability to replicate Whitson and Galinsky’s (2008) finding 
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is related to perceived control or another variable. Therefore, comparing the 
findings across these two studies is problematic. Certainly in future studies of 
where perceived personal control is manipulated, a control manipulation check 
would be crucial in allowing clearer interpretation of the findings. At present, I 
am left to conclude that the inconsistency in findings could be due to either an 
ineffective control prime, an ineffective measure of CPP, or that there simply is 
no significant difference in CPP between those who perceive low versus high 
personal control.  For this reason a different method of controlling perceived 
control was utilised in study 2.  
 In study 2, inducing mortality salience was reasoned to induce a sense of 
powerlessness, and thus may make it possible to detect a difference between how 
low versus high perceived control affects CT creation. Contrary to expectations 
and previous research (Newheiser et al., 2011; Sullivan et al., 2010), participants 
in the high-control group (mortality salience induced after other measures 
administered) perceived more conspiracy compared to those in the low-control 
group (mortality salience induced prior to other measures being administered). 
One reason for this finding may be that those in the low-control group responded 
with a proximal defence, where death-related thoughts were temporarily 
suppressed from awareness (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Another possibility is that 
access to death-related thoughts in the low-control group temporarily softened 
the level of experienced anomie, thus making perception of conspiracy less likely. 
This explanation is also supported by the finding that the high-control group 
reported higher levels of anomie than the low-control group. As frequently 
mentioned in this thesis, anomie is positively correlated with CT belief 
(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). Alternatively, integrating the findings of study 2 
with the LH research, the participants captured in the study may be individuals 
who when experiencing low perceived control (e.g. through mortality salience) 
display reduced response initiation (LH). This could account for why the low-
control group perceived significantly less conspiracy than the high-control group. 
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It is also important to consider Newheiser et al. (2011) examined CT belief rather 
than CT creation, and that Sullivan et al. (2010) looked at causal explanations in 
the context of low personal control. Therefore, Whitson and Galinsky (2008) is 
the only study comparable to the research in the present thesis relating to CT 
creation.  Future research should importantly consider distinguishing between 
different levels of CTA and how it is influence by different levels of perceived 
personal control.   
 When considering the findings across studies 3b and 4, on balance it 
appears that the stereotype of the ‘conspiracy theorist’ is of an individual who 
likely suffers some form of psychopathology, and that this stereotype is not 
completely unfounded. However, the fact remains that mental illness is a 
stigmatising condition (Bryson and Wilson, unpublished; Green et al., 1987; 
Olmstead & Durham, 1976; Walkey et al., 1981). Thus by CTA being considered 
similar to mental illness, believing CTs is also a stigmatised manifestation. In fact, 
CT belief is considered as negative as being a convicted criminal. Such 
stigmatisation suggests that conspiracy theorists are not valued members of 
society, despite the fact that actual conspiracies have been known to take place 
(e.g. the Watergate and Iran-contra affair scandals; Keeley, 1999).  
 On balance, the high CTA group demonstrated higher levels of 
psychopathology in terms of general psychological disturbance, delusional 
paranoia, and schizotypal traits compared to the lowest CTA group. This suggests 
that those who are more likely to believe and create CTs are more likely to 
present with schizotypal traits, persecutory delusions, and general pathology. The 
findings relating to schizotypy and delusions are consistent with previous 
findings (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013) who found that higher CT belief 
was correlated with a more schizotypal and delusional presentation. Although 
their studies did not specifically account for CT creation, one could assume that 
those with stronger tendencies to endorse CTs are more likely to create CTs 
compared to those with weak CT endorsement/belief. Interestingly, the high CTA 
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group did not report significantly more powerlessness than the low CTA group, 
nor did they demonstrate visual illusory pattern perception. This finding is thus 
in contrast with Swami and Cole’s (2010) suggestion that CT belief could be 
considered a rational strategy to restore a sense of personal control. Possibly this 
may be the case with lower affinity to CTs, however, the present research clearly 
demonstrates that some clear pathological mechanisms are implicated in stronger 
levels of CTA. That is, a psychological predisposition to have unfounded beliefs, 
deficits in interpersonal functioning, eccentricities of behaviour, and cognitive-
perceptual abnormalities think in odd ways is associated with a tendency to 
believe many CTs strongly and to create CTs. This pattern of findings provides 
support for the dimensional conceptualisation of CTA, where different levels of 
CT endorsement and creation can have accordingly different levels of associated 
difficulties. Previous researchers have postulated that low perceived personal 
control is an etiological factor for CT belief. However, based on the findings of 
the present research, a major conclusion of this thesis is that perceived control is 
not the only contributing factor influencing CT belief. That is, features of 
schizotypy, clinical paranoia, and overall psychological disturbance, is uniquely 
associated with stronger levels of CTA. What still remains unclear is whether the 
psychopathology causes strong CTA, or whether odd thinking patterns associated 
with strong CTA give way to formation of psychopathology.  
 Early research has suggested that some conspiracy theorists are not aware 
of their membership to the group, and sometimes belief in CTs operates below 
awareness (Douglas & Sutton, 2008). I was therefore interested in investigating 
how those with strong CTA stereotyped “conspiracy theorists”. The findings of 
Study 3c suggested that the strongest CTA groups were significantly more 
favourable in their judgement of the target Conspiracy Theorist compared to the 
two lowest CT affinity groups. Moreover, the greater the level of belief in CTs, 
the more favourably an individual was likely to judge the target Conspiracy 
Theorist. This finding suggests that those with strong CTA, regardless of their 
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conscious membership to the label “conspiracy theorist” appreciate the attributes 
of conspiracy theorists. Furthermore, strong CTA participants did not consider   
 
Strengths and Contributions of this Research 
 The first notable strength of this research has been the conceptual 
delineation between CT belief and CT creation. Most of the literature appears to 
treat the concepts CT believer and conspiracy theorist as interchangeable, 
however, the present thesis suggests that these different levels of CTA tap into 
different processes. At the less extreme end, CTA can be considered a rational 
attempt for control restoration, whereas strong CTA is associated with 
psychopathological processes. The dimensional nature of CTA is not completely 
new to psychological research as previous research has found positive correlations 
between CT belief and a range of personality variables (Abalakina-Paap et al., 
1999), and some markers of psychopathology (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 
2013). This reflects that the stronger the CT belief the stronger the presence of 
the personality variable or marker of mental illness. As outlined in chapter one, 
not all conspiracy believers will be conspiracy theorists; however, those who 
believe many CTs strongly are more likely to engage in CT creation. Thus these 
previous studies may have included participants in their sample, who at strong 
levels of CT endorsement may also create CTs. Therefore, CTA should be 
considered at least quasi-continuous in nature where beyond a particular 
threshold of conspiracy belief, a person is more prone to also constructing CTs to 
explain their world.  
 Another key contribution of the present research is confirmation that 
strong CTA has psychopathological foundations. Previous research examining 
markers of psychopathology has been correlational (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et 
al., 2013). However, the present research compared psychopathological 
difficulties across different degrees of CTA. Therefore, we can now conclude that 
conspiracy theorists are more likely to also experience psychopathology 
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compared to those who only believe CTs, or do not endorse CTs at all.
 Additionally, the present research was unable to replicate the findings of 
Whitson and Galinsky (2008) in terms of conspiracy illusory pattern perception. 
What I did found however, was that when a marker of psychopathology, MI 
(which is a tendency to make odd connections) interacted with perceived low 
personal control, participants were more likely to demonstrate visual illusory 
pattern perception. This finding suggests that low perceived subjective control in 
isolation cannot always account for CT belief. In fact, psychopathology can be 
uniquely associated with CT endorsement. It is possible then, that in samples 
where higher levels of psychopathology are experienced, there may be a greater 
tendency to create CTs. Future research comparing illusory pattern perception 
across various levels of CTA could shed light on this matter.  The contradiction 
across our studies will hopefully generate future novel ways of examining the 
potential link between the conspiracy theorising and lack of control.   
 
Theoretical Implications 
 The first aspect of this study worthy of further theoretical discussion is in 
relation to how conspiracy theorists are stereotyped. From 36 continuous 
descriptors, I was able to deduce the personality traits perceived to be 
characteristic of each target. This research suggests that the majority of people 
characterise those with active mental illness, conspiracy theorists and convicted 
criminals to be people who are emotionally unstable, argumentative, irrational, 
and discontent; whereas the remainder of the targets were deemed to be 
agreeable, emotionally stable, conscientious, and confident people. I arrived at 
this conclusion by mapping the descriptors used in the semantic differential study 
onto Goldberg’s (1990) taxonomy of personality traits and examining which 
personality traits were most closely associated with the quadratic distribution of 
the targets. 
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 There are a number of personality factor models suggested in the wider 
personality literature; however, Goldberg’s (1990) five-factor model of 
personality has received the most empirical attention. Some researchers have 
argued that questionnaires of this model are psychological constructions and may 
not accurately reflect the full breadth of personality traits that exists in reality, 
and therefore cannot be considered a theory of personality (Block, 1995). 
However, as argued by (Goldberg, 1993; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008), the five-
factor model was not intended as a theory of personality, but rather a framework 
for approximating how common personality traits are structurally and 
dimensionally related to each other. Therefore, for the purposes of this particular 
study, which was not focused on explaining how the personalities of conspiracy 
theorists develop, the five-factor model was applied here to understand the 
personality traits broadly stereotyped to be characteristic of the Conspiracy 
Theorist. Therefore, I believe this model to be sufficient for the purposes of the 
present research.  
 According to Stangor and Schaller (1996), stereotypes are cognitive 
representations that can serve a number of functions including providing 
explanations of others’ behaviour. One of the causes of stereotyping discussed by 
Stephan and Stephan (2000) is symbolic threat socially deviant/different groups 
are perceived to have on the ingroup. Accordingly in study 3b, it was 
hypothesised that targets were judged based on ascription of culpability and 
perceived psychological adjustment. Despite evidence that real conspiracies have 
been known to take place (Keeley, 1999), it appeared that participants judged the 
Conspiracy Theorist target to have poor psychological adjustment and low in 
culpability for their negative behaviour. Therefore, participants’ perception of the 
contrast between their own psychological adjustment and culpability (target Me) 
compared to the Conspiracy Theorist may have led to the wide distance between 
the two targets. 
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 Another theoretical implication of the present research has been that 
when a sense of low control is felt by someone who tends to think in odd or 
magical ways, this is likely to amplify their tendency to perceive patterns that do 
not actually exist. This interactive effect therefore may suggest that those with a 
tendency for MI may experience lack of control more strongly as an aversive 
state, or may be more likely to look for meaning between unrelated stimuli 
(illusory pattern perception) engage in illusory pattern perception rather than 
utilising other strategies for control restoration. 
 In a related study I induced mortality salience for half of my sample before 
administering visual pattern perception task as well as some measures of 
psychopathology, and they were considered the low control group. However, this 
group demonstrated significantly lower levels of conspiracy pattern perception 
compared to the high control group (who were given the MFODS after 
administration of the other measures and questionnaires). Mortality salience has 
been employed as a lack of control manipulation in previous unrelated studies 
(e.g. Newheiser et al., 2011), and were found to be effective. However, the results 
my study may be accounted for by the fear of death literature. Pyszczynski et al. 
(1999) explain the initial drop in access to death-related thoughts to be a result of 
an active suppression strategy, whereby an individual focuses their attention 
elsewhere to prevent being encumbered by fear or anxiety. This proximal defence 
strategy exhausts after a small elapse of time, and a subsequent increase in access 
to death-related thoughts ensues. Therefore, potentially if I had administered the 
MFODS, then one of the psychopathology inventories and then administered the 
visual and conspiracy pattern perception tasks; I may plausibly have found 
mortality salience to have effectively induced lack of control, and interpretation 
of those findings would be more reliable.  
 However, the mortality salience manipulation may have influenced the 
findings in another way. One personality trait the CT research consistently 
reports to be associated with belief in CTs in a sense of alienation or anomie 
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(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994). This means they are a group of 
people who feel low attachment to society. One of the findings of my research 
was that those not faced with mortality salience reported higher levels of 
alienation compared to those with increased access to death-related thoughts. It is 
possible that such thorough exposure to death-related topics as occurs with 
administration of the MFODs leads to more than cursory contemplation of death, 
and actually results in contemplation of life. This may at first glance appear a 
fairly zen interpretation; but nevertheless, the mortality salience group may have 
been inadvertently drawn to consider what they would miss about their world 
and their life, and temporarily feel more socially integrated (a stronger bond to 
society), thus reflecting lower self-reported anomie.  
  
Clinical Implications 
 Through this research I am not suggesting that having an enquiring mind 
is a negative thing. Some researchers have considered CTs to be 
harmful/dangerous false beliefs (Pfau ,2005; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). This is 
certainly not intended to be the take home message of my research. CTs often 
have the connotation of being bogus theories (Bale, 2007), and the findings of 
study 3b suggest that the label of “conspiracy theorist” is as stigmatising as having 
a mental disorder or being criminally convicted.  It is important to maintain a 
balanced view and acknowledge that whilst some CTs certainly have a far-
fetched flavour to them, there have been some instances in history where CTs 
have eventuated as actual conspiracies (Keeley, 1999). So while the term ‘CT’ 
evidently has many negative connotations, there is historical evidence that 
conspiracies do sometimes happen.  In fact, many consider it important that for 
example, politics should be characterised by transparent processes, and those who 
intend to or do harm others should be held accountable (Sasson, 1995) – this is 
the basis of democracy. CTs often ask questions such as how and why did this 
happen, who was involved, what can we do to prevent it happening again in the 
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future? What the findings of the present research do suggest however, is that 
strong CTA is associated with psychopathology. When unverified CTs are 
culturally transmitted, the consequences can be dire (e.g. loss of life and risky 
decision-making; Bird & Bogart, 2003; Bird & Bogart, 2005; Goertzel, 2010; Grebe 
& Nattrass, 2012; Hutchison, Begley, Sullivan, Clark, Boyett, & Kellerman, 2007; 
Nattrass, 2005; Nattrass, 2012; Ross, Essien, & Torres, 2006; Thorburn & Bogart, 
2005).   
 As I detailed earlier (chapter two), it is also important to acknowledge 
how important novel meaning-making can be for example, in the realm of 
scientific discovery (Petchovsky, 2008). Again, the interacting forces of odd 
meaning making and low perceived personal control may make a person 
susceptible to a style of pattern perception that differs from when people feel in 
control and do not make odd connections. 
 Considering the strength of the argument that lack of control is implicated 
(it is not the only contributing factor) in conspiracy theorising, clinicians with 
clients appearing to be experiencing high levels of psychological distress, social 
alienation, and impairments in the ability to function on a daily basis, should 
consider implementing strategies to increase mastery and enhance perceived 
personal as a target for therapy. For instance, encouraging the client to engage in 
activities where they can amplify their sense of control such as organising clubs, 
events, volunteer work, developing competencies that will improve the chance of 
promotion in the workplace. Interpersonal skills training may also arm the client 
with more confidence (and therefore more control) in relating to others, with the 
aim of re-establishing old relationships, or establishing new ones, and may also 
improve the level of social integration the client feels.   
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Limitations 
 Whilst this research has contributed significantly to this area of research, 
there are some limitations of my methodology that I would like to acknowledge 
and suggest future means of minimising such weaknesses.  
 
Tools of Measurement 
 First, I have some reservations as to the efficacy of the CPP scale as a 
proxy for conspiracy theorising. Whilst Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found 
significant group differences, my findings were less marked than theirs. There has 
been no published information relating to the CPP scale development or 
reliability to measure the construct, or any equivalent tool to measure CT 
creation. In my research the internal consistency of the CPP did not prove to be 
satisfactory. For instance, the Cronbach’s alpha for CPP in study 2 was only .49. 
Pallant (2002) explains that as the number items comprising a measure can affect 
the strength of the internal consistency and too few items can result with very 
small Cronbach’s values. In the case of the CPP, it is a measure comprised by only 
three items (with significant inter-item correlations), so potentially in future 
more items could be included to see if the internal consistency improves to a 
more satisfactory level (over α = .70). Low item numbers may have also been the 
issue concerning the poor internal consistency of the Powerlessness scale (Pearlin 
et al., 1981). Improving the internal consistency of any measure of low control 
should be a priority for future research as experimental induction of low control 
is associated with its own weaknesses.  
 Similar to previous research (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), studies 1 and 2 
randomly assigned participants to either the low or high control conditions, and 
then artificially induced a low sense of control for participants in the low control 
condition. A stable tendency to subjectively feel a low level of control may 
possible present differently from a transient feeling of low control. Thus, an 
effective measure of sense of control is considered here to be the best way to 
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investigate genuine illusory pattern perception, the significance of lack of control 
in its contribution to conspiracy theorising. 
 Finally, based on review of the literature (and hindsight), low control and 
its influence on the contribution to conspiracy theorising might arguably be more 
of an issue for individuals with a high personal need for structure (PNS). In 
chapter two it was argued that conspiracy theorising may be more likely in those 
with a high PNS. That is, individuals with high PNS have a strong motivation for 
simplicity, clarity, and predictability in their environment (Meiser & Machunsky, 
2008; Moskowitz, 1993). Thus when faced with complexity or uncertainty, high 
PNS individuals may be more likely to ascribe to CTs. Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008) found that participants with high PNS were more likely to demonstrate 
illusory pattern perception in the visual realm; however, they did not investigate 
this in relation to CT belief.  PNS was not measured in the present research in 
order to keep testing sessions to a reasonable duration, however, investigation of 
PNS (using the PNS measure by Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1992) in 
conspiracy theorising and psychopathology could be a fruitful avenue for future 
research.  
 
The Impact of Clinical Considerations 
 Arguably one of the most limiting aspects of study 4 was the lack of data 
collection relating to substance and medication use of participants. A conceptual 
link has been made in prior research that the paranoia or suspiciousness seen in 
conspiracy theorists are akin to the paranoid delusions seen in psychosis (Bentall 
et al., 2001). Psychosis with delusional features can also be substance or 
medication-induced (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Kuipers et al., 
2006). For the present research, the series of questionnaires and measures 
presented to participants was found to take 30-45 minutes to complete, and it was 
considered that an additional questionnaire could prove problematic in terms of 
fatigue effects on responding. Therefore, at the expense of this limitation, data on 
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substance and medication use was not collected. However, future research could 
consider collecting information regarding level of substance or medication 
consumption in order to rule out cases whose paranoia may be related to heavy 
substance or medication use.  
 
Future Directions 
 As I have outlined above, there are a range of considerations future 
research could consider in reducing the limitations that may be implicated in the 
present work.  Additionally, there are some a range of aspects of CT research that 
is deserving of future empirical attention. One particularly fruitful avenue for 
research may be the specific investigation of bias against disconfirmatory 
evidence in CT affinity using a BADE task such as used in studies of delusion and 
schizotypy (Buchy et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2002; Orenes et al., 2012). Previous 
research has suggested that the majority conspiracy theorists are not able shift 
their beliefs even in the face of contradictory evidence (Clarke, 2002; Goertzel, 
1994; Groh, 1987; Keeley, 1999; Leman, 2007; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). 
Therefore, direct investigation using the BADE methodological paradigm would 
be particularly relevant. Similarly, investigation of theory of mind deficits in 
conspiracy theorists would be an important contribution to the CT literature. A 
task such as the Character Intention Task as used by Sarfati et al. (1997) in their 
research of theory of mind deficits in schizophrenia could have utility in CT 
affinity research. Most importantly, future research should seek to clearly 
distinguish between variants of CTA when designing their methodology, so that 
interpretation of their findings can be more meaningful.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 Prior CT research has largely focused on which CTs are most commonly 
believed, and the personality variables most closely associated with the tendency 
to believe conspiracies. Another popular area of interest has been how belief in 
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CTs affect the decisions of the believers. For instance, the belief that HIV is a 
man-made weapon devised with the intention of genocide has been found to be 
related to less consistent safe sex practices, and therefore has implications for 
public health (e.g. Bogart & Thorburn, 2005). However, only very limited and 
correlational research has examined the link between CT belief and 
psychopathology. And at least one study has considered CT creation as a form of 
illusory pattern perception.  
 This thesis sought to take a cohesive approach to examining the factors 
implicated in development and maintenance of CTA to fill these empirical gaps. 
On balance, my research suggests strong CTA is associated with markers of 
psychopathology such as paranoia, schizotypy, and general psychological distress. 
Furthermore, when an individual with a magical or odd thinking style perceives 
low subjective control they are also likely to present with illusory pattern 
perception. Therefore, public perception of conspiracy theorists where they are 
associated with those who have current mental health concerns has a nugget of 
truth to it. However, unfortunately, public perception of mental illness is largely 
stigmatizing, and therefore, the similar perception of conspiracy theorists also 
suggests that it is a stigmatizing title to be labelled with. The personality traits that 
these targets judged on arguably relate to ascription of culpability as well as 
perception of psychological adjustment. 
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Appendix A 
Study 1 Measures 
 
Recall task: Low control condition 
 
Please recall a particular incident in which something happened and you did 
not have any control over the situation. Please describe the situation in which 
you felt a complete lack of control – what happened, how you felt etc. 
 
Describe here what happened in this situation where you felt no control: 
 
 
 
How did you feel in this situation?: 
 
 
Recall task: High control condition 
Please recall a particular incident in which something happened and you were 
in complete control over the situation. Please describe the situation in which 
you felt complete control – what happened, how you felt etc. 
 
Describe here what happened in this situation where you felt complete 
control: 
 
 
 
 
How did you feel in this situation?: 
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Modified snowy pictures task 
 
 It is helpful to be able to see objects quickly in spite of 
their being partially concealed by snow, rain, haze, darkness, or 
other visual obstructions.  
 
 Look at the picture below. What object do you see? 
 
 Sample Item 1:   
                       
 
1. ______Anchor______________________ 
 
By looking carefully at this sample you will see an anchor. The word 
anchor has been written on the line under this picture. Now try 
another sample. Write the name of the object on the line provided. 
 
 Sample Item 2: 
                                                                
 
2.  _______________________________ 
 
 
The picture shows a small boat sitting in the water. Boat, rowboat, 
or other similar words would be correct answers. 
 
Some pictures in this test may have no object in them. If you believe 
a picture does not have an object in it then describe the picture by 
writing 'none'. 
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Your score on this test will be the number of pictures of objects 
that you name correctly. Work as quickly as you can without 
sacrificing accuracy. If some pictures are difficult, skip them and 
return to them later if you have time.  
 
Do not spend too much time on any one picture.  
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Conspiracy Pattern Perception 
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Conspiracy Beliefs Scale 
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Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 
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Locus of Control Scale 
 
For each question below, please choose (tick) the statement that best reflects 
how you feel. 
 
1. 
   □a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much 
   □b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too 
easy with them. 
 
2. 
   □ a. Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad 
luck. 
   □ b. People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
 
3.  
   □ a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don’t 
take enough interest in politics 
   □ b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent 
them. 
 
4. 
   □ a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in the world. 
   □ b. Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognised no 
matter how hard he tries. 
 
5.  
   □ a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense. 
   □ b. Most students don’t realise the extent to which their grades are 
influence by accidental happenings. 
 
6.  
   □ a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. 
   □ b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage 
of their opportunities. 
 
7. 
   □ a. No matter how hard you try some people just don’t like you. 
   □ b. People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to get 
along with others. 
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8.  
   □ a. Heredity plays a major role in determining one’s personality. 
   □ b. It is one’s experiences in life which determine what they’re like. 
 
9. 
   □ a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
   □ b. Trusting to fate has never turned out well for me as making a decision 
to take a definite course of action. 
 
10.  
   □ a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a 
thing as an unfair test. 
   □ b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work 
that studying is really useless. 
 
11. 
   □ a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing 
to do with it. 
   □ b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the 
right time. 
 
12. 
   □ a. the average citizen can have an influence in government decisions. 
   □ b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much 
the little guy can do about it. 
 
13.  
   □ a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. 
   □ b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn 
out to be a matter  of good or bad fortune anyhow. 
 
14. 
   □ a. There are certain people who are just no good. 
   □ b. There is some good in everybody. 
 
15.  
   □ a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. 
   □ b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin. 
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16.  
   □ a. Who gets to be boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in 
the right place first. 
   □ b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little 
or nothing to do with it. 
 
17. 
   □ a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victim of 
forces we can neither understand, nor control. 
   □ b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can 
control world events. 
 
18.  
   □ a. Most people don’t realise the extent to which their lives are controlled 
by accidental happenings. 
   □ b. There really is no such thing as “luck”. 
 
19. 
   □ a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
   □ b. It is usually best to cover up one’s mistakes. 
 
20.  
   □ a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. 
   □ b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you 
are. 
 
21. 
   □ a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by good 
ones. 
   □ b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, 
or all three. 
 
22. 
   □ a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
   □ b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians 
do in office. 
 
23.  
   □ a. Sometimes I can’t understand how teachers arrive at the grades they 
give. 
246 
 
 
   □ b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades 
I get. 
 
24.  
   □ a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they 
should do. 
    □b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are. 
 
25. 
   □ a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that 
happen to me. 
   □ b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an 
important role in my life. 
 
26. 
   □ a. People are lonely because they don’t try to be friendly. 
   □ b. There’s not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like 
you, they like you. 
 
27. 
   □ a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school. 
   □ b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character. 
 
28. 
   □ a. What happens to me is my own doing. 
   □ b. Sometimes I feel that I don’t have enough control over the direction 
my life is taking. 
 
29. 
   □ a. Most of the time I can’t understand why politicians behave the way 
they do. 
   □ b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a 
national as well as on a local level. 
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Hostility Questionnaire 
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Self-Esteem Questionnaire 
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Anomie Authoritarianism scale 
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Appendix C 
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Appendix D 
 
Multidimensional Fear of Death Scale 
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Appendix E 
 
Study 2 Forms 
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Appendix F 
Semantic Differential Measure 
 
Participants were asked to rate the following twelve targets using the 7-point 
Likert-Scale for the tabulated descriptors: Me, The Average Man, Insane People, 
Depressed People, An Average Woman, Ex-Mental Patient, Schizophrenic People, 
Most People, Bipolar People, Multiple Personality Disordered People, Mentally-Ill 
People, Conspiracy Theorist, Convicted Criminal. 
 
Complicated 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Simple 
Unpredictable 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Predictable 
Strong 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Weak 
Foolish 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Wise 
Safe 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Dangerous 
Dirty 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Clean 
Relaxed 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Tense 
Worthless 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Valuable 
Delicate 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Rugged 
Slow 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Fast 
Warm 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Cold 
Insincere 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Sincere 
Powerless 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Powerful 
Isolated/Alienated 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Connected/Included 
Untrustworthy 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Trustworthy 
Hostile 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Friendly 
Aggressive 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Peaceful 
Arrogant 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Humble 
Restless 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Relaxed 
Cynical 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Accepting 
Imaginative 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Unimaginative 
Curious 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Uninterested 
Discontent 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Content 
Diabolic 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Good 
Suspicious 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Trusting 
Irrational 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Rational 
Emotional 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Objective 
Argumentative 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Agreeable 
Innocent 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Guilty 
Nutty 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Sane 
Mentally 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Healthy Mentally ill 
Manipulative 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Not manipulative 
Attention-seeking 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Avoids attention 
Understood 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Misunderstood 
Compliant 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Rebellious 
Normal 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Abnormal 
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Appendix G 
Wording used on Facebook Group Page 
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Appendix H 
Wording used on Facebook Profile Page 
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Appendix I 
Wording used in Initial Email 
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Appendix J 
Wording used on Posters and Flyers 
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Appendix K 
Online Survey Information Sheet 
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Appendix L 
Online Survey Debrief Sheet 
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Appendix M 
Online Survey Measures 
 
British Inventory of Mental Pathology – 36 
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Paranoia Checklist 
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Peters Delusion Inventory – 21 
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Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire, Conspiracy Beliefs Scale, Conspiracy 
Pattern Perception Scale, Modified Snowy Picture Task 
Please see Appendix A 
 
 
Powerlessness Scale 
 
Participants responded to the 7 items below using a 5-point Likert-type scale. 
 
 How strongly do you agree or disagree with these statements about yourself? 
 
1. There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have. 
2. Sometimes I feel that I’m being pushed around in life. 
3. I have little or no control over the things that happen to me. 
4. I can do just about anything I really set my mind to. 
5. I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life. 
6. What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me. 
7. There is little I can do to change many of the important things in my life. 
 
 
      
 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5  Strongly Disagree 
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